Varieties of Censorship

When was the last time a book changed your life?

It gets rarer as you get older.

Early in her writing career, author Lois Lowry realized that adolescents are in a golden era of reading, when a book can change everything.

The 89-year-old young adult writer is best known for her work of dystopian fiction “The Giver” about a 12-year-old named Jonas and his world-altering realization that the safety of his peaceful-seeming “community” relies on horrific tradeoffs kept secret from children.

“The Giver,” published in 1993, is both loved and hated. It’s sold more than twelve million copies, and it also frequently appears on lists of banned or challenged books because of its dark themes.

From her home base in Maine, Lowry has written more than 50 books for young adults, and she’s done it again. Her new book is called “Building 903,” which, like “The Giver,” takes place in a dystopian future society where books are outlawed and storytelling is forbidden. Her protagonist, Tessa, must break out of the ideological confines of her world to rescue her twin brother Theo, who’s gone missing.

Lowry visited the Globe studio for a “Say More” interview about “dangerous” books and the enduring angst of adolescence. Here are three takeaways from our conversation.

A world without books is a world without empathy

The premise of Lowry’s new book “Building 903” is that a tyrannical government has outlawed books for generations, resulting in a society with no storytelling or imagination. Lowry says she was inspired to write this book when, seven years ago, she visited her grandson’s high school and found a library with no books on the shelves.

This made Lowry fear that young people won’t value the thing she cares about dearly: the power of stories.

“What happens when you don’t have literature, what do you lose?” Lowry asked. “What you lose is your imagination. And what evolves out of imagination is empathy. And when you lose that, you lose your humanity. I think that’s what I most fear.”

Book bans hurt kids and make us all less free.

Again and again in Lowry’s books, including the new one, is the idea that books are powerful. They can change a person who can then change the world. Books are dangerous to oppressive societies.

“Hitler knew that,” said Lowry. “Hitler banned books in ’36. It’s always the first impulse of a dictator to remove knowledge.”

Lowry has empathy for the parents who want to keep upsetting books away from children. It’s an impulse that guides many of the adults in her dystopian novels. But she thinks their protective bans are misguided.

“[Parents] don’t want their kids to be scared or worried or harmed in any way,” she said. “Of course they miss the truth that the things contained in books are what make kids grow and learn.”

Books, even really sad and scary ones, help children grow strong.

“Every kid who is born into this world is going to face hard things. And the best way to prepare for that is sitting in the room with a trusted adult, talking about these things, reading about these things, feeling these things before you’re feeling them for real,” said Lowry.

Lowery worries deeply about the ever-lengthening list of banned books in the US. But writing for children and sharing stories with them brings her feelings of hope and courage.

“I think if we work at it, if we write good books, if we put them into the hands of children, that has to be a good thing,” she said.

[…]

SOURCE: Anna Kusmer, “‘Even as I’m sitting here talking, I’m feeling it again.’ Why Lois Lowry keeps returning to adolescence,” Boston Globe, 18 November 2026


Since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia’s book publishing industry has faced increasing censorship. Police have raided bookstores, and books by authors designated “foreign agents” or “extremists” have been pulled from shelves. Fearing prosecution, publishers are scrubbing references to the war, queer relationships, and other subjects they worry might anger the authorities. Yet self-censorship is now catching even seemingly innocuous books.

Why is following the rules no longer enough to get a book published in Russia?

Publishers are wary of anything that might attract the authorities’ attention, even if it doesn’t seem to fall afoul of the law. And because there’s no clear way to predict what will cause trouble, books can be shelved for reasons even their editors don’t understand, according to Alexey Kiselev, the former editor-in-chief of the Russian publishing house Individuum. “You don’t know which book will be banned or why, which contracts you’ll have to terminate, or which print runs you’ll have to destroy,” he told Meduza in a recent interview.

Bot blocked 

Kiselev was Individuum’s last editor-in-chief. Eksmo, the Russian publishing giant that acquired Individuum and its young-adult imprint Popcorn Books in 2023, shut down both after Russian authorities arrested three people connected to the two publishers, including their warehouse manager, in May 2025 on “extremism” charges over queer literature. Popcorn Books was the first to go. Individuum survived until September 2026.

After the arrests, Kiselev said, Eksmo began using an automated screening system to check books for potentially prohibited content. The system made a lot of mistakes. In one case, it insisted a bestselling parenting guide should be pulled because the book supposedly promoted not having children. The book was Fediatrics: What to Do If You Have a Child.

“At first it’s funny,” Kiselev said. “But you can’t print a book until the bot says ‘yes.’” When the AI system flagged something by mistake, he had to make the case to management that the concern was unfounded.

How to kill a book

The Beam, a science fiction novel by journalist Daniil Turovsky, is set in an alternate-reality version of Russia, with flashbacks to the country’s real history. Individuum had already printed the book and was about to ship copies to stores when Eksmo abruptly put it on hold. Individuum’s editors had spent a long time carefully editing the manuscript and checking it for legal risks, Kiselev said, and they believed it was ready. 

The voice actor recording the audiobook, it turned out, felt the novel was “anti-Russian” and said working on it made him feel unsafe. Eksmo sent the book for legal review, a step that, Kiselev said, effectively “kills a book.” Once lawyers begin looking for potential problems, he said, they’ll always say the book can’t be printed in its current form. “They have to show they’ve done some work,” he said. “They’re not going to hand the book back and say, ‘It’s all fine, go ahead and print it.’”

The lawyers objected to the book’s nonfiction passages about Russian history, above all an account of atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in Chechnya. The editors blacked out the passage in violet and added a footnote explaining the omission. But the revised edition was on shelves only briefly. A pro-war blogger got hold of the uncensored original, and Eksmo pulled the book again, “just to be on the safe side,” Kiselev said. 

Flying blind

Kiselev said he couldn’t get an explanation from Eksmo of why it had decided not to publish books his team had spent a year and a half working on, even though their layouts and covers were finished. He didn’t know what to tell the authors.

All the uncertainty was making publishing less and less profitable, Kiselev said. Even books Individuum already held the rights to could become impossible to reprint if a character smoked or an author was designated a “foreign agent.”

Before the criminal case against the three publishing employees, Kiselev said, people in the industry assumed that obeying the law and not provoking anyone would keep them safe. “Then the rules changed dramatically,” he said. “It turned out you could simply work in a warehouse or look for ways to grow a publishing business, and that was enough to get you called a terrorist.”

SOURCE: “Complying in advance: How fear of the authorities is shaping what Russia’s publishers are willing to print,” Meduza daily newsletter, 19 November 2026


Hi!

My name is Olesia Bida, and I am a journalist with the War Crimes Investigations Unit at the Kyiv Independent.

Today, I want to recommend a book that holds a special place in the hearts of many Ukrainians. Almost everyone in Ukraine has learned its author’s poems at school. His name is on streets, squares, universities, and cultural institutions across the country.

I am talking about Taras Shevchenko and Kobzar, his landmark collection of poetry, first published in 1840.

Shevchenko was born in 1814, when most of present-day Ukraine was ruled by the Russian Empire. He wrote about Ukraine, freedom, injustice, and imperial oppression — themes that still resonate deeply in Ukraine today. He wrote in Ukrainian at a time when Ukrainian publishing was heavily censored by the Russian Empire. His own works were subject to censorship.

In 1847, Shevchenko was sent into military exile for ten years, with Tsar Nicholas I personally ordering that he be forbidden to write. He continued writing in secret anyway, hiding his poems in tiny handmade notebooks.

Ukrainians often call Shevchenko a prophet. His poetry is full of resistance and the refusal to accept oppression as normal, but also of deep love for Ukraine.

One moment that made his continuing relevance especially vivid to me came during the liberation of Balakliia in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022.

When Ukrainian soldiers entered the city, they began removing Russian propaganda. One billboard carried the occupation message that Ukrainians and Russians were “one people.” When soldiers tore it down, they discovered an older Ukrainian banner underneath, with Shevchenko’s portrait and lines from his poem “The Caucasus”:

Keep fighting — you are sure to win!

God helps you in your fight!

For fame and freedom march with you,

And right is on your side!  

(Translated by John Weir)

The banner had remained there, hidden beneath Russian propaganda, throughout the occupation.

If you would like to read Shevchenko in English, a multilingual edition of Kobzar is available online through the Ukrainian digital library Diasporiana.

There is also a new English-language edition of selected poems from Ukrainian publisher Osnovy, translated by Vira Rich, a British poet and translator who devoted much of her life to Ukrainian literature.

Recommending a Ukrainian book also feels particularly meaningful now. Russian strikes have repeatedly hit Ukraine’s printing houses, publishers’ offices, and book warehouses, destroying millions of books.

There is something painfully symbolic about reading Kobzar in this context: a book associated with the survival of Ukrainian culture under the Russian Empire is still being printed and read while Ukrainian books and the infrastructure that produces them are again being destroyed by Russia.

