Source: Screenshots of an email from The Bell, 21 July 2025, and pro.thebell.io. I “subcsribe”* to a fair number of newspapers, magazines, and online media outlets. None of them would dare to charge me $348 or even $189 for a mere two newsletters a week. That The Bell asks so much for its meager output gives you an idea of how much it was previously receiving, directly or indirectly, from “grant funding for media outlets like us,” that is, from the U.S. government. ||| TRR
* The same typo was in last week’s “abbreviated version” of Russia, Explained.
A growing chorus of pro-Kremlin figures is speaking out against a proposed law that would impose fines for accessing or searching for online content labeled “extremist” by Russian authorities.
The bill, which was passed in its first reading in the lower-house State Duma on Thursday, envisions fines of up to 5,000 rubles ($64) for individuals who “knowingly” view or search for banned content. It does not specify how such activity would be detected, prompting concerns from experts about increased surveillance and possible abuse by law enforcement.
Yekaterina Mizulina, head of the Kremlin-aligned Safe Internet League, said the legislation could backfire on police, as well as those who support the Kremlin and help authorities in their crackdown on dissent.
“We actively monitor this kind of [“extremist”] content and share findings with law enforcement as part of our chartered mission,” Mizulina wrote on Telegram.
“What’s most striking is that under the draft law, even Interior Ministry officials monitoring such content could technically be acting illegally. And any private citizen who reports, say, [potential school shooters] to law enforcement could also face fines,” she added.
Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the state-funded RT news network, also criticized the bill.
“Dear government, tell me, plz, how are we supposed to carry out investigations and throw shade on all types of extremist groups like FBK if we are barred from even reading about them?” Simonyan wrote on Telegram, referring to Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, which Russia outlawed in 2021.
“I hope there will be changes,” she added.
Amnesty International, a London-based NGO, earlier decried the bill as “vague and overly broad,” warning that it enables arbitrary enforcement.
“Once again, the Russian authorities are disguising their relentless persecution of dissent as countering ‘extremism,’” said Marie Struthers, Amnesty’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia director.
“In today’s Russia, ‘extremist’ materials could be anything from a book promoting same-sex relationships to social media posts by opposition groups,” Struthers added.
The Kremlin on Thursday declined to comment on the controversy surrounding the bill, but acknowledged that the “issue has clearly sparked a strong public reaction.”
Authorities in Moscow currently maintain a list of around 5,500 banned “extremist” materials, including books, religious texts, songs, films and other media.
If lawmakers pass the bill and President Vladimir Putin signs it into law, it would take effect on Sept. 1.
My pupils at the St. Petersburg Jewish Community Center’s RFL/RSL (Russian as a Foreign Language/Russian as a Second Language) program for immigrant children), 2016. This was the day we let our hair down.\\\ TRR
Living in circumstances in which evil is consciously perpetrated every day, it is difficult to keep getting bent out of shape over stupidity and injustice. This is also true of the new law prohibiting migrant children without a proficient command of Russian from attending school — a completely outrageous law that has caused little public outrage. I feel the need to write about it, and yet I sense the utter futility of arguing against it.
When I was at art school, we had our own local confrontation with the authorities: they dreamed of banning coil water boilers and other heating devices because they were a fire hazard. We dreamed of keeping them because of the fact that we were working in our studios late at night, which is inevitable if you are studying to be an artist. The authorities shamed us, they threatened us with expulsion, and they confiscated our boilers, but the boilers inevitably reappeared. This is an example of how you can’t solve a problem through bans without providing a solution. If the director, for example, had identified some place on the floor where water could be boiled, it is likely that many people would have stopped boiling water in their studios.
This applies to the populist bill as well. Teaching children who do not speak Russian is an actual problem. Our country has a rather complicated curriculum even in elementary school, which, of course, cannot be successfully navigated by someone who does not understand everyday vocabulary. I’ve been told that some teachers just give children plasticine out of hopelessness: if they’re sitting and molding things from playdough, at least they won’t be a bother to anyone else.
So here is a simple answer to this problem: let’s ban these children from going to school. They can go to school only after they have learned Russian.
The question immediately arises: where will they learn Russian? Do we have an extensive network of educational organizations with readymade programs (even ones for which parents would have to pay) for teaching Russian to children and teenagers, where they can be sent immediately after failing the language proficiency exam? No, there is no such network. Perhaps it will emerge one day, but it doesn’t exist right now.
But we have the know-how of other countries which have been trying to solve similar problems for a long time. We can choose something suitable based on foreign know-how, such as allocating extra classes, hiring visiting teachers, and instituting adaptation classes. But a ban is not a solution.
Besides, bans hit the most vulnerable groups the hardest. Loving parents will find a way to help their children with adaptation by paying for courses or tutors. Those for whom no one cares, those for whom school is the only chance to change their lives, will be left out. And it is not necessarily a matter of their turning to crime, although the rule that if you don’t want to invest in schools you’ll have to invest in prisons is inexorable. It will affect girls, for example: if they can read and write a bit (so the story goes) that’s enough for when they’re married.
Most importantly, children don’t choose to move to or choose a foreign country. It’s not their fault that they don’t know a new language. So why are you punishing them?
In fact, they are being punished for being newcomers, for being strangers. A clear xenophobic message is packed inside this entire caper: these migrants shouldn’t come to Russia, and if they do come (someone after all has to work for cheap), they shouldn’t drag their families here. Legislators are not worried about schoolteachers (who really do have it tough), but about smoking out all the “aliens” from our country. That’s how the matter actually stands. And that’s why all reasonable arguments are more or less useless.
Russia has banned children who do not speak Russian from being admitted to schools. This is a completely inhumane decision which could have terrible consequences.
For two years I taught Russian at the Russian Red Cross, where I had two groups of children and one group of adults. The adults were mostly women from Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, and they were often learning Russian from scratch and were unable to study it elsewhere.
But the children whom I taught came from a nearby school. Our lessons were supplementary Russian lessons to speed up their integration. And after six months they were already speaking Russian perfectly well.
The usual situation for children whose parents have come to Russia to work is seeing their parents at home only at night, when they hardly communicate, because the parents have to work like crazy to earn the bare minimum for survival, to pay for housing, food, and a work permit.
If these children are not able to go to school, they stay at home and play on their phones or tablets all year long. At best they go for walks in the yard. (Often these children get into trouble, suffering burns and other injuries, because they are left to their own devices.) It is impossible to learn a language on your own at their age, nor do migrant workers have the money to pay tutors to come to their homes and teach their children Russian.
I don’t understand why the Russian government is doing this. Why are they now, in an apparent effort to save money, cancelling these children’s futures, their prospects, their opportunities?
So that in a few years we have a group of young people who can’t read and write? To reinforce racism? To reinforce the social divide — one set of occupations for locals, another set for migrant workers?
The very notion that there are certain others who are not supposed to study in mainstream classes unless they know the language is harmful to the locals as well. It is vital that children see other children with special needs, with immigrant backgrounds and other experiences of life.
At that age, language is easiest to learn at school, and ethnically mixed classes are a wonderful experience for children for later life. I know what I’m talking about: I live in emigration with my children. My youngest son has always been in multi-ethnic classes, and he has no concept of “us” and “them.” (It was funny: in the first grade he had a friend with whom he played all year long, but it was only at the end of the year that Rodion found out his friend’s ethnicity.)
Poor children, poor adults: what a mess our lawmakers have made of things. Recently it was Human Rights Day, and every time I think about it, I realize that migration is dangerous terrain where human rights lead a piecemeal existence.
Russian lawmakers voted Wednesday to ban migrant children from attending school unless they pass a Russian language proficiency exam.
The lower-house State Duma passed the bill in a 409-1 vote.
“Before enrolling the children in school, there will be mandatory checks of their legal status in Russia and their Russian language proficiency,” Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said.
The new rules will take effect on April 1, 2025, after upper-house Federation Council senators vote for the bill and President Vladimir Putin signs it into law.
Volodin claimed 41% of migrant children experienced “difficulties” with Russian language skills at the start of this school year.
The latest ban comes amid renewed anti-migrant sentiment following the deadly Moscow concert hall attack in March, which was claimed by the Islamic State and allegedly carried out by citizens of Tajikistan.
The fallout from the attack included police raids and deportations of migrants, a majority of whom come from poor former Soviet Central Asian republics.