For me, Kobzar is also part of my own family history. My grandmother gave me my first copy when I was a child, and I still have it.

SOURCE: “Recommendations from the Kyiv Independent: Taras Shevchenko and Kobzar,” Team Recommendations members’ newsletter, 19 November 2026


Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) was a Ukrainian poet and artist who spent many years imprisoned for his pro-Ukrainian independence activities in tsarist Russia. He is revered for his literary works and self-sacrificing contributions to the people of Ukraine.

Inscriptions

Statue platform front face

TARAS
SHEVCHENKO
1814-1861
BARD OF UKRAINE

ТАРАС
ШЕВЧЕНКО
1814-1861
БАРД УКРАЇНИ

Statue platform back face

Dedicated to the Liberation, Freedom and Independence of all Captive Nations

This monument of Taras Shevchenko, 19th century Ukrainian poet and fighter for the independence of Ukraine and the freedom of all mankind, who under foreign Russian imperialist tyranny and colonial rule appealed for “the new and righteous law of Washington”, was unveiled in June 27th, 1964. This historic event commemorated the 150th anniversary of Shevchenko’s birth. The memorial was authorized by the 86th Congress of the United States of America on August 31, 1960 and signed into public law 86-749 by Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th President of the United States of America. On September 13, 1960, the statue was erected by Americans of Ukrainian ancestry and friends.

Pedestal left bottom rear

Leo Mol – Sculptor
Radoslav Zuk – Architect

Лео Мол – Скульптор
Радослав Жук – Архітектор

White granite wall back

..Не вмирає душа наша.
Не вмирає воля,
І неситий не виоре
На дні моря поле.

Не скує душі живої
І слова живого.
Не понесе слави Бога,
Великого Бога.

Тарас Шевченко – Кавказ – 1845

..Our Soul Shall Never Perish.
Freedom Knows No Dying,
And the Greedy Cannot Harvest
Fields Where Seas Are Lying;
Cannot Bind the Living Spirit
Nor the Living Word.
Cannot Smirch the Sacred Glory
Of Th’Almighty Lord.

Taras Shechenko – The Caucasus – 1845

SOURCE: “Taras Shevchenko Memorial,” National Park Service, n.d.

The Needle and the Damage Done


Aaron Maté, Their Blood, Our Bullets: The Hidden Story of the US–Russia War for Ukraine

The hotly anticipated debut from an award-winning journalist reveals the hidden story of the US-Russia proxy war in Ukraine.

“One hell of a reporter who knows how to get at the truth.” —Seymour Hersh

“Exposes wars and crimes and corruption—Maté, a courageous, independent journalist, has done a great service.” —Katrina vanden Heuvel

“A must-read for anyone hoping to transcend Western propaganda about the Ukraine War.” —John J. Mearsheimer

About the book

In this bombshell investigation, years in the making, Aaron Maté exposes Washington’s professed support for Ukrainian sovereignty and democracy as a sham.

Building on the rigorous, fearless reporting that has established him as a leading independent journalist, Maté irrefutably documents how the US and its NATO allies have meddled in Ukraine with the real aim of weakening and destabilizing Russia.

In pursuit of this aggressive geopolitical design, successive US administrations exploited Ukraine’s internal divisions and sabotaged every chance for compromise while relentlessly backing Russia into a corner. Gambling with the global economy and risking nuclear war, US planners then provoked and prolonged an illegal Russian invasion that has had catastrophic consequences—for the Ukrainian people above all.

Washington’s cynical foreign policy did not just detonate peace in Europe but also deranged politics at home. Controversies around Russia and Ukraine played a pivotal role in three consecutive US presidential campaigns, driving the national hysteria known as “Russiagate” as well as the first impeachment of Donald Trump.

With Trump’s re-election pledge to broker peace still elusive, Maté presents a groundbreaking account of how the Russia–Ukraine conflict came to be, and how a brutal proxy war with existential stakes for humanity can finally be resolved.

Aaron Maté is an independent journalist and co-host of the podcast Useful Idiots. He has reported and produced for outlets including The Grayzone, The Nation, The Real News, Al Jazeera, and Real Clear Investigations. He won a 2019 Izzy Award for outstanding achievement in independent media and was previously a longtime producer at Democracy Now!

SOURCE: OR Books


Neil Young, “The Needle and the Damage Done” (1972)

Elena Kaspirovich fled political repression in her native Russia nearly a decade ago, when she was targeted by law enforcement for protesting and activism under the authoritarian regime of President Vladimir Putin.

After arriving in the Chicago area, the Russian dissident was elated by the sense of freedom and strength of democratic ideals in the nation that provided her haven.

Yet Kaspirovich has grown increasingly disturbed by the Trump administration’s close – and often fawning – relationship with Putin, the imperialist ruler who has methodically dismantled democracy in her homeland since coming to power in 2000.

She was concerned when President Donald Trump welcomed Putin with a red carpet ceremony in Alaska last summer, a sharp break in traditional diplomatic protocol for a longtime U.S. adversary, particularly one facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for war crimes.

She expressed dismay at Trump’s frequent flattery of Putin – calling the autocrat “savvy” and “genius” – as well as the president’s decision last month to waive stiff sanctions and tariffs on Russia.

And more broadly, Kaspirovich is disturbed by a mounting U.S. coziness with an array of dictators and far-right figures, fearing this warmth for autocrats could have devastating consequences on democracy domestically as well as internationally.

“I believe the club of dictators is real,” Kaspirovich said. “Its members never ask each other about human rights. For them, human life counts for nothing. … Dictators admire only power.”

Other Chicago-area survivors of autocratic and totalitarian nations offer similar words of warning as they watch their adopted homeland increasingly embrace the very regimes they came here to escape.

Continue reading “The Needle and the Damage Done” →

The War on Terror

Stills from The Body, Quinn Shephard’s brilliant, imaginative evocation of the hysterical, ultra-violent George W. Bush era, now streaming on Netflix and other corners of the internets. |||||trr


A US army sentinel guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier loudly reprimanded the embattled US defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, and his top staffers on Wednesday, after some in the group were heard laughing and talking near the memorial following a Veterans Day ceremony.

According to video captured by the TV network pool, Hegseth was with his wife, Jennifer, chief of staff Ricky Buria, deputy chief of staff Patrick Weaver and senior adviser and deputy assistant Tami Radabaugh walking up the steps in front of the memorial after posing for pictures. A laugh is audible, prompting the guard to yell: “All visitors will maintain an atmosphere of silence and respect at all times.” Hegseth looked over his shoulder in the direction of the soldier as he continued walking up the steps.

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement: “The secretary and the entire department have always honored – and will always honor – the sacrifices our military men and women have made to keep America safe.

“While commemorating this solemn day, a soldier correctly and respectfully reminded everyone to maintain decorum.”

Hegseth and his team were at the cemetery for a Veterans Day ceremony that was also attended by Donald Trump and vice-president JD Vance, who both laid wreaths at the memorial in honor of fallen soldiers and delivered remarks afterwards.

The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington national cemetery is one of the most sacred war memorials in the country, marking the final resting place of an unknown soldier who was killed in the first world war. An army sentinel from the 3rd US Infantry Regiment – also known as the Old Guard – has been guarding the tomb around the clock, rain or shine, since 1948.

In an article on the US army’s website, Staff Sgt Chadwick Winget, the relief commander, said visitors rarely disrupt the calm intentionally, but sentinels are always ready to react when rules are not being followed. On average, sentinels address noisy crowds roughly two or three times per day.

“It’s usually just them being oblivious,” Wingnet said of some visitors. “They’re talking and not realizing how loud they’re being, or laughing or making jokes amongst their group. It detracts from the other people that are trying to pay their respects.”

Former GOP congressman Adam Kinzinger called the incident “truly abhorrent” and condemned Hegseth as “completely unqualified for the job”.

“Pete Hegseth doesn’t know how to conduct himself, even at The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery,” Kinzinger wrote on X. “His behavior is unbecoming of any visitor to the Tomb, let alone that which comes from a Secretary of Defense.”

In a video clip attached to the post, Kinzinger added of Hegseth: “Everything is a show to him. Everything to him is about attention … He is completely unqualified for the job.”

In further comments to CNN, Kinzinger said he could not fathom taking a picture at the memorial, let alone talking and laughing. Kinzinger also commended the sentinel guard for doing his job. “It’s very embarrassing for [Hegseth], and at the same time I’m very proud of the fact that our country held those rules, even in the face of the secretary of defense,” he said.

The sacrifices associated with guarding the memorial and the solemness of the site are “an amazing testament to how much we honour people who have made the sacrifice for this country … and one of the very few places we hold sacred,” he added.

The incident comes just a day after Hegseth narrowly avoided impeachment. House Republicans were able to block the effort to impeach the defense secretary, rejecting allegations that he had repeatedly violated the constitution through his handling of the Iran war and other conflicts globally.

The 211-204 vote came a week after Republicans dramatically lost control of the Senate and House of Representatives in their worst midterm election in more than a half century, and underscored how lawmakers remain wary of crossing Trump, who has signaled his continued support for Hegseth.

Thomas Massie, a Republican congressman who lost his primary after breaking with the president, had in September proposed impeaching Hegseth, alleging an array of illegal acts, including killing civilians in Iran, launching unauthorized operations in Venezuela and Yemen, and retaliating against a Democratic senator.

Democratic minority leader Hakeem Jeffries, who is expected to become the House speaker in the next Congress, has backed the push to impeach Hegseth, accusing the embattled secretary of having “undermined America’s national security”.

SOURCE: Lucy Campbell, “Hegseth and aides scolded by guard for laughing at Tomb of the Unknown Soldier,” Guardian, 11 November 2026


[…]

Different ways of honoring veterans were highlighted today, as Trump suggested that the 250-foot triumphal arch he wants to build between the Lincoln Memorial and Arlington National Cemetery is for veterans, although Vietnam veterans are among those suing over its construction. “Soon we’re going to dedicate a magnificent triumphal arch to our veterans, and that’s in honor of our great veterans and our great militaries,” he said. “They’ve been waiting for it for 200 years.”

But in New York City, Mayor Zohran Mamdani had a different prescription for honoring veterans. “This Veterans Day, let us renew our commitment to those who served by confronting the injustices too many veterans still face, from homelessness and isolation to the threat of deportation,” he posted. “Our responsibility to those who served does not end when they come home.”

Eric Umansky of ProPublica hammered this point home today, chronicling the dramatic cuts to the VA, or U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Cabinet-level government agency that provides lifelong healthcare, benefits, and memorial services for veterans and eligible family members. Umansky explains that the VA serves 9 million veterans, providing healthcare that is “essentially socialized medicine,” with doctors, nurses, and staff all employed by the federal government. Umansky also notes that despite occasional scandals and chronic short-staffing, the VA has better outcomes than private care.

But the right wing has worked for decades to get rid of VA healthcare and push veterans toward private sector doctors and hospitals, claiming that such private care is more efficient than government-run healthcare. With data reporting by Joel Jacobs and illustrations by Hokyoung Kim, Umansky’s piece lays out how under Trump and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Doug Collins, the administration initially considered sweeping cuts to the VA but, after massive pushback, appear to have settled on making work conditions so bad people would leave on their own.

Citing national security, they canceled union contracts, ordered remote staffers back to work in buildings that couldn’t accommodate them, required employees to report what they had accomplished each week, and offered incentives to retire or quit. Under President Joe Biden, the agency had been hiring personnel; in the first six months under Trump’s second administration, the VA lost 3,800 doctors, nurses, and “mission critical” staff and eliminated hiring for positions that were open. In September 2025, Collins imposed new caps on staffing levels as part of his plan to cut 30,000 employees, and numbers of employees have continued to drop.

Umansky chronicled the downward spiral of a VA medical center as it and its affiliated facilities lost nearly 10% of their staff. Umansky reports that according to the VA’s watchdog, 97% of VA hospitals report “severe shortages of doctors.” Veterans are being pushed into the Community Care system Trump supports, but those systems are overwhelmed and wait times can run into months. Under Trump the VA has increasingly acted like an insurer, Umansky writes, simply paying private doctors to care for veterans as part of their normal practice.

[…]

SOURCE: Heather Cox Richardson, Letters from an American, 11 November 2026

News from Ukraine Bulletin 220

Pacific Grove, California, 8 November 2026. Photo by the Russian Reader

In this week’s bulletin: More evidence of Russian torture; Russia’s withdraws from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture; Statement on the persecution of Ukrainian journalists; French trade union solidarity with Ukraine.

News from the territories occupied by Russia:

Russia causes the death of Kharkiv teacher illegally held in solitary confinement in Crimea (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 6th)

54-year-old Serhiy Diachuk has multiple rib fractures after two years in secret Russian FSB captivity (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 6th)

The Face of Resistance: The Story of Political Prisoner Eldar Yakubov (Crimea Platform, November 6th)

Called up for Russian army service and forced to sing Russian national anthem: 13 children and teenagers rescued from occupation (Ukrainska Pravda, November 6th)

Weekly update on the situation in occupied Crimea (Crimea Platform, November 3rd)

Crimean Tatar mother of three sentenced to 12.5 years for a donation to Ukraine’s Armed Forces (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 2nd)

News from Ukraine:

Kyiv faces extremely difficult situation with electricity, heating and water (Ukrainska Pravda, November 7th)

Suspects in high-profile case discussed acid attack on Ukraine’s top investigative journalist (Kyiv Independent, November 6th)

How Ukraine’s security service sought access to the Anti-Corruption Court’s restricted database (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 6th)

Khinprom drug cartel planned to bribe former minister Klymenko through his associates – Ukraine’s anti-corruption bureau (Ukrainska Pravda, November 6th)

Ukraine’s anti-corruption court orders probe into prominent Zelensky ally (Kyiv Independent, November 5th)

Here’s what we know three days after the clash at a temporary base for the National Guard’s Azov Corps outside Kyiv (Meduza, November 5th)

Forty people confirmed killed in Russian aerial bomb attack on school in Komyshuvakha – photos, video (Ukrainska Pravda, November 4th)

Crowd gathers outside house near Kyiv where mobilized troops and AWOL soldiers were being held. Clashes erupt, shots are fired, and Zelensky’s chief of staff intervenes (Meduza, November 3rd)

Russia bombs humanitarian aid distribution site in Southern Ukraine, killing 31. More than 40 people remain missing (Meduza, November 3rd)

War-related news from Russia:

Russian regions have slashed payments to families of soldiers killed in Ukraine by up to 20 times (Ukrainska Pravda, November 6th)

A foreigner is arrested in Moscow on charges of mercenarism. His namesake served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Mediazona, November 6th)

At least 350 Russian conscripts have been killed in the war with Ukraine. Here is the list of their names (Mediazona, November 6th)

Russian losses in the war with Ukraine. Mediazona count, updated (Mediazona, November 6th)

Investigation finds Russia’s billboards featuring troops fighting in Ukraine include men with criminal convictions and soldiers accused of war crimes (Meduza, November 6th)

Russia’s economy is suffering under the weight of war and sanctions. So why is the ruble still one of the world’s strongest currencies? (Meduza, November 6th)

Comment and analysis:

Stephen Kinzer’s Boiling Point: How America Brought War to Ukraine – a critical review (Anti-Capitalist Musings, November 6th)

Europe’s sanctions on Russia: Riddled with loopholes (Centre for European Policy Analysis, November 6th)

Could Ukraine have made a deal with Russia in 2022? Former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba on negotiations (Ukrainska Pravda, November 2nd)

Oil on the water: How Russia avoided accountability for the Black Sea tanker disaster caused by its sanctions evasion efforts (The Insider, November 2nd)

Research of human rights abuses

Russia abducts husband of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant employee whom it sentenced to 14.5 years on insane charges (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 5th)

Valentyn Vyhivsky endured torture, years in solitary confinement and is still captive in Russia after his sentence (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 4th)

Ukrainian POW ‘dies’ in Russian prison as Moscow abandons vital convention against torture (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 3rd)

Crimean held incommunicado and beaten for 6 months, then sentenced to 15 years in an afternoon (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, November 2nd)

Statement on the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists (Zmina, November 2nd)

International solidarity:

Eight French trade union federations speak out in solidarity with Ukraine (USC, November 7th)

Marseille Appeal: Defeat Russian Imperialism, by the Antifascist Platform against Russian Imperialism (Left Renewal, November 4th)

KVPU appeals to the international trade union community over Russia’s escalating aggression against Ukraine (KVPU, November 4th)

Also not to be missed:

100 years ago Kyiv’s young writers sought artistic freedom. Stalin’s purges cut their experiment short. (Kyiv Independent, November 7th)

Trump’s new Ukraine proposal could push Putin to escalate the war (ZN,UA, November 7th)

Trump’s diesel deal with Russia falls apart as tankers change course (ZN,UA, November 5th)

To end war on Ukraine, Washington must revoke its Russian diesel licence and block Novatek’s Alaska gas plans (Razom We Stand, November 5th)

Opinion: Putin’s diesel won’t fix Alaska’s fuel bill, but it will pay for attacks on Ukraine (Razom We Stand, November 2nd)

Upcoming events:

TUESDAY 10 NOVEMBER, 6.30pm Life Under Russian Occupation: Stories from Ukraine. Meeting with Anhelina Zinovieva (Donetsk), Sofia Naumenko (Mariupol), Daniil Shapovalo (Luhansk). Queen Mary, University of London. Hosted by Ukrainian Society and the Centre for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies (CEREES)

WEDNESDAY 11 NOVEMBER, 7.00pm. Public meeting: Stand with the people of Ukraine. Meeting with Oleksandr Kyselov (Sotsialnyi Rukh Ukraine). Somers Town Community Hall, 150 Ossulston St, NW1 1EE. Hosted by Anti-Capitalist Resistance

FRIDAY 13 NOVEMBER, 6.00pm. Meeting: The US midterms, Ukraine and the fight against fascism. with Tanya Vyhovsky, Vermont State Senator (Progressive / Democratic), and Dylan Burns, journalist, streamer and founder of Track Ukraine. Hosted by Ukraine Solidarity Campaign. Register here

This bulletin is put together by labour movement activists in solidarity with Ukrainian resistance. To receive it by email each Monday, email us at 2022ukrainesolidarity@gmail.com.