Volodin said the Duma had passed a total of 14 bills aimed at “improving” Russia’s migration policy and combating illegal immigration since the start of 2024.
The draft law banning the enrollment in school of immigrant children who do not speak Russian has caused a flurry of outrage, its critics claiming that the decision will establish an insurmountable barrier to the integration of immigrants in Russia. However, if we shift our perspective and look at the bill not in a normative but in a positivе light, it pursues a quite rational goal — to institutionalize the exclusion of immigrants from Russian society. Their integration is not only seen as needless by the authorities and a considerable number of citizens (and yes, not only Russian citizens, but also citizens in many other countries), but is seen as an extremely undesirable process. That is, the presence of migrant workers as such is generally regarded as an unavoidable evil, but at the same time the political preferences are such that migrant workers should not be granted any rights at all while all possible obligations (including military service) should be imposed on them. Thus, the goal of policy toward migrant workers is to hire them only for unattractive jobs and pay them the less the better, never grant them or their children citizenship, never provide them with any social benefits (such as pensions and insurance), and if they squeak, hit them the full range of possible penalties. From this point of view, educating the children of migrant workers only generates needless complexities toward achieving this goal.
Bizarre Beasts, “Tenrecs Will Not Stay in Their Lane”
If all crustaceans “want” to look like crabs, then tenrecs “want” to look like basically any other small mammal. These weird little guys are endemic to Madagascar—they’re native to nowhere else on Earth.
Новый культурный (или мультикультурный?) код Европы (если это правда Финляндия). https://t.co/ktnP1D1fp0
— Геннадий Гудков Gennady Gudkov (@gudkov_g) July 7, 2024
Prominent Russian liberal in exile Gennady Gudkov wrings his hands over what the “coloreds” are doing to his Russian liberal fantasy “Europe”: “Europe’s new cultural (or multicultural?) code (if that really is Finland).” ||| TRR
We can build and work. We have been creating many new things — from cleaning firms [kliningovykh firm] and journalism projects to organizing impressive professional conferences and medical services the likes of which have never been seen!
We can overcome animosities and help one another! We have built outstanding platforms on the internet to help those who have it worse than we do. (However, it is still difficult to say this about the Russian opposition.)
Sciences Po and its Provost Sergei Guriev, a world-renowned Russian academic and economist who had to flee his country in a day in 2013, were honoured to welcome @Ekaterina_Schulmann for a very exclusive conference on 20 April, 2023. This political scientist and social media sensation guest speaker addressed the serious matters of the Russian regime stability and the dynamics of public opinion.
Source: Sciences Po (YouTube), 8 May 2023. My question, had I been in the auditorium for this fascinating lecture, would have been to the audience: how many of you are neither Russian nationals nor speak Russian? I suspect that the numbers of such non-Russian nationals and non-Russian speakers were quite low. And why was this lecture delivered in English, not French?||| TRR
Source: unsolicited ad on Facebook
On 2 July 2024, International Law Club successfully organized an academic discourse entitled “Russia and NATO: Ceasefire in Ukraine.”
The speakers for the program included Dr. Yubaraj Sangroula (Professor of International Law), Dipak Gyawali (Former Minister of Ministry of Water Resources, Nepal), Dr. Govind Kusum (Former Secretary of Ministry of Home Affairs), Prem Chandra Rai (From Himalayan Development Affairs Council, Nepal), Yugichha Sangroula (Masters in International Humanitarian Law from Geneva), Dmitry Stefanovich (From IMEMO RAS, Moscow)
The welcoming remarks for the discourse were delivered by Anton Maslov, First Secretary and Director of the Russian House. The distinguished Chief Guest of the program was Seniormost Advocate Krishna Prasad Bhandari.
Dr. Dipak Gyawali provided valuable insights into the historical context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, emphasizing its longstanding nature within the framework of NATO-Russia dynamics.
Professor Dr. Yubaraj Sangraoula shed light on the hegemonic influences and Western interference in global affairs, highlighting the concept of a rule-based international order that has been divisive.
Assoc. Prof. Yuggichhya Sangroula emphasized the importance of interpreting international law in a balanced manner, noting the significant contributions of Asian nations to its development alongside European nations.
Assoc. Prof. Prem Chandra Rai advocated for adherence to the UN Charter as the foundation of international law, stressing the need for inclusive peace initiatives that engage all relevant parties, including Russia.
Dr. Govind P. Kusum underscored the disproportionate impact of global conflicts on developing nations and emphasized the urgent global need for peace and security.
Mr. Dmitry Stefanovich discussed the inadequacy of mere ceasefires and called for sustainable solutions and increased global cooperation, particularly from the Global South, to address ongoing conflicts.
The subsequent question and answer session facilitated critical discussions on ceasefire strategies and institutional reform. Speakers analyzed geopolitical dynamics, and Western dominance, and proposed measures for achieving global peace and security, with a focus on strategies applicable to third-world nations.
Overall, the seminar provided a platform for robust dialogue and strategic insights into resolving international conflicts and fostering a more peaceful world order.
We sincerely express our gratitude towards the speakers, guests, and participants for their involvement.
The Club would like to thank the Russian House, especially the Director of Russian House, Mr. Anton Maslov for supporting us in organizing this academic discourse and acknowledge the presence of Ms. Alena Danilova, Press Secretary from the Russian Embassy at this program of ours.
Our team is thrilled to present an incredible interview featuring Yana, a 28-year-old Ukrainian volunteer who has recently returned from Avdiivka. It’s a highly illustrative story showcasing how people, specifically young Ukrainian women, continue to support Ukrainian troops on the most dangerous frontlines. If you’re curious about what’s happening in Avdiivka and wish to hear a firsthand account from a location typically closed off to journalists and the general public, look no further. We found her answers insightful, so don’t miss out!
FI (Frontelligence Insight): Hello! Could you please provide a brief introduction and tell us more about yourself?
Y (Yana): My name is Yana, and I am 28 years old. Before the full-scale invasion, I worked in the construction industry as a manager of construction projects. I dedicated a lot of time to learning English and took additional courses in ArchiCAD and LIRA-SAPR. A significant part of my free time and, in general, my life, was devoted to studying and improving my knowledge in the field of design. However, after February 24, everything changed. All construction projects that were planned for 2022-23 were canceled and frozen. Currently, I am busy in the field related to my economics education.
FI: How and when did the war start for you?
Y: The war began for me in 2014. It was a very challenging period during which I experienced depression. I constantly felt unwell both physically and morally. Of course, this affected the learning process, at times impacting my performance, interaction, and communication with people. I worked with a psychologist. It was a huge blow for me to realize that, 1000 km away from where I was living, studying, and currently residing, the most terrible thing was happening – war. It was surreal for me that while I was performing mundane actions, someone was dying, someone was getting injured, homes were destroyed. It was shocking to see that despite these events, people could calmly attend classes, go to work, cafes, and clubs.
A part of what I loved was forever lost in 2014. It tore me apart to think that while I was attending an accounting class, there were ongoing military actions in the Donbas region. It was also challenging because many people said, “They themselves called for the Russian world,” “They wanted Putin,” “It’s because of them that there’s a war.” These were people who never knew the history of Eastern Ukraine and never understood it.
FI: When and why did you decide to become a volunteer?(In Ukraine, the term “volunteer” refers to individuals engaged in providing military and humanitarian aid to both military personnel and civilians. These volunteers contribute by fundraising, purchasing, and delivering essential goods to military units and civilians on the frontlines.)
Y: It seems that, like many others, it all started for me with weaving camouflage nets. Yes, there were requests for them, and we were told how important it was and how it helps our defenders. It was enough for me as a second-year student at that time. But, as I shared earlier, I found these events deeply painful, and I wanted to do more. I spent my entire scholarship on supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU). It wasn’t about large-scale fundraising; I didn’t inquire about who was buying what and why. We had local volunteers and civic organizations in Chernivtsi (which are still active), and I financially supported them. It was important to me. At that time, intense battles were taking place in Donetsk Airport (DAP), Debaltseve, Ilovaisk, and so on. It was heart-wrenching, and I felt the need to be somehow involved in providing assistance.