SOURCE: News from Ukraine Bulletin 220, 8 November 2026

Borshch Belt

Two Ukrainian soldiers eat borsch delivered to them near Bakhmut, Ukraine, on 7 February 2023. 
Photo: Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP/Getty Images

At the entrance of Inshi Cafe in downtown Lviv, Ukraine, stood a full-size cardboard likeness of the country’s best-known chef, Yevhen Klopotenko. In immaculate kitchen whites, the 39-year-old was immediately recognizable by his handlebar mustache and eccentric coif: the right side of his head shaved close, with an unruly mop of curls thrown over his left ear. This is an updated take on the hair art of the ancient Ukrainian Cossacks, a nomadic warrior people central to Ukrainian identity. Likewise, Klopotenko seeks to modernize traditional Ukrainian cuisine, especially borsch, a beet-based soup that, he claims, is as Ukrainian as the Cassocks themselves.

“Sure, there’s borsch in other countries in Eastern Europe,” Klopotenko, who co-owns Inshi—which he closed a month ago—and another restaurant in Kyiv, explained in a phone interview. But, he went on to say, nowhere is borsch (the preferred Ukrainian spelling [sic]) so variegated and central to a country’s diet and culture as in Ukraine.

Klopotenko, widely considered Ukraine’s borsch aficionado, has turned the dish into his life’s work. In 2022, when Russia’s full-scale invasion captured one-sixth of Ukraine, Klopotenko raced to fast-track the process of enshrining Ukrainian borsch-making on UNESCO’s list of cultural heritage in urgent need of safeguarding. To help establish the dish’s distinct national roots, Klopotenko co-founded the Institute of Culture of Ukraine, which collected over 700 pages of evidence, including recipes and historical records from across the country. Borsch was inscribed on the UNESCO list that July.

Klopotenko’s field research is explicitly political: He strives to reconnect Ukrainians with their ancestors, building on the national renaissance that took off with independence in 1991 and was turbocharged by the Russian invasions. He wants to show that Ukraine is a full-fledged nation with deep roots and age-old traditions—in stark contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fiction that Ukrainians are really Russians, and thus a legitimate target of reconquest. For Klopotenko and many other Ukrainians, the country’s borschs are a critical element in the complex cultural tapestry that constitutes national identity.


Likes its kaleidoscope of borschs, the country of Ukraine is a patchwork of different traditions. Ukraine is made up of Jews, Hungarians, Roma, Tatars, Moldovans, and, yes, Russians, among others. Many speak in other languages at home and seamlessly switch to Ukrainian in public. Regionally, Ukraine is also a smorgasbord: Its constituent territories were for centuries divided among the Russian, Austrian, Mongolian, and Polish empires, as well as other foreign lords.

But borsch, whose name comes from the Slavic word for beet, is a passion of all stripes of Ukrainians. Most borschs today include some combination of beets, cabbage, onions, carrots, potatoes, tomatoes, and broth. The first thing that strikes one, even before a bowl is in sight, is the soup’s earthy, tangy fragrance, often accentuated by fresh dill. Its audacious color usually (but not always) takes on a spectrum of vibrant reds and deep purples. The spectacular sweet-and-sour tango that borsch performs on your taste buds is the juxtaposition of its core ingredient, beet kvass—a fermented juice made by soaking beets for days—and the sweetness of the tomatoes. A fulsome dollop of sour cream on top balances the acidic and savory flavors.

Ingredients beyond the basics vary widely, which one learns quickly after striking out to explore Ukraine’s culinary landscape. Central Ukraine, around the historical [Cossack] city of Poltava, boasts a classic Ukrainian borsch: The broth can be beef-, pork-, or poultry-based, with generous chucks of smoked rib meat floating in a bouquet of root veggies. A home-style variation includes halushky, or small dumplings, that swim in the broth.

Central Ukraine is probably where borsch made its debut about a thousand years ago, according to the research of the Institute of Culture of Ukraine, one of the many until-now-unknown facts about the dish. It did not have the name “borsch,” and this was long before the likes of tomatoes or even potatoes appeared in European gardens. The earliest first known written mention of the word borsch dates to the 16th century, concocted out of fermented sorrel and wild grasses, notably hogweed. The borsch Ukrainians know today, Klopotenko said, hails back about two centuries. Ivan Kotliarevsky’s 1798 “Eneida,” a mock-heroic poem considered the first piece of literature published entirely in Ukrainian, mentions various traditional Ukrainian dishes consumed by Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants, including borsch.

In northwestern Ukraine’s Volyn region, along the Polish borderlands, borsch is sometimes cooked with the blood of wild boars. To the south, along the Hungarian border, ethnic Magyars spice up the dish with smoked paprika (a staple of many Hungarian dishes) created by roasting red peppers over a fire. In eastern Ukraine, borsch is often so thick that a spoon can stand up in the dark red stew. And, along the Black Sea, borsch can boast fish rather than meat, Klopotenko said.

Klopotenko’s restaurant in Lviv offered four kinds of borsch, including one flavored with red wine and another that contains wild mushrooms. His signature borsch is known for its smoky, rich flavor and features baked beets, plums, and smoked sour cream. (It also includes pork ribs, but all of his borschs also come in vegetarian versions, a rare courtesy in Ukraine.) But a locality’s truest borsch, Klopotenko said, is served in homes. His mother’s recipe was incomplete without pork ribs, celery root, and smoked dried pears.

Klopotenko contends that Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories and the displacement of Ukrainians there threaten the survival of gastronomical traditions. Indeed, many experts, including those from Human Rights Watch, say that Russia targets cultural heritage in a deliberate strategy to erase Ukrainian nationhood and rewrite regional history. In Moscow’s thoroughgoing Russification of the occupied territories, everything Ukrainian—language, symbols, history—is snuffed out or labeled as Russian, including culinary staples.

On the Azov Sea, where all Ukrainian port cities are in Russian hands, Mariupol-style borsch traditionally features sprats, gobies, or other fresh fish. The local bychky (similar to dumplings) are pan-fried and then dropped into the broth shortly before the dish is served. Mariupol was occupied by Russia in 2022 and “cleansed” of Ukrainian culture, including gastronomy, so it’s unclear how common the dish is today. It isn’t that specific types of borsch were literally made illegal to prepare, but rather that the occupying forces erased the variety and identity of Ukrainian food, replacing it with monolithic Russian fare. Sure, Russians eat borsch, too, Klotopenko said, but with nothing of the Ukrainian flair.

Whether Crimean Tatars, also under Russian occupation, still cook borsch in massive kettles and with slabs of roasted lamb and ample coriander, is unknown. There are simply many fewer Tartars there than were in 2014, when Russia annexed the peninsula. Since then, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians have moved into Crimea, substantially altering its culture. Crimea is a Russian police state, and there is little truck between the peninsula and free Ukraine. But Crimean-style borsch can still be found in the homes of Tatars who have left Crimea. Around 25,000 Tatars relocated from Crimea to mainland Ukraine after 2014. Today, community groups preserve their culture in exile, convinced that they will return one day to a Ukrainian Crimea.

Russia’s onslaught continues to threaten the cultural fabric of the eastern parts of Ukraine, including the factory city of Dnipro, which boasts a tightly knit community of Ashkenazi Jews. Their borsch is pink, lighter than most variations of the dish, and of course, kosher: no pork, with cows and sheep slaughtered according to ritual. For now, at least, two restaurants at the community’s Menorah Center in downtown Dnipro serve kosher borsch; lemon juice replaces kvass, celery root replaces cabbage. The broth is simmered for four to five hours to induce a rich, concentrated taste. And it is almost always served with out-of-the-oven pampushka: soft white buns smothered in garlic butter. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is Jewish and was born in Kryvyi Rih, the next city over from Dnipro, probably grew up with a borsch like this.


On the other side of Ukraine, roughly 500 miles to the west, the people of the Carpathian Mountains, who live along the Romanian border, raise their children on white borsch, concocted with fermented white sugar beets and pork, seasoned with dill, parsley, and green onions. This is the favored meal of the Hutsuls, an eastern Slavic people descended from shepherds.

Last December, my Hutsul friend invited me into the homestead of the Makivnychuk family in Verkhovyna, a Carpathian town considered a Hutsul stronghold. There I was honored to attend a 12-course Christmas Eve dinner. The family borsch—cooked on a wood stove and served in candlelight because the Russians had knocked out the electricity—is a marker of identity. Marie Makivnychuk can trace her recipe back six generations, to a time when mountain folk ate what grew on their rock-strewn slopes. White beetroot grows best in the mountain’s cool climate.

Most Ukrainians, Kletopenko said, are aware that borsch is not uniform across the country, but they’re oblivious to the universe of borschs and the rich, historic backstories. And why should they bother, when their mother’s borsch is the most wonderful of all?

SOURCE: Paul Hockenos, “The Battle for Borsch,” Foreign Policy, 17 July 2026


This is Yana Boretska, Operations Manager for the Kyiv Independent Store. So many of you have asked us for a Ukrainian borshch recipe, so here it is at last — my family recipe, the one I make for my family, my friends, and sometimes simply for my own enjoyment.

In 2022, the culture of Ukrainian borshch cooking was added to UNESCO’s List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, recognizing its importance as a part of Ukrainian cultural heritage. At the Kyiv Independent, we celebrate the dish with our Borshch collection, which features the ingredients of borshch illustrated by Ukrainian illustrator Albina Kolesnichenko on T-shirts, sweatshirts, aprons, and tote bags.

Yana in Kyiv’s Podil district, wearing a Borshch tote bag

Ingredients


For the broth:                           

  • 1-1.5 lbs. (500g-700g) beef on the bone
  • 1-2 bay leaves

For the borshch:

  • 0.5-1 lb (300-500g) boneless beef
  • 1 onion, diced
  • 1 carrot, grated or julienned
  • 2 medium red beets, grated or finely chopped
  • 2 tbsp tomato puree (or 3–4 fresh tomatoes)
  • 1 tsp sugar
  • 1 tsp vinegar or lemon juice
  • 3-4 potatoes, diced
  • 11oz (300g) cabbage, shredded
  • 2-4 cloves of garlic, finely chopped
  • Fresh dill and parsley, finely chopped

Serves 6-8

Preparation time 2-3 hours

Secret ingredient: Make it in our borshch apron!

Method

First, make the broth. Put the beef on the bone in a large pot and cover with about 4-5 pints (2.5–3 liters) of cold water. Bring to a boil and carefully skim off any foam that rises to the surface. Add the bay leaves and a little salt, then reduce the heat to low and simmer gently for 60–90 minutes, partially covered, until the broth becomes rich and flavorful.

While the broth is cooking, cut the boneless beef into medium-sized pieces. Heat a little oil in a large frying pan or heavy-bottomed skillet over medium-high heat. Add the beef and sear it well, stirring occasionally, for approximately 25–30 minutes, until it has a deep golden-brown crust. Once browned, set the beef aside.

Add a little more oil to the pan. Add the diced onion and cook for 4-5 minutes, until softened, then add the carrot and cook for another 3-4 minutes. Add the beets, and cook for 5-7 minutes, stirring regularly. Then, add the tomato paste, a small amount of water or broth, the sugar, and vinegar or lemon juice, and simmer everything together for another 5-7 minutes. Set aside.

When the broth is done, remove the beef on the bone from the broth. The meat can be removed from the bone, cut into pieces, and returned to the broth if you want.

Bring the broth back to a gentle simmer, add the fried beef, and cook for 5-10 minutes. Then add the potatoes and cook for another 10 minutes or so. Add the shredded cabbage and cook for another 5-7 minutes, depending on how soft you like it.

Add the sautéed vegetables to the pot, stir well, and simmer for another 8-10 minutes. Season with salt and black pepper to taste. Avoid a very aggressive boil— a gentle simmer helps preserve the beets’ beautiful red color.

In the last couple of minutes, add the garlic and fresh herbs. Turn off the heat and taste the borshch — adjust the salt, pepper, sugar, and vinegar/lemon juice if necessary.

Cover the pot and let the borshch rest for at least 30 minutes before serving, an hour if possible.

To serve

This is the most important part. Serve the borshch hot with a generous spoonful of sour cream directly in the bowl. Sour cream adds creamy richness and perfectly balances the acidity of the beets and tomato.

Finish with fresh dill and parsley, and with bread on the side — garlic bread works well. And to really go all out, why not wear a Borshch T-shirt while you eat?

Plate of traditional borshch with sour cream, served with pampushki (garlic bread buns).
(Photo by: Natasha Breen/REDA/Universal Images Group/Getty Images)

For me, borshch has always been about that feeling of home, warmth, and comfort. It carries a taste of Ukraine that is incredibly difficult to forget.

If you decide to try my version of borshch, I would genuinely love to hear how it turns out! If you have any questions while making it, simply reply to this email (store@kyivindependent.com), and I’ll be happy to answer personally and help with any details.

With love from Kyiv,

Yana, Operations Manager, The Kyiv Independent Store

SOURCE: “The recipe you’ve been waiting for: traditional Ukrainian borshch,” Kyiv Independent Store email newsletter, 5 November 2026. I just ordered a Kyiv Independent borshch apron and tote bag to go along with the Kyiv Independent borshch t-shirt which I’ve been wearing proudly the last few years. ||||| TRR

Don’t Let Them Tell You It’s Fair

The Belair Lip Bombs, “Don’t Let Them Tell You (It’s Fair)”

I need you to hold me
I need you to care
I need you to listen
They won’t understand
Don’t let them tell ya
Don’t let them tell ya
Don’t let them tell ya
Don’t let them tell you it’s fair

I see you look out the window
I know you’re close to the brink
A younger version of me
I lie awake and I think
So when you look in the mirror
Tell me what do you see
Starstruck, you gotta make your own luck
And I’m making a woman out of me

Well I know they think I’m funny
They’ve got all their money
Look what I’ve become
And just stop talking to me

They’re looking down upon me
A metaphorical illusion of a mezzanine scene
But don’t you quit that thing
He’s just a rich cat, subtract the judgement from him
And remember my name, remember my face
Remember the place where I came
And I’ll be out of your way

You’ve made it this far
I’ll make you a star
Hold onto my arms
And let out all the grief in your heart

Well I know they think I’m funny
They’ve got all their money
Look what I’ve become
And just stop talking to me

Well I know they think I’m funny
They’ve got all their money
Look what I’ve become
Honey I’ve never felt this free

Well I know they think I’m funny
They’ve got all their money
Look what I’ve become
And just stop talking
They think I’m funny
Got all their money
But I don’t care
Don’t let them tell you it’s fair

SOURCE: The Belair Lip Bombs (YouTube), 4 September 2025


Russia has officially withdrawn from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture. It is a logical step. It was abnormal that a fascist state which had trampled on all norms of law and morality formally continued to be among the signatories of this Convention.

Everything has now fallen into place. A state that employs torture on a scale comparable to that of Nazi Germany or the Stalinist USSR has finally brought its de jure status into alignment with its de facto reality.

I would remind you that Putin’s Russian Federation has murdered 200,000 to 300,000 people in Chechnya, 133,000 in Syria, and approximately 200,000 in Ukraine, including tens of thousands of women, children, and old people.

Pictured above are two of the latest Russian victims of Putin’s Gulag.

On the left is Alexander Kondratov, production designer for the miniseries Liquidation and winner of the TEFI and Golden Eagle awards.

Kondratov was originally from Moscow, but moved to Kyiv in 2012.

In May 2026, he flew to Russia to get a new travel passport (what the hell for, one wonders). He was arrested immediately upon arrival at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport and charged with “high treason.”

There is little need to explain what “high treason” means in the parlance of Putin’s fascists. In Kondratov’s case, it consisted of “at least six posts” on the internet.

On 26 October 2026, Alexander Kondratov died in a prison hospital at the age of fifty-two.

Pictured on the right is political analyst Alexander Kynev.

When they arrested him, the Russian Gestapo broke his shinbone in two places and planted a kilogram of narcotics on him. He is currently being held in a cell designed for thirty-four inmates, which now houses thirty-five inmates.

The cell has a hole in the floor instead of a toilet. Kynev, who is on crutches, cannot use this hole and so has gone on a hunger strike.

The plight of these two men serves as a simple reminder: you must not be naive when dealing with a fascist state.

Fascism kills.