Later, my mother and I started preparing homemade treats, and I delivered them to the military hospitals in our city. Every Tuesday, I would enter a random ward to visit the soldiers. There was a period when I consistently donated and supported the army without hesitation. Again, my mother always assisted me—whether it was making Easter bread for the soldiers or baking Christmas cookies to send to the front lines.
When the full-scale invasion began, on February 25th, my father and I filled our car with essential items and headed to the Territorial Defense headquarters in our city. We collected items for units that were being prepared and sent to the East. We were also helping civilians – by evacuating people from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kyiv oblast, and evacuating animals, transferring them to Europe. Only when I completed my second higher education in May 2022 did we start going on humanitarian missions directly to the frontlines.
FI: What is the essence of volunteering and who are volunteers?
Y: The essence of volunteering is perhaps in selfless work, in ongoing activities aimed not at gaining profit or any other additional benefits. Volunteering is, above all, the opportunity to influence environment, to initiate one’s own projects, and to change the country. When people become volunteers, they not only get a chance to express themselves, get new knowledge and skills, but also strive to make the lives of others better.
I believe that each person who calls themselves a “volunteer” has their own motives that prompted them to engage in this activity. For me, it is primarily patriotism and the fact that my country is at war. Parts of our land are immersed in pain, suffering, and blood. And then, it is about fulfilling the needs of the less fortunate, gaining new experience in working with people, organizing, and conducting various social projects.
Currently, the activities of the majority of volunteers and volunteer organizations in Ukraine are focused on helping the military, supporting refugees, and assisting people affected by the war. Because this is our own, our homeland, and I simply cannot comprehend or accept how one can be indifferent to this movement in such challenging times.
FI: You’ve been to many cities and villages that were destroyed by Russian forces. What impressed you the most during your volunteer trips?
Y: Oh, here one could talk for days and nights because for almost 2 years of trips to the front and near-front cities and villages, there were many different situations and moments when I could cry and scream from pain and despair, when we laughed, probably hysterical laughter, when we said goodbye to life dozens of times and rejoiced because an important evacuation had succeeded, and when we scolded ourselves for arriving late.
I approach each of our trips calmly. For me, it’s like going to work, with one important nuance. I perceive it as work because I go to various locations to work with civilians and the military, to help them.
This time, I’ll share just one incident from our recent trip. We were working specifically along the Mariinka direction, and we entered the village of Maksymilianivka, just 5 km from Mariinka, or more precisely, the stones and ruins left of it. Before the war, 3000 people lived there; now, there are probably around 100. Maybe more, maybe less – it’s hard to count accurately because it’s constantly under shelling, and people hide in their homes, rarely coming out. In Maksymilianivka, they don’t allow entry without an escort; everyone is checked at the checkpoint. And it was the last day of our trip: we traveled to Avdiivka and its surroundings, Bakhmut direction, Vuhledar direction – everywhere destruction, grief, no communication, and here we enter a house in Maksymilianivka, and there’s light. It so impressed me, and I said to my colleague, “Wow, there’s light here, it’s a real miracle!” In the midst of terrible devastation in the village, constant shelling, lack of communication, and internet just 5 km from the front line, we saw light in a house. The thing is, electricians stay there, and despite the constant threat of artillery, MLRS shelling, and Orlan drones, these people work until the last moment and provide light to the people who stay in the village. Our people will probably never cease to amaze me.
FI: Let’s talk about the painful – Avdiivka. Tell me about your personal impressions from the recent visits.
Y: Avdiivka is my personal pain and a wound that has probably been with me all my life. Working and helping in Avdiivka – I mean both the military and civilians – is like living another life. Perhaps, after the war, I will write a book about it because so much has been experienced there. A lot of things that I cannot always talk about, and things that need to be told and shown to those who come after us, so that these things and stories are not forgotten.
I remember Avdiivka differently, in every season, and, of course, it hurts every time… as if for the first time when, instead of a city, I see piles of rubble and construction debris, and on the way to the city, instead of the outlines of a giant industry, I see clouds of black-black smoke from the next shelling…
I’m not saying it for the last time because I know that we will still work in the Avdiivka direction – and the last time I was there on my birthday.
On November 18, we woke up at 4 in the morning to load humanitarian aid for civilians and equipment for the military, so that by 6:00, a maximum at 6:30 AM, we would already be in the city. Avdiivka now is 22 km of a constantly shelled road. There are sections where enemy UAVs are actively working, so, as we say, we need to “skip” quickly. We entered without headlights, quickly, with open windows in the car to hear enemy UAVs.
The landscape in Avdiivka changes every night. Dozens of air strikes per day turn the city into complete ruins. There are fewer and fewer places for shelter, constant “KABs” (Guided Aerial Bombs), the scariest thing imaginable, when a building collapses like a house of cards before your eyes – I’ve seen that only in apocalyptic movies.
If you work with civilians: humanitarian aid and evacuation – everything needs to be done in the morning and very quickly. After the morning, the Russians fly with Orlans (recon UAV); they observe, and determine where there are groups of people (3 or more), from which building smoke is coming from a home stove, and KABs target it. Just damned scum waging war on absolutely unarmed and defenseless people.
It’s very hard for me when through the window of a burned, black building with broken windows, I see remnants of life – a small intact chandelier that will never shine again, winter clothes on the shelves that no one will ever wear, and neatly arranged books.
But every damn time we enter this city, and at the entrance, Ukrainian flags greet us, it adds strength and motivation to move forward. I want everyone, both here and around the world, to realize the price we pay to see these blue-yellow flags in Avdiivka, and what irreparable losses we suffer. When I see our tired, exhausted soldiers who clearly say, “It’s hard, but we’re fighting,” I understand that we have no right to get tired and stop. I’m ready to sacrifice my health, but I will be sure that I did everything to protect and help the bravest people in our country and our city, Avdiivka.
FI: In your opinion, why is Avdiivka so important for the Russians?
Y: Avdiivka, like a bone in the throat of our enemies, has remained an impregnable fortress. Unfortunately, this fortress is now forced to defend itself. As they say now, “capturing Avdiivka is purely a political goal” for these damn Russians and Putin in particular. They need victories. But a victory over what? Over peaceful people who have been deprived of their homes or because they destroyed the entire city?!
Avdiivka is the gateway to Donetsk. From there, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the opportunity to control the presence of the enemy in the oblast center, even by preventing them from moving certain vehicles and ammunition around the city. So, of course, they want to push the front line away from Donetsk. Another point, Avdiivka is probably the only defensive area that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not lost from 2014 to 2022. That is, during the time when there were large and difficult battles for Soledar, Bakhmut, Lysychansk, Severodonetsk, etc., their advances in Avdiivka were insignificant. Only the surrounding settlements from Avdiivka were lost to the Russians, and that was very long and very difficult for them. And another logistical component. I believe and will always believe that Avdiivka is a symbol of resistance. Probably even the Russians understand this, and that’s why they are pushing so hard in this direction. You have to look at the map and understand that Avdiivka is precisely that outpost that, from 2015 to the present, has practically not moved forward or backward. It’s a strong defensive zone that has been fortified.
FI: Do you agree with the opinion that when the Russians cannot quickly surround a city, they systematically destroy it?
Y: Yes, I often think about it… Bakhmut, Popasna, Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Svatove, Kremenna, Mariinka, Vuhledar, Mariupol, Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Siversk, Soledar, and so on… and these are just the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk that Russia has destroyed, erased below the foundations. Once peaceful, flourishing, industrial or not, these cities may never be rebuilt. And how many villages? It’s impossible to count. Millions of destroyed homes and millions of shattered human lives.
And when they write in their damn publics about the “liberation” of Donbas, I am disgusted with this phrase. Because it is total destruction. In some points of Avdiivka, the destruction is so catastrophic, but it is still being bombed, that I can no longer remember what this city looked like before. Avdiivka is a city where no building is suitable for even a major reconstruction. Also, a key location in Avdiivka was the AKHZ – once the largest coke-chemical plant in Europe, and a city formed around it. If the plant cannot be restored, there will be no more Avdiivka. All the industry of Avdiivka is destroyed, ruined, and brought to a state where it simply can never function again. Probably, this is what they seek – to destroy even the industrial potential of this region so that after the war, it will be simply unusable. These are absolute degenerates, despicable degenerates with nothing sacred, who just, for the sake of entertainment or idiocy induced by imperialist propaganda, destroy everything: schools, hospitals, kindergartens, abandoned warehouse buildings, residential and non-residential buildings.