SOURCE: Alexander Zhelenin (Facebook), 2 November 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader


So here we are at last. After two years of Donald Trump’s Washington—the idiocy, the cruelty, the malice, the bullying, the bigotry, the hubris, the state violence, the monomania, the cowardice—it’s finally time for the president to make the first payment on the bill. Barring a catastrophic polling error (and when has that ever happened?), Americans seem set to deliver a colossal rebuke to Trump, who stormed into office last year ready to crack heads and is now doddering out the last days of his trifecta ranking asses.

The big political killer was Iran. Trump’s disastrous Middle East war fractured his coalition and doomed the country to a year (or more!) of terrible economic vibes. A week into the war, Trump’s approval rating was sitting north of 42 percent; it’s been slumping lower ever since. Nothing makes price-conscious Americans reach for their pitchforks like spiking energy prices.

But I think that the turning point in Trump 2.0 actually came a little earlier. The thing that convinced Trump he needed to beat a retreat on a core part of his domestic agenda was his fiasco in Minneapolis.

It’s only been a year, but it’s already easy to forget just how big a part large-scale state violence against Democratic protesters played in Trump’s plans in 2025. Over and over, the White House launched remarkable provocations against blue cities and states, from Los Angeles to Portland to Washington, D.C. These actions weren’t just intended to cow Democratic leaders. They were intended to stoke deliberate conflict between militarized agents of the state and people on the ground—conflict that Trump and MAGA could then repackage as content for their base.

Amid Trump’s many simultaneous assaults on the norms and laws that restrain the presidency, this content served a specific rhetorical purpose. In videos of riots and clashes with protesters, Trump’s government represented the forces of order, while those who opposed him were the forces of chaos. The law, Trump’s violence argued, wasn’t some bunch of buzzkill rules dorks and eggheads used to rein in great men like him. The law was pepper spray in an angry protester’s face.

As I wrote last October:

Trump goes out of his way to start conflicts. He wildly exaggerates the horrors of daily life in blue cities. He sends the National Guard in a shock-and-awe show of force into those same places. In the protests and clashes that result, he tells them the only way they can err is by pulling their punches. You’ve got to teach these criminals, he says, the only way they understand. They spit, you hit. And “criminals” are whoever Trump says they are.

When he ordered ICE into Minneapolis, Trump was just following the natural progression of this plan. But the plan quickly met disaster. ICE’s clownishly brutal occupation of the city spurred ever-increasing organized resistance from locals, who tracked ICE vehicles and made their job consistently irritating and difficult—blowing their cover by following them with blaring horns and shrieking blowing whistles, organizing deliveries of groceries and other materials to terrified immigrants wouldn’t have to risk leaving their homes, and so on. And videos of irritated agents lashing out at annoying but law-abiding and peaceful protesters started to turn public sentiment against the occupiers—even before things went catastrophically wrong.

And then came the deaths of Renée Good and Alex Pretti. More than anything else, these two instances of shocking police violence against peaceful protesters turned the tide. Trump and Co. wanted a constant feed of videos of police administering street justice to hooligans; instead, Americans’ social platforms were suddenly full of videos of deadly violence dealt against—in Pretti’s case—a man who had literally tried to peacefully place his body between an agent of the state and the woman he was roughing up.

MAGA’s propaganda machine tried feverishly to smear these two dead Americans as domestic terrorists and would-be cop killers. But no one was buying it, and soon even they had to admit it. Not long after, the White House announced an about-face: They were heading out of Minneapolis. From now on, federal immigration enforcement would focus on the red cities and states that would cooperate with less fuss. The blue-city occupation strategy was at an end.

I don’t mean to oversell this. It isn’t as though Trump et al. have gotten significantly more careful about the violence the state wields: Others have died at the hands of DHS agents this year, including Lorenzo Salgado Araujo in Houston and Johan Sebastián Durán Guerrero in Maine this summer. And, as our Adrian Carrasquillo reported last week, Good and Pretti’s families have never gotten accountability from the officers who killed them.

But Minneapolis’s resistance still achieved something extraordinary: At a time when Trump seemed at his strongest and they seemed at their weakest, they managed to throw him off his violent agenda simply by standing up nobly as individuals and as a community against his designs. Maybe—probably?—voters will put Democrats back in power today, and Trump will never again achieve the level of unilateral state authority that he enjoyed last year. But even if they don’t—even if Republicans beat the odds and give Trump back more or less united control of Washington—Minneapolis still gives us the model: You resist with whatever you’ve got.

SOURCE: Andrew Egger, “Trump’s Downfall Started in Minneapolis,” The Bulwark, 3 November 2026. As a proud paid subscriber of the Bulwark, I’m happy to share this essay with my own readers. |||||trr

Telepathy and the Russian Internet

On September 5, 1982, a music festival in San Bernardino, California, organized by Apple’s Steve Wozniak, bore witness to the first-ever public television link between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two large screens on either side of the stage broadcast performances by singer-songwriter Alla Pugacheva and rock band Voskreseniye, while Soviet citizens gathered at a Moscow radio station rocked out to the American lineup—that is, until Grateful Dead promoter Bill Graham, “convinced the whole thing was a KGB trick,” as Jeffrey Kripal wrote in his 2007 book Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion, “literally pulled the plug halfway through the concert.”

This so-called US-Soviet Space Bridge (the first of several, including one co-hosted by television host Phil Donahue) often features in books about the cultural history of the Cold War. But what many of these books don’t tell you is that a large number of the people who organized these events also hoped to lift the Iron Curtain through another method: telepathy. In her new book Hacking the Iron Curtain: A Media Archaeology of the Russian Internet, journalist and “media archeologist” Natalia Konradova reveals how the story of the early Soviet internet—and the role it played during the collapse of the USSR in 1991—can be traced back to early- and mid-twentieth-century dreams of instantaneous and unmediated mass communication.

Telepathy was, for much of the twentieth century, considered a real possibility—one whose secrets modern science could and would eventually discover.

Though recognized today as a pseudoscientific fantasy, telepathy was, for much of the twentieth century, considered a real possibility—one whose secrets modern science could and would eventually discover. In the Soviet Union, scientific interest in telepathy stemmed not only from a sense of general techno-optimism shared by many countries both before and after the two world wars, but also from beliefs and aspirations particular to communist society. Like cosmism (a philosophical movement that aimed at nothing less than the colonization of space, the attainment of immortality, and the resurrection of every person who ever lived), research into “parapsychology” was expected to help usher in a utopian future.

Of course, what this future looked like depended on who you asked. Some scientists and science fiction authors envisioned a world in which doctors could diagnose patients remotely and one person could beam their skills and talents directly into the bodies of others. The CIA worried that Soviet officials would be able to steal sensitive government information and control “machines on the moon or in the ocean” with their thoughts, according to a 1973 report. Meanwhile, Iosif Goldin—a parapsychology enthusiast and principal organizer of the Soviet side of the first Space Bridge—imagined mass communication as a cure for geopolitical conflict. He once wrote that if “one realizes the observation of the sunrise simultaneously on all continents of the Earth and does it regularly, turning it into a form of bringing people together, there may be no nuclear catastrophe.”

Although the internet itself did not directly contribute to the USSR’s demise, it should come as no surprise that the appearance of one closely coincided with the disappearance of the other. Described by Konradova as a “perfected version of samizdat,” or self-published dissident literature, the rise of the internet and online communities made censorship and the suppression of information virtually impossible—at least for a time. Hacking the Iron Curtain concludes with a brief though warranted reflection on how, amid digital restrictions under Vladimir Putin, the Russian internet ecosystem—Runet—has become increasingly cut off from the rest of the World Wide Web, aiding the country’s return to autocracy.

How did you become interested in parapsychology?

I have worked on many different subjects as an anthropologist and media theorist. But I have always been particularly interested in phenomena or systems that are either created by users or shaped through their efforts and self-organization. It does not really matter whether I’m studying war memorials in small villages, which were one of the subjects I researched in the early 2000s, or internet literature—a phenomenon of the early Russian internet, when users had for the first time the opportunity to publish their literary works without them having to pass through any editorial process.

That was how my research into the Russian-speaking internet began. In the mid-2000s, colleagues in Germany invited me to join their project, where I studied internet forums. At that point, though, neither cybernetics nor parapsychology was anywhere on my research horizon. They emerged only during the research process.

What did you feel was missing from existing treatments of this subject (like Alaina Lemon’s book) that you wanted to explore with Hacking the Iron Curtain?

Because my research is interdisciplinary, I read literature from a wide range of research fields: the history of the internet and digital culture, Cold War studies, studies of utopias and technological imaginaries, “parascience,” and so on. These fields have been studied for a long time, and each has produced fascinating work. What I felt was missing was precisely the connection between them.

Alaina Lemon’s book was an important discovery for me, not only because it was the only work I encountered that placed Soviet parapsychology within the context of the Cold War, but also because she shows just how powerful the mutual desire for communication was among people in both the USSR and the US. That said, Lemon’s approach was grounded more in theatrical practices, and she was not interested in the history of technology. When Soviet parapsychology is discussed elsewhere, it is typically situated within the history of supernatural beliefs and esoteric practices, as in The New Age of Russia: Occult and Esoteric Dimensions, a substantial volume edited by Birgit Menzel.

What interested me was a phenomenon identified in the 1960s by Lynn Schroeder and Sheila Ostrander, authors of the classic Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain: for a considerable period in the USSR, parapsychology was treated as a science. Researchers used scientific methods in their experiments and attempted to identify patterns in telepathy, telekinesis, and other phenomena. Yes, this no longer fits within our contemporary scientific understanding of the world, but I am talking about events that took place sixty years ago, when faith in the power of science was virtually limitless. As far as I know, before my work, no one had considered research into telepathy as one scientific field among others—regarded today as a dead end, but one that at the time could be seen as almost equivalent in status to computer science.

At what stage in your research did it become clear to you that there was a connection between parapsychology—telepathy in particular—and the early Russian internet?

I originally set out to study the history of the Russian internet. I interviewed figures from the Runet of the 1990s and worked with online archives. In those archives, I discovered that one of Russia’s first internet providers had actually been founded in the 1980s. This simply did not fit with my understanding that the internet could only have appeared after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Once I delved into the history of the first network connections from Soviet territory, I found myself dealing with an entirely new set of questions and, for me, an entirely new research field. Media archaeology is exactly the kind of (proto) discipline that is interested in dead ends, unrealized projects, and strange coincidences. It is still not particularly well known in the US, but I live in Germany, the birthplace of media archaeology.

To what extent was parapsychology research responsible for the rise of the Russian internet?

I distinguish between several levels of this connection. One is relatively simple and straightforward. The first contact between American and Soviet users on Usenet became possible thanks to American entrepreneur Joel Schatz, who came to the USSR in the mid-1980s. He did so because of his connections to the Esalen Institute in California, a well-known center of “alternative research,” now better known as a popular retreat destination for California tech people.

Esalen, in turn, had those connections because people associated with the institute had begun traveling to the USSR in the early 1970s hoping to establish contacts with Soviet parapsychologists (and they did). Later, they established a Soviet-American exchange program and joined the citizen-diplomacy movement, but initially it was the parapsychologists—with their desire for grassroots communication and their refusal to accept conventional boundaries of what was possible—who proved capable of connecting people from two countries on opposing sides of the Cold War.

How the archetype of the quirky, brilliant tech entrepreneur whose ideas could change the world migrated from high-tech hacker culture to Wall Street.

While studying this phenomenon, I also arrived at another, conceptual level of connection. In a sense, the internet is telepathy, except that a digital signal plays the role of the brain waves that science has never succeeded in discovering. In the 1960s, an era of techno-optimism and great hopes that human reason would triumph over war, disease, and death, computer science and the development of computer networks advanced alongside research into other possible forms of communication—forms that do not exist in nature but that, theoretically, could exist.

You mention on multiple occasions that telepathy was researched more extensively in the USSR than elsewhere. Why was this?

I think the USSR, as a project intended to realize a socialist utopia—and I am not discussing here how successful that project ultimately proved to be—had much stronger investments in radical scientific discoveries expected to fundamentally transform human life. Some of these ambitions were realized, such as spaceflight. Scientists today are still working on others, such as immortality. Others, such as telepathy, have disappeared from the scientific agenda.

One could probably add that the USSR had an obvious overproduction of specialists in the natural sciences, which was connected to the military-industrial complex. At some point, the Soviet Ministry of Defense also began investing in this new field because it seemed potentially useful for defense purposes. As a result, Soviet laboratories could often find room for experiments involving new and uncertain phenomena.

Still, I think all of this was more a consequence of the first factor: an exceptionally strong belief in scientific progress. Both American and Soviet societies were modern societies, if by modernity we mean above all a reliance on rational knowledge and technology. But in the USSR, this modernity was particularly radical and allowed virtually no alternative: it lay at the very foundation of the state as the only possible form of its existence.

You mention that Soviet scientists like Vladimir Bekhterev continued to research telepathy even after failing to find proof of its existence. Why did this interest persist, including among the CIA and US politicians?

In general, I have the impression that, from the 1920s through the end of the 1980s, scientists around the world were reluctant to abandon the subject completely. I do not know enough about Bekhterev’s activities to speculate confidently about his motives, but I do know that he was aware of the research his former student Vasiliev was conducting at his institute. I interpret this as an attempt not to burn any bridges—simply to keep the possibility open, “just in case.” What if the experiments ultimately did produce results, and you found yourself among those accused of suppressing something new and progressive? But of course, that is only my theory.

As for the CIA and politicians, that belongs to a different period. Judging from documents in the declassified CIA archives, they were deeply impressed by reports of Soviet achievements in this field and wrote alarmed assessments suggesting that the USSR might soon learn to guide missiles with the power of thought, kill people with a glance, and so on. Their primary objective, therefore, was to ensure the United States did not fall behind in this area.

Beyond parapsychology, to what extent did the Soviet internet become possible thanks to perestroika, and to what extent did perestroika become possible thanks to the Soviet internet?

I do not think I would subscribe to either proposition, because for me the causal relationship lies outside both perestroika and the Soviet internet. Rather, a second modernity—or postmodernity—arrived: a period in which users gained real possibilities to influence events. In the USSR, perestroika began, and contacts with the US intensified. In the United States, the internet became available to a critical mass of users. The mythology of the Cold War was ceasing to work on both sides: people understood that official authorities were lying and wanted to escape their control. All of this was happening simultaneously.

Of course, before perestroika, it would have been impossible for an American to walk into a closed Soviet scientific institute and ask to be connected to a classified network—which is exactly what happened when the internet provider SovAm Teleport was founded in the mid-1980s. But perestroika itself would not have happened if a significant portion of Soviet society had not already been ready for it.

You note that, at various points in twentieth-century Soviet history, techno-utopian dreams often gave way to practical and commercial applications. Between the two, which ultimately plays a larger role in this story?

Once connecting to the internet from the USSR became technically possible, there was much less room for fantasy. Why take risks and invest in uncertainty—which any grand vision requires—when a concrete technical solution already exists, and all you need is the money to implement it? More broadly, the USSR was shifting from overregulated socialism to unregulated capitalism, which would reveal itself in full force in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, pragmatism and commerce alone did not define the character of the early Russian internet. Because early users saw the network primarily as a hobby, they enthusiastically invested their time and energy in games, poetry, and all kinds of impractical inventions. Until the end of the 1990s, when the first major commercial projects emerged, the network was primarily a space for entertainment and free communication.

Can you talk about the role Russian Usenet played during and after the unsuccessful 1991 coup attempt to prevent the USSR from collapsing? Could events have played out differently if Russians had not had this window to the outside world?

This was an important moment. Information about the Moscow coup of 1991 reached American media and politicians largely through Usenet users at the Kurchatov Institute, in Moscow. They, in turn, collected information through their internal network, translated it into English, and posted it to newsgroups.

I would say the absence of the internet probably would not have changed the fundamental course of events, because the victory of the democratic forces during the coup depended much more on resistance on the ground than on support from other countries. The absence of access to Usenet might, however, have affected more specific aspects of what happened: how quickly information circulated, how much pressure came from outside the Soviet Union, and so on.

Some people think that if the Soviet internet had developed sooner, it could have ensured the survival of the USSR. Do you share this belief?

The idea that the development of the internet might have saved the USSR comes from the author of an alternate-history novel in which technologies are transported into the Soviet Union from the future. I don’t believe in this idea, because creating the internet required not only high-quality materials, which were in short supply, but also international cooperation, from which the USSR was cut off after World War II. It also required the internet itself—if, by the internet, we mean a system of communication and community formation.

I think this last factor matters most. Soviet society, and even more so the Soviet leadership, had absolutely no need for people to communicate freely with one another beyond institutional control. At the same time, Soviet engineers were already connecting computers into networks before work on ARPANET had even begun. In other words, the technical possibility existed, but neither the social demand nor the political will did. Even telephone services remained unavailable in many Soviet cities until the 1990s. To stay in touch, people exchanged letters, postcards, and telegrams.

Cybernetics, however, did produce a powerful vision that extended far beyond computers and even beyond communication itself. But because cybernetics was a product of Soviet culture as a whole, that vision faded when Soviet culture entered into crisis. The desire to imagine radically different futures was replaced by a desire to “live like people in the West,” particularly in terms of everyday life and living standards.

In the conclusion, you draw parallels between the futurism of Silicon Valley (specifically the quest for immortality) and the techno-utopianism of Soviet cyberneticians. Could you also speak to any meaningful differences between these visions?

To be honest, there are surprisingly few substantial differences, and that amazes me. Eternal life is hardly a new idea, of course, but one might still expect to see signs that these people lived in different periods and in very different cultures.