School in Avdiivka
When there is no success on the battlefield, they show their vile power through terror against civilians and through the total destruction of the city. Take, for example, Popasna – they just destroyed the city and announced that they would not rebuild it, and now they are using it as a military base.
FI: I know that many Ukrainians trust you and constantly try to help. Do you feel foreign aid from ordinary citizens or organizations?
Y: Yes, as strange as it may sound, during this terrible war, there are pleasant moments, such as meeting incredible and strong people or receiving feedback from people. Trust from the community is the best thing anyone can receive. And of course, I am very pleased to receive trust and support from my fellow citizens and from foreigners. Getting help and support from the civilized world is very valuable to us. I always mention and sincerely thank Ukrainians abroad and foreigners in general for supporting the Avdiivka front. Sometimes people, when they see where we are going, how and where we work, say, “I want to help the defenders of Avdiivka!” I repeat, this is very important to me. It is important that the world sees the crimes that the Russians are committing in the once-small industrial city of Avdiivka.
Avdiivka is currently closed to journalists, so it is important to show how the city lives and fights, that there are still civilians here, and that the Russians are committing genocide against them. I am very grateful to everyone who supports our fundraisers for the defenders of Avdiivka, and to those who simply support me with warm words and wishes for success, because now it is more dangerous in Avdiivka than ever.
FI: How can one help the defenders of Avdiivka? Are there any urgent needs that need to be addressed?
Y: Today, once again, I spoke with servicemen from the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade, who have been firmly defending this direction since March 2022. The primary need is for combat equipment! There is also a shortage of personnel. Additionally, there is a constant need for drones: daytime, nighttime, strike, and FPV drones for installing surveillance cameras on various objects. Maximum unity and concentration of efforts are required. We must show that we are a reliable and worthy support for our defenders on the front lines.
FI: After the war, what would you like to do?
Y: Certainly, I would like to return to my former job in the construction industry. I hope to resume working in the field of design. However, it is very difficult to imagine what life will be like after the war. In any case, I can never go back to my previous life. Our work will continue in one way or another, with a lot of tasks in the de-occupied territories, working with civilians, and humanitarian missions. But yes, along with that, I would still like to engage in design.
FI: What places would you recommend for foreigners to visit in Ukraine?
Y: Currently, this is a very difficult and painful question for me because dozens of places I would recommend to visit to immerse oneself in the culture, better understand the locality, and experience the uniqueness of the region are unfortunately either destroyed, no longer exist, or are in temporary occupation.
Of course, I would like to recommend visiting Donetsk – as we used to call it, the “City of a Million Roses.” Or Soledar, there was something to be surprised about in Soledar: remnants of the ancient Permian Sea, industrial objects, steppe landscapes, vast lakes, and even “Martian landscapes.” And, of course, the salt mines. There, the descent is almost 300 meters deep, where there used to be a salt mining museum, a salt football field, a naturally occurring salt crystal the size of a human, sculptures created by local craftsmen, and a special hall for symphonic concerts. I also really liked the Avdiivka quarry, or as the locals called it, the “Maldives of Avdiivka.” They used to extract quartz sand there. The former industrial zone eventually turned into a local landmark. It had clean and cool water. But many, many other places were destroyed and ruined by the Russians.
So, I would recommend visiting the Carpathian Mountains. Take a walk through the wooded hills and blooming meadows, and definitely climb the highest mountain – Hoverla.
If you enjoyed reading this, please consider supporting our defenders in Avdiivka – you can find more information on Yana’s account, or can directly contact her.
Russian troops are trying, for example, to capture Avdiivka. The bulge in the front line it forms enables the Ukrainians to easily strike at Donetsk, thus complicating logistics for the Russian military.
Both Ukrainian and western media write that the undoubted, albeit small, successes of Russian troops in Ukraine are primarily due to the huge number of soldiers and officers whom the high command dispatches to certain death, apparently, without the slightest pity or doubt. Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov was infamous for this terrible “tactic,” which today’s General Staff has adopted as a precept in its own military campaign.
The terrible loss of Russian soldiers and officers bothers no one, however. And Dmitry Medvedev (it is not very clear why he is the one) reports constantly about the new cannon fodder which he has succeeded in herding off to the front.
Is it a lot? No, it is not enough for Vladimir Putin, who has signed a decree ordering the authorities to recruit more cannon fodder, another 170 thousand men.
The dolphins got it good: they can just swim off when their cages are flung open by a powerful storm in Crimea. Russians have nowhere to swim, and nothing to swim for. War and murder shower a lot of money on a Russian man or his widowed family, and the war suddenly gives meaning to his hopeless existence.
Medvedev’s figures make it clear that the mobilization which everyone so feared will most likely not happen. And this means that it will not harm political developments, as it did last year.
But the authorities will not permit the men who were mobilized last year to go home, contrary to their promises.
The grass widows continue to demand the return of their men. They even wrote a manifesto, but all for naught.
Writer Denis Epifantsev suggests that the liberal opposition take advantage of the situation by getting involved and trying to assist both the wives of the mobilized and [pro-war] journalists in pushing their thoughts and arguments to their logical conclusion, thus regarding them as temporary and vital allies in informing the indifferent masses about the regime’s crimes. But no is likely to listen to him.
It takes a massive sum of money to feed, arm, and equip such a mob of men (i.e., the military) who are neither doing useful work nor are being taxed. They already figure in the Russian Federation’s budget for 2024: it is the highest expenditure on the army since the Soviet era.
Political scientist and economist Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that the Russian Federation will be able to weather even such fantastic expenditures for some time, but wonders whether the west will have enough patience to continue supporting Ukraine.
By the way, we must also take into account the embezzlement factor. Rosfinmonitoring head Yuri Chikhanchin reported to Putin that money allocated for defense spending has been cashed out! No surprise, eh?
Russian forces are intensifying attacks on the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka, seeking to encircle Kyiv’s troops there as Moscow’s war in Ukraine grinds on.
The fighting is reminiscent of a battle for another eastern city, Bakhmut, which fell to Russian forces last May after months of brutal urban combat.
Since Moscow launched its renewed offensive around Avdiivka in October, Ukraine’s top general and Western military experts have made downbeat assessments of Ukraine’s ability to break Russian lines.
In Kyiv and Western capitals, there is an acknowledgement that Russia’s full-scale invasion more than 21 months ago, which Moscow calls a “special military operation”, could drag on into a much longer war.
WHAT IS AVDIIVKA?
Avdiivka, which had a pre-war population of around 32,000, has been a frontline city since 2014, when it was briefly occupied by Moscow-backed separatists who seized a swathe of eastern Ukraine in what Kyiv and the West.
Avdiivka, much of it now damaged, is home to Ukraine’s largest coke plant, a Soviet-era facility which before the war was one of Europe’s top producers of the fuel.
The plant, which Moscow says is being used by Ukrainian forces as a base and weapons storage facility, is now the primary focus of Russian attacks.
Located just north of the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk in the industrial Donbas region, Avdiivka hosts deeply entrenched Ukrainian defences.
Today, just 1,500 residents – many sheltering in cellars and basements – are estimated to remain in Avdiivka, where officials say not a single building remains intact.
FIERCE FIGHTING
Ukrainian and Western analysts say Russia’s renewed offensive on Avdiivka, its largest operation since the assault on Bakhmut, is proceeding at an extremely high human cost.
In a Nov. 27 update, British military intelligence said the fighting had contributed to “some of the highest Russian casualty rates of the war so far”.
“Every day there are new fresh forces, regardless of the weather, regardless of anything – of losses,” one member of Ukraine’s 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade told Radio Liberty.
“But no matter what, they keep crawling, literally over the bodies of their own.”
Andrei Gurulyov, a Russian lawmaker and retired military officer, has said the offensive has shown the need for Russian forces to improve their ability to attack.
Russian war bloggers, whom the Kremlin’s media handlers have brought under tighter control, have acknowledged heavy losses on their own side but pointed to significant Ukrainian losses too.
The main war bloggers’ collective account on the Telegram messaging service – “Operation Z: War Correspondents of the Russian Spring” – has given its more than 1.3 million followers detailed accounts of what it says is the steady but hard-won progress of Russian forces in Avdiivka.
It has described how they have been using air strikes with targeting assistance from special forces, artillery, drones, helicopters, tanks and infantry against heavily dug-in Ukrainian troops.
Semyon Pegov, a prominent Russian war blogger who has attended Kremlin meetings with President Vladimir Putin, has described Avdiivka, which Russians call Avdeevka, as “a fortress” with numerous concrete-reinforced bunkers.
Pegov, who has likened the fighting to trench warfare in World War One, said Russian forces took control of Avdiivka’s industrial zone in recent days and that Russian cluster munitions were inflicting “huge losses” on Ukrainian forces.
The Russian defence ministry issues spare but regular updates. Unlike late Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose forces spearheaded the assault on Bakhmut, it does not offer predictions or set out its aims.
WHAT’S AT STAKE?
Both sides see Avdiivka as key to Russia’s aim of wresting full control of the two eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk – two of the four Ukrainian regions Russia says it has annexed but does not have full control of.
Avdiivka is seen as a gateway to Donetsk city, about 15 km (9 miles) to the south, whose residential areas Russian officials say have been regularly shelled by Ukrainian forces.
Pushing Ukrainian forces out of Avdiivka would be seen as enlarging the amount of territory Russia controls and making Donetsk city safer.
Seizing Avdiivka could boost Russian morale and deal a psychological blow to Ukrainian forces, which have made only incremental gains in a counteroffensive launched in June.
Mykola Bielieskov of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, an official think-tank in Kyiv, said taking Avdiivka would not “decisively” tip the situation in Moscow’s favour but “would make the situation more tenable for occupied Donetsk as a major Russian logistics hub.”
Bielieskov believes the campaign to capture Avdiivka is mostly driven by what he called the Kremlin’s eagerness to “strengthen the hand of Western sceptics” who are calling for a cut in military and financial support for Kyiv, citing the limited impact of billions of dollars in military aid.
I found this “hilarious” cartoon attached to an essay entitled “No Moral Equivalence in the Middle East,” but it serves just as well as an illustration of the sadly predictable “liberal Russian” ruminations, below. ||| TRR
Hello, dear readers!
This is the Moscow Times weekly newsletter at your disposal. Let’s hope that our friends, acquaintances, relatives, and just plain Israelis survive the barbaric attack by terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad with minimal losses. We’ll discuss the role the Russian Federation played in this attack below, immediately after a preview of this issue.
You will read:
about debt-ridden Russians;
about the demographic disaster in the Russian Federation;
about the civil war in Moscow thirty years ago.
But let’s go back to Israel. Yes, it has to be said that the Israeli special services, often called the best in the world, failed to fulfill their principal mission this time round. They were asleep at the wheel in the face of the most serious danger, and the country has paid for it with the lives of not only soldiers, but also of ordinary people. Israel has already lost at least 300 people, and many more have been seriously injured, while Palestine [sic] says there have been 250 victims [among Palestinians?], but the military [sic] operation against Hamas has only just begun.
Commentators have especially focused on the number of rockets that Hamas has managed to stockpile, and see in this the undoubted support of Iran and, possibly, Syria. Without its involvement, weapons or parts of weapons would simply not have got from Iran to Palestine [sic]. It’s geographically unlikely.
Here is what the Iranian Foreign Ministry had to say: “The protection of their land and shrines from occupation, aggression, daily crimes and terrorism on the part of the Zionist regime is the natural and legitimate right of the oppressed Palestinian nation.” And here are the words with which Vladimir Putin justified the invasion of Ukraine: “The purpose of the special operation is to protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years.” Putin has also repeatedly called the Ukrainian leadership “terrorists.”
Russia, unlike most European countries and the United States, does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization, and Moscow received its leader Ismail Haniyeh with all possible honors just a year ago. Now Haniyeh says that Hamas is going to seize Jerusalem—and the Russian Foreign Ministry officially agrees with him: Palestine [sic] should be returned to its 1967 borders and have its capital in East Jerusalem.
But the point, of course, is not in the verbal support that the Russian Federation has provided to Hamas. Russia, by unleashing a war in Ukraine, has shown that international law and diplomatic methods of conflict resolution can be ignored. We should also not fail to point out the consistent indecision of Western countries in response to Russian aggression. This indecision was undoubtedly noticed by Iran, which freely supplies weapons to the Russian Federation, and by Azerbaijan, which blockaded and then conquered Nagorno-Karabakh, and by Palestine [sic], which stockpiled a gigantic arsenal and has put it to use. The Russian Federation has shattered the world order with its actions, and considerable efforts will be required to return to the situation of three years ago, if at all it is possible to return to it.
Let’s finish with the statement made by the Taliban movement, who have also received a warm welcome in the Kremlin. The Taliban appealed to Iran, Jordan, and Iraq to let their troops go help Hamas conquer Jerusalem.
[…]
The Hamas attack is Israel’s Pearl Harbor for Israel, military expert Sergei Migdal argues [in his opinion piece] about the causes and consequences of the attack, written hot on its heels. If you want to read about the background of what is happening, then here is an almost academic article by Ze’ev Khanin, in which he clearly answers the question of whether it is worth negotiating with terrorists.
[…]
Source: Moscow Times Russian Service weekly email newsletter, 8 October 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader, who reminds his readers that the opinions expressed in the texts published in this almost-sixteen-year-old Russian zeitgeist chronicle may not coincide with his own. But how else would his readers find out that “liberal” Russians don’t regard Palestinians and many other Arabs (e.g., Syrians) as full-fledged human beings who can lay claim to the same rights and freedoms as “just plain Israelis” and “liberal” Russians?
Voting in prison is not a bad form of entertainment. Dozens of prisoners are escorted to the ballot boxes simultaneously, providing a rare opportunity to chat and exchange news with your neighbors.
We were assembled in the “gully” and launched in pairs into a room equipped for a polling station. The convicts had fun arguing who to vote for. Mostly, of course, there were juicy quotes from Leningrad’s song about elections….
“Elections! Elections! The Candidates Are Buggers!” The song, written by Alexei Kortnev for the theater production Election Day (2003), was performed in the eponymous film (2007) by Sergei Shnurov and Leningrad
With a clear conscience, I wrote “FOR RUSSIA WITHOUT PUTIN” on my ballot paper. After that, I conducted a spontaneous exit poll at the prison polling station, thanks to which it transpired that most of the inmates had voted for anyone, just not for [ruling party] United Russia. Only one of them admitted that he had ticked the box for [incumbent Moscow mayor Sergei] Sobyanin. The guy, however, is a United Russia activist himself: he embezzled a factory and is now serving a sentence for fraud. So it all makes sense.
And I also saw and hugged Sergei Klokov (Vedel) for the first time in several months. For a year and a half, the man has been doing time for a telephone conversation with relatives, bugged by the security services, during which the murders in Bucha were discussed. He looks tired and misses his family, including his two young children. But he is slightly encouraged by the news that Ukraine is willing to exchange its collaborators for Russian political prisoners. I hope Sergei will be released soon. He’s a good guy.
Olga Kolokolova’s campaign poster in the 10 September 2023 elections in Krasnokamensk (Perm Territory): “I’m for peace!” Image courtesy of Igor Averkiev
Olga Kolokolova, the head of the Perm regional branch of the Yabloko Party for many years, won the elections to the City Duma in Krasnokamsk (a satellite city of Perm). Moreover, she won running on the slogan “I’m for peace!”
Having received 55.2% of the votes cast, Olga Arkadyevna was returned to the Krasnokamsk City Duma, of which she was a deputy from 2005 to 2018.
Kolokolova is a veteran of the Perm loyal democratic opposition. (I say this without the slightest hint of judgment: the loyal opposition has its own positive mission, especially during periods when the regime relaxes the rules.) She is one of the most well-known politicians in Krasnokamsk, and the most consistent and most well-known Yabloko Party activist in the region.
Despite her status as a member of the loyal opposition, the election of Olga Kolokolova as a deputy in our time, and running on such a slogan, is really an unusual event, a kind of relic or vestige of the Putin regime’s bygone hybridity. In any case, it is impossible not to be happy for Olga Arkadyevna.
I went to see the spontaneous memorial to Prigozhin on Zolnaya [“Ashes”] Street [near the former (?) Wagner Center office building in St. Petersburg]. I have to say that what I saw impressed me. People kept coming and coming—young dudes and girls, men who were slightly older, and some people even had their kids with them. They brought flowers. They stood and looked for a long while. Some got down on their knees, and this one young dude crossed himself and genuflected. A Chinese guy was videotaping the whole scene and talking in Chinese, but it troubled no one. That’s him sporting a rucksack and filming point-blank the woman in the hat who is putting what looks like a whole bush of roses in a vase.
Hello, dear Moscow Times readers! This is your weekly newsletter, and we’re kicking off with the (near-certain) death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the man dubbed Vladimir Putin’s “chef.”
However, Prigozhin gained notoriety not for his culinary talents, but for his business ventures. He set up several enterprises that were extremely vital to the Russian authorities. The most well known were the private military company Wagner and the “troll factory” in Olgino, a suburb of Petersburg, which was used as a tool for influencing the information space in the Russian Federation and the world.
Trolls are fantastic creatures, and they vanished of their own accord, you might say, but apparently it was Vladimir Putin who put the kibosh on Wagner. The rowdy band of freewheeling mercenaries, who took their orders from god knows whom, has come to end.
We should recall, of course, that Prigozhin took a long time admitting that Wagner and the Olgino trolls worked for him. He acknowledged this obvious fact only in the midst of the war, and this was the first step toward the mutiny of 23 June and his (near-certain) death on 23 August. The public owner of an effective resource can either use it or give it up. Prigozhin didn’t feel like giving Wagner away—that is, transferring it to the command of the Defense Ministry (and take an oath, as Vladimir Putin has now ordered)—and so the strange mutiny that had such supremely serious political consequences happened, and, later, the Embraer jet plane crashed in the Tver Region. (It was the first time this type of plane had an accident involving fatalities.)
We interviewed people in the know about the moods among Russia’s elites to find out how they were taking the “chef’s” demise. We went further, though, asking several people who kept a close eye on Prigozhin’s rise and (alas, literal) fall to explain the meaning of the story that has unfolded before our eyes.
The first explanation comes from an observer in civil society who claims that the plane crash was caused by underlings going farther than they had been ordered to go. In fact, this observer argues, Putin did not want Prigozhin dead. Without his trolls and without Wagner, which had ceased to operate in the RF and had begun to be transferred to Defense Ministry-controlled outfits in Africa, Prigozhin was no threat to Putin. However, there were people (in the GRU, most likely) who believed that Putin would be pleased if they brought him the mutineer’s head on a plate.
The risks are the same as in the case of the late [Boris] Nemtsov [assassinated near the Kremlin in 2015]. After his untimely death, Prigozhin’s significance as a symbolic figure could increase and thus serve as a consolidating factor. We cannot rule out the possibility that Prigozhin’s memory will lead to the creation of something bigger than what emerged around the man during his lifetime.
The second explanation comes from an observer in the defense sector, who argues that we’re seeing a repeat not of Nemtsov’s murder, but of the death of Polish president Lech Kaczyński in 2010. (The official Polish Tu-154 plane carrying him and other Polish officials crashed while attempting to land in Smolensk, Russia. Many Poles believe that the plane was brought down by a bomb planted onboard by the Russian secret services.)
The hit squad didn’t go too far. On the contrary, [Prigozhin’s plane crash] was a carefully planned operation that was brought off nearly flawlessly. Although we can claim that such things don’t get done without Putin’s consent, there is no way to prove it.
The third explanation comes from a political spin doctor and frequent guest on YouTube channels. He wonders why everyone has decided that the passenger manifest and the presence of his personal effects [at the crash site] is sufficient to prove that Prigozhin was killed. We cannot rule out the possibility that Prigozhin and Putin made a deal and that Yevgeny Viktorovich will be the Kremlin’s secret weapon. I’m joking on this point, of course. But Russian realities are such that a man dies he shakes off all the bad stuff that happened in his life, and people focus on his admirable qualities. Look at Stalin: his bloodthirstiness and lack of principle have been forgotten, and no one remembers the terrible mistakes he made while running the country. He’s a winner, a victor. Stalin and Prigozhin cannot be compared, but nor can we deny that Prigozhin has been the most auspicious commander in the Ukraine war.
The fourth explanation comes from an opinion journalist and writer who asks us to the recall the Russian fairytale about the vixen and the thrush. The vixen terrorizes the thrush by threatening to kill its fledglings. First the vixen asks the thrush to give it something to drink, and then it asks the thrush to feed it, so the thrush helps it to steal food and beer. (The analogy here with the “chef” is obvious.) The sated and drunken predator then orders the thrush to make it laugh, and so the thrush alights on the heads of two peasants, father and son, who cripple (and even kill) each other whilst trying to beat the thrush. (Thus recalling the Olgino trolls and their work on the US elections, for example.) After the vixen has laughed its fill, it says to the thrush, Now scare me! The thrush raises a mutiny against the fox—oh, sorry, it gets hunting dogs to attack the vixen. Depending on which version of the fairytale you find, the vixen either gets killed or escapes the attack, but it is genuinely frightened.
Vladimir Putin wanted to have an alternative both to his own generals and to the supremely dangerous Kadyrovites. He came to count on Prigozhin to carry out sensitive missions both in Africa and the RF, but failed to take into account the man’s ambitions and got carried away. When Putin was faced with Prigozhin as an actual threat, he had to defend himself in earnest.
Russian Media Monitor, “Propagandist blames US, Ukraine and NATO for Prigozhin’s crash,” 24 August 2023 Thanks to Monique Camarra (EuroFile) for the heads-up)
Mykola Honchar lives in a crumbling stone house in what is left of a tiny hamlet of eastern Ukraine. The town was attacked by Russian forces in June of last year, as the Wagner mercenary forces were spearheading a renewed offensive.
Even before the Kremlin set Wagner loose to wreak havoc in Ukraine, the Russian campaign was notable for its brutality. But from the moment Wagner forces entered the war in April 2022, they earned a special reputation for bloodlust from civilians and soldiers alike.
To Mr. Honchar, the death this week of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, responsible for so much carnage in the war, would be fitting — a violent end to a violent life.
“He has blood on his hands,” said Mr. Honchar, 58. “If there is a god, god will figure out what to do with him.”
Even in a war in which civilians were shot dead in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, and the town of Mariupol was bombed into oblivion, Wagner and Mr. Prigozhin cultivated an image of brutality.
A video was promoted across Wagner-affiliated social media of the execution of one of Mr. Prigozhin’s own soldiers with a sledgehammer after he was captured and then released by the Ukrainians in a prisoner swap. While in custody, the prisoner had taped an interview saying he did not believe in Russia’s war.
“A dog receives a dog’s death,” Mr. Prigozhin said in the video.
By the time Ukraine regained Mr. Honchar’s village of Bohorodychne, Mr. Honchar was one of only two people left living in the village, once home to around 800 people.
The other person was Nina Honchar, his 92-year-old mother. He had stayed there despite the danger to take care of her. She died earlier this month.
He does not know if Wagner fighters were among the occupiers. “I did not ask for their documents,” he said. But he recalls seeing Russian fighters, who appeared to be on drugs, wandering around town in their underwear, their bodies covered with prison tattoos.
Wagner amplified its force by recruiting prisoners. After Wagner left the battlefield in June of this year, the Russian military continued the use of convicts as part of newly formed “Storm Z” units along the most dangerous front line positions.
To Mr. Honchar, it hardly matters under what banner the soldiers fought. The legacy of Wagner and Russian forces, he said, are one and the same: death, destruction and ruin.
“My brother and his wife were torn apart by shells,” Mr. Honchar said. Before he could bury them, he had to collect their body parts. “There was no skull, his hands were scattered,” he said of his brother.
Once he collected what he could find, he wanted to bury them in the local cemetery but it was under constant attack and too dangerous. He laid their remains in a trench and covered them with dirt.
When his 80-year-old neighbor died, he buried her in the crater of the shell that killed her.
Looming over the village is the Church of the Holy Mother of God, ‘Joy of All Who Sorrow.’ With its sky blue walls visible for miles around and majestic golden domes, it was once a draw for tourists and pilgrims.
Now its walls are blasted apart, one dome has tumbled to the ground and the gold leafing blasted away from another.
Video still of burning military recruitment office in Moscow Region. Courtesy of Moskovsky Komsomolets via the Moscow Times
Since the war in Ukraine broke out, protesters have set fire to military enlistment offices in several regions of Russia. The media has reported at least five such incidents. The people detained in these cases told police that they were trying to disrupt the spring recruitment campaign.
On February 28, a 21-year-old local resident set fire to the military enlistment office in Lukhovitsy, Moscow Region, to protest the war’s outbreak. After he was detained, he said that he wanted to destroy the archive containing the personal files of conscripts in order to prevent mobilization. Two weeks later, he escaped from the police station.
In March, military enlistment offices caught fire in Voronezh, Sverdlovsk Region, and Ivanovo Region. In all cases, local residents threw Molotov cocktails in the windows of these offices. The young men who started the fires in the Sverdlovsk and Ivanovo regions were detained. Both of them explained their actions by saying that they wanted to disrupt the draft campaign amid the hostilities in Ukraine. Moreover, persons unknown had scrawled anti-war appeals on local government buildings and shops in several towns in the Ivanovo Region before the blaze.
In April, Molotov cocktails were thrown at the military enlistment office in the village of Zubova Polyana in Mordovia. In this case, the protesters achieved their goal: the recruitment campaign was stopped. The rooms in the office where the data of conscripts were stored caught on fire.
The spring draft in Russia began on April 1 and will end on July 15. 134,500 young men are scheduled to be drafted into the army.
The Russian authorities have repeatedly claimed that conscripted soldiers will not be sent to fight in Ukraine. However, on March 9, the Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged for the first time that conscripts were fighting in Ukraine, and reported that several conscript soldiers had been captured.
On February 24, university student Anastasia Levashova threw a Molotov cocktail at an antiwar rally in Moscow. The court sentenced her to two years in prison for violating Article 318.1 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code, which criminalizes the use of violence against authorities.
Different people will react in different ways, of course, but for me two things stand out in the story of 19 year old Igor Ivkin of Pskov. First, I could’ve taught this kid. Others actually *did* teach him, but he reminded me of more than a few Russian students I taught English and History to over the years: good kids, salt of the earth, with their whole lives ahead of them. Now, just like that — and for no good reason — he’s gone.
Secondly, the beginning of Igor’s exchange with wife Yulia, as recorded here — when he says “I promise to come back” — cannot help but remind people of my generation (and older) of another Russian 19 year old soldier who doesn’t come home alive: Alyosha Skvortsov, the hero of Grigorii Chukrai’s classic film “Ballad of a Soldier” (1959), who tells his mother near the movie’s end “Mama, I’ll come back.”
The movie is set up as a retro-narrative, so the audience already *knows* he doesn’t make it back home; and that is part of what makes it an enormously effective cinematic moment in a film that is manipulative in both good and bad senses. The short version of a viewer’s reaction, in any case, is as predictable as it is earned: if you are unmoved when Alyosha makes his promise to his mother, you need to check your wrist for a pulse.
Finally, and hardest of all to take, is a third thought born of the first two: Alyosha Skvortsov died for a good cause, one that everyone remembers; Igor Ivkin did not have that honor, dying for a cynical parody-version of Alyosha’s cause that his country’s leaders keep advancing but can never justify.
These evil people somehow succeeded in making a fine young man, Igor Ivkin, husband and father, one of the Bad Guys in Europe’s first new-millennium war-as-morality story. He didn’t deserve that.
It is important to hold the people responsible for this accountable — and even more important to do whatever we can to end the Russian leadership’s war against Ukraine, a tragedy beyond any telling of it, as soon as humanly possible.
Source: Mark H. Teeter, Facebook, 8 April 2022. Thanks for his kind permission to reprint his remarks here.
Yulia Ivkina would have preferred her husband to become a carpenter, not a soldier.
But as the coronavirus pandemic dented the Russian labor market and the newlyweds from the western city of Pskov tried for a baby, 18-year-old Igor Ivkin reasoned a short-term contract in the army was the best option to safeguard his family’s future.
Igor enlisted in February 2021, shortly before Yulia realized she was pregnant. A little over a year later, he was killed in heavy fighting outside Kharkiv amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He was seven months short of his 20th birthday.
“People from the draft board told me about his death, they came to me with a death notice on March 25. He was buried on March 30 in the village of Vorontsovo where he was born,” Ivkina, 24, told The Moscow Times.
Igor Ivkin is one of at least 25 teenage Russian soldiers to have died fighting in Ukraine, according to a review of official statements and social media posts by The Moscow Times.
Source: James Beardsworth, Yanina Sorokina, and Irina Shcherbakova, “Born Under Putin, Dead Under Putin: Russia’s Teenage Soldiers Dying in Ukraine,” Moscow Times, 8 April 2022. Read the rest of the article by clicking on the link.
Grigorii Chukrai’s “Ballada” is the movie that probably best represents how Russia’s Greatest Generation saw World War II — or wanted to see it, rather, at a decade’s remove. The film is an undisputed classic of postwar Soviet cinema, combining a multi-dimensional, wide-angle depiction of Soviet soldiers & civilians during the war w/ the extraordinarily successful close-up manipulation (largely in a positive sense) of its sympathetic young hero (wonderfully played by Vl. Ivashov) and his 2 nearest and dearest (Zhanna Prokhorenko, Antonina Maksimova).
How was “Ballada” perceived outside the USSR? In an era when Soviet propaganda, actual and historical, was routinely dismissed in the West, Chukrai’s film was a revelation to American critics and audiences, producing an emotional reaction many art-house and festival viewers found overwhelming: as Time magazine’s awed critic put it, the movie “brings back the kind of catch in the throat that Hollywood movies used to achieve on occasion.” And indeed, if you find yourself unmoved as the teenage Private Alyosha Skvortsov tells his mother at the end of his odyssey through war-torn Russia, “Mama, I’ll come back” (“Mама, я вернусь”), you need to check your wrist for a pulse.
Some of the crew who made “Ballada” were unhappy w/ parts of the film during production, apparently, and some day an enterprising dissertation writer will tell us why. What emerged on the screen, in any case, became the most decorated Soviet-produced World War II film ever made, taking home something over a hundred international and domestic awards altogether (including an Oscar nomination).
Tune in and see what so impressed the world in the early 1960s about this groundbreaking Mosfilm effort — and then decide for yourself just how true its message rings two decades into the new millennium, when Moscow gears up to commemorate the next anniversary of what official Russia will always call the “Great Patriotic War.”
Source: Mark H. Teeter, Facebook, 8 April 2022. Thanks to him for his kind permission to reprint his review here.
It is no secret that I am now shooting a project dealing with the so-called people’s article [Article 228 of the Russian Criminal Code, which makes it a felony to possess over seven grams of a controlled substance; see the articles, below—TRR]. Among other things, I have been photographing people who were convicted under this article and interviewing them. Four months ago, I went to Novgorod to shoot Dima, who was on his own recognizance as his trial was underway. [Last] Friday, Dima, who is twenty-two, was sentenced to eleven years in a maximum-security prison.
Dima was not a dealer. He used synthetic drugs and, as often happens, he used them in the company of others. A couple of times he also used his Hydra account to buy stashes of drugs for friends and sent them photos of the stashes. At some point, the “friends” were detained, the photos Dima sent were found on their telephones, and Dima became a “drug dealer.” At most, he should have been charged with aiding and abetting, but the court refused to change the charges.
This is not a matter of right or wrong, but of whether the punishment fits the crime. Dima is guilty of using drugs and “helping” friends in such an irresponsible manner. Nowadays, however, the emergence of the Darknet and Hydra make it akin to a computer game: you can buy anything with a couple of clicks. I remember what my friends and I were like at the age of twenty-two: any of us could have been sent down like Dima. We lucked out, however, and he did not. Eleven years in prison! People get less time for rape and murder, not to mention assault and battery, domestic violence, and robbery.
We walked around Novgorod for five hours, conversing the entire time. Dima already had a different life: he had stopped using, improved his relationship with his girlfriend, and worked as a loader when possible. (Although Dima is a talented programmer, no one will hire you above the table if you are under investigation.) When he gets out of prison, society will punish him again. Among the people I have met, no one convicted under Article 228 who has served time or been put on probation can get a decent job above the table because corporate security services reject such applicants.
If any of my friends on Facebook know good lawyers in this area or foundations that help people convicted under Article 228 or have practical advice, be sure to write me and I will pass on these contacts to Dima’s girlfriend. His family is now preparing an appeal, and they need support and legal assistance.
Petersburg and other Russian cities are now chockablock with stencils and placards advertising illegal drugs like this one, which I photographed in March 2018.
The Stash and Its Master: Why Russians Are Becoming Drugs Couriers
Nataliya Zotova BBC Russian Service
June 10, 2019
With the spread of the internet and smartphones in Russia, a whole new profession for young people has emerged—stashers (zakladchiki) aka stashmen (kladmeny), people who deliver drugs ordered on the internet to buyers. Although it is a fairly easy way for young people to make money, they could face up to twenty years in prison if they are caught.
Young people employed in the business told the BBC why they went into it, what the job involved, and whether they were afraid of getting caught.
[…]
Twenty-year-old Daniil Zhilenkov did his mandatory military service in the Russian National Guard, and when he was demobbed, he wanted to sign up again as a professional soldier. But he changed his mind when he found out that novice guardsmen made only 16,000 rubles [approx. $250] a month. He then left his hometown of Mariinsk, in Kemerovo Region, to live with his girlfriend, a university student in Krasnoyarsk. Kseniya could not contribute to their joint budget because she had to finish her studies.
Daniil found employment at the train depot (he had graduated from the railway college before going to the army), but he left the job after a month, again due to the low salary. He tried working part-time at a car wash.
“The salary was 27,000 rubles [approx. $420] a month. Our rent was 15,000, and then there were the groceries. We didn’t have enough money to cover everything,” he said.
Kseniya recalled that she bought only the cheapest products at the time.
One day, Daniil and a friend were walking down the street and saw an ad on a wall: a store was hiring couriers. Daniil found out what the store sold when came home and googled the name.
“He took the job without my knowledge. When he started going out in the evenings, I realized something was wrong. We sat down and talked. We had a huge row over it,” Kseniya recounted, explaining that she was afraid for her boyfriend.
Daniil was not afraid, however.
“I didn’t think about how to do things more safely. I couldn’t imagine the police were interested in us. It was quite the opposite, as it turned out: it is only people like us who are arrested,” he said.
Daniil and Kseniya agreed that he would not do the work for long, only until he found a better job.
“He said, ‘I’ll save up and leave,'” she recalled.
So four months passed, but one night Daniil was detained on the street by the police. He was sentenced to seven years in prison for distributing drugs.
He spoke to me on a pay phone from the penal colony in Irkutsk: he had served around two years of his seven-year sentence. Daniil wondered how old I was. I told him I was twenty-age. Daniil would be the same age when he was released.
[…]
Translated by the Russian Reader
“Stashers wanted.” Petrograd Side, Petersburg, March 2018. Photo by the Russian Reader
A Change in Russia’s Draconian Drug Laws Could Be on the Horizon The fiasco surrounding the case of investigative journalist Ivan Golunov is bringing the country’s controversial Article 228 into the spotlight.
Pjotr Sauer Moscow Times
June 14, 2019
Living in a country where so-called gay propaganda is banned, Denis, 19, was happy to finally meet someone he felt a connection with on the dating app Tinder.
A few weeks after they had started chatting, the guy on the other side of the screen invited him over and asked him to bring “some weed” to relax them during their first encounter. But when Denis arrived at the address his date had given him, he was met by two policeman who began to search him.
“It turned out to be a set up, and the guy I was talking to on Tinder was a cop,” Denis told The Moscow Times.
The police presented him with a choice — pay a bribe or face being charged under the notorious Article 228 for drug-related crimes.
“They told me they would charge me with possession of 7 grams of marijuana and open a criminal case against me, even though I had much less on me. It would have been the end of my university career and possibly my future,” he said.
Possession of up to 6 grams of the drug is an administrative offense, while anything over that is a criminal offense. Denis paid the 70,000 ruble ($1,088) bribe.
Russia has the highest number of people per capita imprisoned for drug crimes in Europe. Most of them were convicted under Article 228 of the Russian Criminal Code — nicknamed “narodnaya statya” or “the people’s article” because of the large number of people imprisoned under it. In 2018 alone, around 100,000 people were jailed under the article, and a quarter of all prisoners are in jail on drug-related charges.
According to Maksim Malishev coordinator of the Andrey Rylkov Foundation NGO that aims to change Russia’s drug laws, Denis’s story is far from unique.
“We constantly hear of police either planting drugs on innocent people or increasing the amount of drugs they caught someone with in order to prosecute the person under criminal law,” he said.
Human rights lawyer Arseniy Levinson said that police and other officials fabricate cases for several reasons, including having to reach certain quotas and collecting bribes.
Last week, Russian investigative reporter Ivan Golunov was arrested and charged with drug trafficking under Article 228. The anti-corruption journalist’s detention led to a national outcry among his Russian peers and human rights activists, who said drugs found by police in his backpack and apartment were planted. On Monday, Russia’s Interior Ministry ruled to drop the charges against Golunov, admitting that there was no evidence the drugs belonged to him.
“Not everyone is as famous as Ivan Golunov, and most cases go unnoticed as they aren’t political. We have thousands and thousands of people rotting away in jail because of false charges,” said Vyacheslav Matushin, a colleague of Malishev at the Andrey Rylkov Foundation.
The Golunov case has ignited public debate about Article 228 and how it is being implemented.
“We are feeling the post-Golunov effect, and this could be a turning point in how Russians look at Article 228,” said Ella Paneyakh, a sociologist at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics.
The problem with current drug legislation is how the system is set up, said Mikhail Golichenko, a human rights lawyer specializing in drug and HIV cases.
He pointed to official state figures showing that over 80 percent of all people charged under Article 228 are convicted for the possession of drugs without the intention of selling them.
“In those cases, police have almost full oversight over the evidence that is presented to the courts and the judges need little else to make their decision.”
Golunov’s high profile case, however, might have triggered a response from the authorities. On Tuesday, the independent television station Dozhd reported that a proposal to cut sentences for drug possession unrelated to attempted sales might be passed by Russia’s State Duma before the end of the spring session.
The first hearing could be on June 20.
“I know they have been working for a while now on softening the legislation, maybe now they think they will have the support of the public to push it through,” Malishev said, adding that “it is only a tiny step in the right direction.”
Several high profile officials have also voiced their support for reform. Alexei Kudrin, the head of the Audit Chamber and a long-standing advisor of Russian President Vladimir Putin said while he “welcomed” the release of Golunov, “many others are still in jail” and called for a reform of Article 228.
Lawyers and human rights activists The Moscow Times spoke to, however, remain skeptical that new legislation will bring genuine change.
“The government might soften the laws a bit, but unless there is a fundamental shift in the way police deal with suspects, this will keep on happening,” Levinson said.
It’s also unclear if drug reform has popular support
Sociological polls indicate little public support for any kind of drug decriminalization in Russia. Levada, the country’s sole independent pollster, in 2014 showed that only 14 percent of the population would like to see soft drugs legalized.
VTsIOM, the state polling agency, showed similar numbers in 2018. But attitudes toward punishment for drug-related offenses were much more lenient among under 24s.
“There is a definite generational shift in attitudes towards drug use, young people are seeing the absurdity of the current legislation and how it is being implemented,” said Malishev, adding that his organization received a “large amount of interest and calls” following Golunov’s arrest.
Other initiatives have also sprung up to bring attention to the issues surrounding current drug legislation, including a range of t-shirts with the slogan “228” from Moscow-based fashion brand Kultrab.
“They have been a massive success, we completely sold out and had to order a new batch, people have been proud to wear them on the streets and are posting about them on social media, so the stigma seems to be going away,” said Kultrab’s founder Yegor Yeremeev.
“We have the momentum with us, suddenly everyone is talking about 228. People have realized that they too could be Golunov,” he added.
This sentiment was echoed by the editors of Russia’s three most influential newspapers — Vedomosti, Kommersant and RBC — who on Monday made history by printing identical front pages with the headline “I/We are Ivan Golunov” in support of the journalist.
RBC’s editor-in-chief, Igor Trosnikov, told The Moscow Times that Golunov being charged under Article 228 played a big role in the decision.
For Denis, change can’t come soon enough, as he said he and his friends often feel “hunted by police” in Moscow under the current laws.