One possible distinction is that the American version of this techno-utopia is somewhat less closely tied to the public good and more oriented toward individual benefit, whereas Soviet cyberneticians had in mind, first and foremost, a new society, and only then a new human being as a member of that society. But we also have to remember that Soviet cyberneticians wrote articles and gave interviews under conditions of censorship. With that in mind, this difference may be less substantial than it initially appears.

In your conclusion, you write that the “historical connection between the attempts to rebuild the power lost during the collapse of the USSR and the current reality cannot be ignored.” To what extent did the Russian internet contribute to Russian world ideology and its consequences, including the war in Ukraine?

The figures of the early Russian internet did not make the decision to launch a military attack on Ukraine, and they should not be held responsible for it. The concept of the “Russian World” emerged from the political technologies of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although political technologists participated in the development of the Russian internet, they were not the ones who made the decision to launch Russia’s most recent military aggression.

Nevertheless, I do see—and describe in the book—a conceptual connection between the expansive space of Russian-language verbal culture, which became the first meaningful content of the Russian-speaking internet, and the “Russian World.” The fact that this connection is conceptual is important.

Until very recently, the expression “Russian internet” was something of an oxymoron, because the internet is, by definition, a global network. Yes, you can write in any language you like, but technically you are still writing on a common, international internet that does not recognize state borders. This is no longer entirely the case. In Russia, a “sovereign Runet” whose borders increasingly coincide with the state’s borders has, by now, almost become a reality.

In other words, Russians first entered the American internet; then they developed the concept of the “Runet,” which technically remained part of the global network but was culturally understood as a unique and independent phenomenon; and decades later, they physically carved out a segment of the global network in which international conventions no longer operate in the same way and where an antiwar post can result in a prison sentence. I am not sure I would call this a “Sonderweg,” but it is a remarkable development. One can only hope that the rest of the world will not follow the same path, although there are reasons for concern.

Resources

Hacking the Iron Curtain: A Media Archaeology of the Russian Internet, pp. 11-36
University of Wisconsin Press
 
Hacking the Iron Curtain: A Media Archaeology of the Russian Internet, pp. 37-57
University of Wisconsin Press
 
Southern California Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Winter 2007-2008), pp. 430-432
Historical Society of Southern California
 
Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Feb., 2014), pp. 136-138
University of Pennsylvania Press

SOURCE: Tim Brinkhof, “How Telepathy Helped Build the Russian Internet,” JSTOR Daily, 28 October 2026. Image courtesy of University of Wisconsin Press

Path to Open Books on JSTOR

Hacking the Iron Curtain: A Media Archaeology of the Russian Internet is part of JSTOR’s Path to Open initiative, which helps nonprofit university presses meet the challenges of open access publishing. Books in the program become open access three years after publication. JSTOR Daily is making the first and second chapters available for free now to drive awareness of the program.

Yan Shenkman: The Meaning of the Network Case, Nine Years On

The Network Case defendants, during their trial in Penza. Photo courtesy of Yan Shenkman

Around this time nine years ago, the so-called Network Case kicked off in Penza. It was a harrowing case concocted by the FSB against antifascists, whom they tortured. Eleven young men were convicted and sent to prison. Some have already served their time and been released. The key defendant, Dima Pchelintsev, has served half of his sentence and remains in prison. He was sentenced to a total of eighteen years.

While in custody, Pchelintsev has written a book entitled Shooting Fireworks (Strelba iz feierverka). I highly recommend it, since it provides a detailed account of the entire story.

A lot has happened since then: covid, war, exile. Criminal cases based on confessions obtained by torture have become routine, commonplace. People are imprisoned in large numbers, for any reason at all.

It is important to remember that if the sadists at the FSB had been stopped in their tracks back then, in 2017, we would be breathing easier today.

Evil must be battled before it’s too late. Its victims must have our backs when it matters.

You hesitated, you harbored doubts, you were too busy, and before you knew it, you were living under a dictatorship, missiles were raining down on civilians, and you were forced to flee the whole mess.

Back then, public opinion still meant something. Now, it means nothing at all.

All you have to do is show concern when it counts.

SOURCE: Yan Shenkman (Facebook), 20 October 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader. For a list of all the articles on the Network Case that I have published since January 2018, go here. |||||trr

Network Case Defendant Vasily Kuksov Released from Prison

Vasily Kuksov

According to Mediazona, [o]n October 16, 38-year-old Vasily Kuksov was released from Penal Colony No. 16 in the Nizhny Novgorod region. [On the] 17th of October he arrived by train in Serdobsk, in the Penza region, where he [was] reunited with his family.

In 2020, Kuksov, a musician and design engineer, was sentenced in Penza to nine years in a penal colony in the case of the “Network organization” (the defendants in this case received sentences of up to 18 years in prison).

The criminal case was opened in October 2017. At the time, FSB officers accused anti-fascists and anarchists, many of whom shared an interest in airsoft, of creating a “terrorist organization” and planning to “mobilize the masses to further destabilize the political situation in the country.”

Over the course of that month, security forces detained Kuksov, as well as Ilya Shakursky, Dmitry Pchelintsev, Andrey Chernov, Arman Sagynbayev, and Yegor Zorin. The formal grounds for initiating the criminal prosecution were Zorin’s confession. The young man had been detained with drugs and gave testimony about a terrorist organization. The case against him was subsequently dropped. In January 2018, Viktor Filinkov and Igor Shishkin were detained in St. Petersburg in connection with the same case. On April 11, another St. Petersburg resident, Yuly Boyarshinov, was also charged.

Initially, most of the defendants made confessions, but later retracted them, stating that they had been tortured. Viktor Filinkov, Dmitry Pchelintsev, Ilya Shakursky, Arman Sagynbayev, and Andrey Chernov reported violence and electric shocks inflicted by security officers. The Investigative Committee did not open a criminal investigation into any of the defendants’ allegations of torture. Five witnesses in the case also reported torture and pressure from security forces.

Vasily Kuksov told the court that FSB officers beat him during his arrest, saying, “You’re screwed, your life is over,” and threatened to cut off his finger. Despite this, he never made a confession.

During the investigation, while being held in Penza’s Pre-Trial Detention Centre No. 1, he was diagnosed with active tuberculosis shortly before his sentencing. He was not hospitalized and continued to be held together with other defendants in the case.

After the verdict in the Network case came into force, Kuksov was transferred in November 2020 to Medical Correctional Institution No. 3 (LIU-3) for tuberculosis patients in Nizhny Novgorod. He was discharged from the medical facility in January 2022. After that, at Penal Colony No. 16 in the Nizhny Novgorod region, he was repeatedly placed in a punishment cell.
 

Anarchist Black Cross Moscow

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Photo: Rupression

SOURCE: “Vasily Kuksov, sentenced in the Network case in 2020, released from prison,” Avtonomnoe Deistvie, 20 October 2026. Photo courtesy of Rupression. Thanks to Simon Pirani for the heads-up. For a list of all the articles on the Network Case that I have published since January 2018, go here. |||||trr

Russian Business Daily Paints Ukraine as the Aggressor, Europe as Its Victim

A drone’s-eye glimpse of my favorite place on earth: Imatra, South Karelia, Finland. SOURCE: Imatri.fi, via Delovoi Peterburg

Major foreign travel agencies have begun canceling bus tours to southeastern Finland’s Lake Saimaa region en masse, according to Yle.

The companies consider the risk of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entering Finnish airspace to be a security threat.

Armi Hatakka, manager of the castle-like Imatran Valtionhotelli hotel in Imatra, reported that organized bus groups from European countries virtually stopped visiting the area in the summer of 2026

She noted, however, that the threat posed by drones deterred only major tour operators. Individual foreign travelers continued to visit the region on their own.

With Russians no longer visiting the Finnish border region, Germans have become the largest group of foreign tourists there. The number of overnight stays by tourists from Germany in Imatra more than doubled, reaching 2,400 over the summer.

Since the tourist influx from Russia ceased, the number of foreign tourists in the region has been declining for the fifth consecutive year, and domestic tourists are not enough to sustain the growth of local businesses, the article notes.

Since May of this year, the Finnish military has regularly imposed restrictions in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and closed the airspace to aircraft due to Ukraine’s attacks on neighboring regions of Russia.

Preparing for the possible arrival of UAVs in Finnish airspace has become a standard part of planning for all major events in the country. Finns have been advised to be prepared for threats from drones throughout the country, though it was noted that the risks are higher near the border with Russia.

In Latvia, the local tourism industry described the situation in the sector as catastrophic: Ukrainian drones have scared off all the tourists. Mass cancellations of trips to the eastern part of the country began in the spring, and the summer season as a whole fell short of expectations.

SOURCE: “Foreign tour groups are cancelling trips to Finland due to drone threats,” Delovoi Peterburg, 20 October 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader