Russian Business Daily Paints Ukraine as the Aggressor, Europe as Its Victim

A drone’s-eye glimpse of my favorite place on earth: Imatra, South Karelia, Finland. SOURCE: Imatri.fi, via Delovoi Peterburg

Major foreign travel agencies have begun canceling bus tours to southeastern Finland’s Lake Saimaa region en masse, according to Yle.

The companies consider the risk of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entering Finnish airspace to be a security threat.

Armi Hatakka, manager of the castle-like Imatran Valtionhotelli hotel in Imatra, reported that organized bus groups from European countries virtually stopped visiting the area in the summer of 2026

She noted, however, that the threat posed by drones deterred only major tour operators. Individual foreign travelers continued to visit the region on their own.

With Russians no longer visiting the Finnish border region, Germans have become the largest group of foreign tourists there. The number of overnight stays by tourists from Germany in Imatra more than doubled, reaching 2,400 over the summer.

Since the tourist influx from Russia ceased, the number of foreign tourists in the region has been declining for the fifth consecutive year, and domestic tourists are not enough to sustain the growth of local businesses, the article notes.

Since May of this year, the Finnish military has regularly imposed restrictions in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and closed the airspace to aircraft due to Ukraine’s attacks on neighboring regions of Russia.

Preparing for the possible arrival of UAVs in Finnish airspace has become a standard part of planning for all major events in the country. Finns have been advised to be prepared for threats from drones throughout the country, though it was noted that the risks are higher near the border with Russia.

In Latvia, the local tourism industry described the situation in the sector as catastrophic: Ukrainian drones have scared off all the tourists. Mass cancellations of trips to the eastern part of the country began in the spring, and the summer season as a whole fell short of expectations.

SOURCE: “Foreign tour groups are cancelling trips to Finland due to drone threats,” Delovoi Peterburg, 20 October 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader

Traitor

Trump says Russia is being “fine” on Ukraine

Writing in the New York Times, David Sanger highlights the extent to which Donald Trump is going all out to support Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine:

President Trump’s intensifying effort in the past few weeks to rehabilitate Russia and usher President Vladimir V. Putin back into diplomatic society is remarkable for its speed, its characterization of Mr. Zelensky as the primary obstacle to peace, and its brazen denial that Russia is continuing the war that Mr. Trump says he is trying to end.

“Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine,” Mr. Trump said on Monday, speaking to reporters outside the White House as he left for a campaign rally. “They haven’t been doing much,” he said, making no mention of the Russian missiles and jet-powered drones that have been targeting apartment buildings in Kyiv and Ukraine’s surviving electricity grid.

In contrast, he said, “We’ve given a lot to Ukraine. They’ve given nothing to us. Remember that.”

As Sanger notes, Trump’s support for Putin is unique in American history. Previous administrations have made deals with erstwhile adversaries, as Nixon did with China, and given up on support for failing allies, as the U.S. did in Vietnam and Afghanistan. But never before have we outright switched sides, let alone supported an aggressor while vilifying that aggressor’s victim.

What makes Trump’s support for Putin even more remarkable is that Russia has, by many accounts, been actively aiding Iran against America in the war Trump started. Who says so? Well, among others, Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the aid goes beyond intelligence sharing that has helped Iran target U.S. forces. Russia has also reportedly been sending Iran explosives and weapons components.

What would Republicans be saying if a Democratic president were supporting a foreign dictator even as that dictator was helping another nation kill American troops? They would be crying “treason.” But this is all apparently “fine” with Trump.

What’s going on here? It’s important to understand that — as Phillips O’Brien documents — Trump hasn’t “pivoted” away from Ukraine toward Russia. He has been a Putin supporter all along.

Thus when Trump says that “We’ve given a lot to Ukraine,” who, exactly, does he mean by “we”? He cut off all economic and military aid to Ukraine as soon as he took office. Here’s total support for Ukraine, by country, since January 2025:

True, the U.S. continued to share military intelligence with Ukraine while allowing Ukraine to use Elon Musk’s Starshield and permitting European nations to transfer some U.S. weapons to Ukraine. But these actions cost America nothing. The most you can say is that until recently Trump shied away from actively sabotaging Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

And now even that restraint is gone. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, U.S. intelligence sharing was blocked “for some period of time,” although it appears to have resumed for now. Ukraine’s access to Starshield has been limited. And the Washington Post reports that the U.S. has been holding up European transfers of Patriot missiles to Ukraine.

There are two questions here. First, why does Trump love Putin and hate Zelenskyy? Second, why has he ripped off the mask and gone full pro-Russia in the past few weeks?

On the first question, Zelenskyy gave a blunt answer in a recent interview with the Financial Times: Trump, he asserted, has an instinctive affinity for autocrats and the super wealthy: “He speaks about it openly that he loves such people and he respects such people.” That’s clearly right.

I would add three points. First, Trump and his inner circle don’t just love autocrats. They hate democracy and rule of law — which means that they hate America and American values.

Second, Putin-worship was widespread on the authoritarian right even before Trump entered the picture, with many celebrating Russia’s anti-wokeness and perceived masculinity. Remarkably, the valorization of Russia’s supposed toughness has survived despite Russia’s repeated military humiliations. So Trump has been following a well-trodden path.

Finally, whatever else you may say about Zelenskyy, he’s a genuine hero, who showed great personal courage by staying in Kyiv when Russia invaded. And Trump surely resents the fact that Zelenskyy is everything he is not.

The second question is, why now? Why has Trump chosen this moment to switch from covert, deniable support for Putin to overtly, explicitly taking Russia’s side?

As I suggested yesterday, the answer lies precisely in Trump’s collapsing support at home. Nothing he does now is likely to avert Republican catastrophe in the midterms. Republican politicians have been going out of their way to avoid being seen with him on the campaign trail. Trump officials are already lawyering up in preparation for the probes a Democratic Congress will launch.

At this point, then, Trump effectively has nothing left to lose on the political front — and his political bankruptcy has freed him to become his worst self, indulging himself by doing what he always wanted to do — which includes supporting corrupt, murderous dictators.

And there will be much more of this to come. Trump can’t and won’t make America great again. But he can betray everything America stands for, and he’s doing it as we speak.

SOURCE: Paul Krugman (Substack), 20 October 2026. I subscribe to Mr. Krugman’s Substack, and I’m happy to share it occasionally with my own readers. }}}}}trr


Donald Trump claims Russia has been “fine” in Ukraine, and Michael Weiss, who has witnessed Russian atrocities firsthand, is furious. Weiss and former CIA officer Marc Polymeropoulos examine Trump’s increasingly alarming alignment with Putin, reports that Elon Musk interfered with Ukraine’s satellite defenses, Pete Hegseth’s refusal to release desperately needed Patriot missiles, and whether Trump now fits the intelligence definition of a Russian agent of influence.

SOURCE: “Michael Weiss Goes Nuclear After Trump Says Russia Has Been ‘Fine’ in Ukraine,” The Bulwark (YouTube), 20 October 2026


“Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine. They haven’t been doing much,” U.S. President Donald Trump remarked to a group of journalists outside the White House on Oct. 19.

The comments came as tensions between Kyiv and Washington are rising after reports that the U.S. stopped warning Kyiv of incoming Russian ballistic missiles and limited the use of Starshield, a military version of Elon Musk’s Starlink, for Ukraine, making it difficult to intercept Russian attacks on Ukraine.

While Russia wages its war with no regard for civilian lives or human dignity, these are just some of the things that Trump seemingly considers “fine.”

The U.S. president spoke only hours after Russia had launched another deadly attack on the people of Ukraine a few hours before he made his comments. A Russian drone struck a park in the town of Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv Oblast, killing six and injuring at least 15 others.

Inna Mariukhna, a 28-year-old teacher at a local school, was one of those killed in the attack. She was pushing her 1-year-old daughter, Anhelina, in a stroller when the Russian jet-powered drone struck them both. Anhelina was killed instantly, while Inna succumbed to her injuries in hospital.

Pictures showing Anhelina’s bloodied and lifeless body, still strapped in her stroller, her small shoes still perfectly tied, were posted on social media by many including President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Arina Koval, an 8-year-old girl, was also killed in the drone strike, as were 34-year-old Yulia Spichak, 36-year-old Marianna Tsymbal, and a sixth victim who has not been named.

Zelensky described the attack as an “absolute atrocity.” Trump thinks this is “fine.”

In the morning hours of Oct. 20, at least three people were killed and four people injured after a Russian drone struck early morning commuter traffic in the Holosiivskyi District of Kyiv.

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported Russia’s drone strike, saying: “The enemy is once again cynically attacking civilians. Behind each such blow are human lives, pain, and ruined destinies.”

This was but one of hundreds of continuous Russian strikes on Ukraine’s capital and dozens of other cities and communities across the country, as the Kremlin is pursuing another theory of victory — attempting to bomb Ukrainian cities into submission.

“328 civilians were killed and 2,105 injured in September 2026.”

According to the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, at least 328 civilians were killed and 2,105 injured in September 2026, an 85% increase from September 2025. The deadly trend is continuing into October, according to the mission. “The first two weeks of October were among the deadliest periods for civilians in years,” Danielle Bell, head of the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, said.

Recent U.S. actions have increased the threat for Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine’s Starshield satellite internet terminals, which Ukraine uses to control anti-drone interceptors, have been impeded, while deliveries of vital Patriot interceptors have been deliberately delayed by the Pentagon, Zelensky said on Oct. 18, an allegation corroborated by reporting in the Kyiv Independent and the Washington Post.

The New York Times, meanwhile, reported a Russian plan, presented to the publication by Ukrainian authorities, to destroy Ukraine’s beleaguered energy system once and for all. While Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy system have been ongoing throughout the year at a low level, Moscow has recently ramped up mass attacks to wipe out power plants, substations, and gas infrastructure for its fifth winter offensive during the full-scale invasion.

At a recent official event of Russia’s International People’s Unity Club in Moscow, Russian Lt. Col. Alexey Selivano said: “Wherever Russian troops arrive, Ukrainians cease to exist.”

From the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Russian forces have inflicted countless atrocities against Ukraine.

In March 2022, Russian forces carried out a massacre of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war in Bucha, a suburb to the west of Kyiv, after their failed attempt to take the Ukrainian capital. Liberating Ukrainian forces found the bodies of victims, some with their hands tied, lying in the streets. The bodies of 458 people were eventually recovered from Bucha. The majority of them had been shot, tortured or bludgeoned.

From the opening days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the people of Mariupol suffered horrifically during the 86-day Russian siege. To this day, the exact number of Ukrainian civilians killed in Russia’s assault on the city is unknown. According to preliminary estimates by Ukraine’s Center for the Study of Occupation, at least 22,000 civilians were killed during the siege. The true figure might never be known, as Russia has deliberately destroyed graves and cremated bodies in an attempt to conceal the true death toll in Mariupol. Some estimates put the actual figure as high as 87,000.

A Russian airstrike on March 16, 2022, likely killed 300 to 900 people hiding inside the Mariupol Drama Theater, according to different estimates, including an Associated Press investigation and figures by exiled local authorities. They were awaiting evacuation from the then-besieged Mariupol amid heavy Russian bombardment. Footage of the theater shows that the word “Children” in Russian was written in large letters on the square in front of the theater. Russia bombed the building regardless.

Across Ukraine’s occupied territories, Russia has been kidnapping Ukrainian children. Russia’s forcible transfer of children constitutes crimes against humanity, according to a probe by an U.N.-mandated independent commission.

“Based on new evidence, the Commission has now concluded that the Russian authorities committed two types of crimes against humanity: deportation and forcible transfer of children, as well as their enforced disappearance,” Erik Mose, chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, said in a statement on March 12.

This was an issue the White House at least appeared to care about previously, with the U.S. State Department allocating $25 million in funding in March 2026 to help trace and rehabilitate Ukrainian children abducted by Russia.

In May, the United Nations also blacklisted Russian armed and security forces for carrying out systematic sexual assaults, rape, and widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners. Despite Russia’s refusal to grant access to U.N. human rights investigators, they were still able to independently verify 310 cases of conflict-related sexual violence in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. The victims were prisoners of war and civilian detainees, the vast majority of them men.

SOURCE: Jimmy Rushton and Jonas Heins, “Things Russia has done to Ukraine that Trump thinks are ‘fine,'” Kyiv Independent, 20 October 2026. As a paid-up supporter, I’m happy to share the Kyiv Independent’s excellent journalism with my readers occasionally. }}}}}trr


Though they deny any involvement, the Trump administration and Elon Musk are apparently helping Putin escalate his campaign of terror against Ukraine. Civilian casualties across Ukraine are rising—including women and children—but Trump said Monday that Russia “has been fine on Ukraine.” At the same time, Team Trump looks to be lining up business deals with Russian energy companies. And Marco’s whitewashing of it all is sickening. Plus: Zelensky is tired of Trump’s games, China is playing a curious role on both sides of the war, and JD has another whopper to add to his stack of lies. Former Amb. Michael McFaul joins Tim Miller.

SOURCE: “Former Ambassador NUKES Pathetic Sellout Marco Rubio (w/ Michael McFaul),” The Bulwark (YouTube), 20 October 2026

Donald Trump Is Helping Russia Win the War

It’s already been said many times that the U.S., under President Donald Trump, was turning its back on Ukraine.

But the past few days show something worse than abandonment: Trump is now actively helping Russia win the war.

Many media and commentators have been far too careful in their phrasing, saying that Trump is “squeezing Ukraine” or putting pressure on it. We all need to do the responsible thing and call it what it is, as ugly as it sounds: Trump is not trying to reach a deal — he is trying to “end the war” by simply helping Russia win.

Since last week, the Trump administration has been in a downward spiral of betraying Ukraine and embarrassing the U.S.

It started when Trump announced that he had reached a deal with Vladimir Putin to buy diesel from Russia. By doing so, he went against the sanctions bill he himself had signed less than a month ago, which sought to penalize countries buying energy from Russia.

The deal is not going to help bring down fuel prices for regular Americans, but it sends a tremendously harmful signal: That it’s alright to make deals that pump cash into Russia, despite its brutal ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

That move was followed by Trump announcing a surprise energy ceasefire that Kyiv didn’t know about. When Russia ignored it and continued to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Trump said nothing about it.

It only got worse from there. For the past two nights, Russia has hit Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles that came without any warning. That is, the early warning alerts that Ukraine typically receives about missile and drone launches from its partners — chiefly, the U.S. While there is no confirmation yet, there is a strong possibility that the U.S. has limited some intelligence data sharing.

If true, it would mean more Ukrainians killed. No warning means there is no time to get to the shelter. At least three people were killed in such an attack in Kyiv last night — civilians in their homes.

No warning means there is no time to get to the shelter.

Finally, this morning, we learned that Ukraine’s military use of Starlink had been restricted without warning, undermining Ukraine’s middle-strike capabilities that are critical for its front-line operations against Russia. In the rear, it hurts Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian drones targeting civilians.

This betrayal comes after one of the deadliest weeks for Ukrainian civilians. Last week, Russia killed more than 150 civilians in Ukraine. Just one of the strikes, on a bus stop in Kramatorsk, killed 33 people. In another Russian attack, in Pryluky, three one-year-old children were among the dead.

Most strikingly, Trump has repeatedly condemned Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries — Moscow’s largest source of revenue to fund its war effort — but remained silent on Russia’s slaughter of Ukrainian children.

The most recent time we found Trump publicly condemning Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilians was in 2025.

While Trump has shown his disdain for Ukraine on many occasions (you will remember the Oval Office episode, surely), his latest cynicism should shock even his most ardent supporters.

But what may come as a surprise to the American president is that giving a boost to Russia’s war effort, while a big help, cannot force Ukrainians to stop fighting. That is not up to the U.S. What is up to it, and to its president, is whether it wants to uphold the values of democracy by supporting a country under siege from its aggressive neighbor that wants to determine its future.

Because helping Russia to win the war won’t stop it. It will simply give it the ability to cause more death and more destruction. In other words, it will help prolong the war.

And the danger isn’t confined to Ukraine — the rest of Europe is at risk. U.S. intelligence last month warned that Russia could launch a limited attack on a NATO country as early as this fall.

An emboldened Putin makes that more likely. Trump is endangering the security of the entire European continent in an attempt to score short-term political points. It’s difficult to name a time when a U.S. president has acted so recklessly on the international stage.

We all need to start calling it what it is:

Trump indeed wants the war to end quickly. He’s just choosing to end it with a Russian victory.

Source: “Editorial: Donald Trump is helping Russia win the war,” Kyiv Independent, 14 October 2026. I’m a proud, dues-paying member of the Kyiv Independent’s community of supporters, which I urge you to join if, like me, you support independent journalism and Ukraine. |||||trr

Image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (R) at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, U.S., on Aug. 15, 2025. AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson, via the Kyiv Independent.

The Ninth Circle of Hell

Woodcut for Inferno, canto 34. Pietro di Piasi, Venice, 1491

So now, after more than a decade of pretending that he is not associated with Russia and that he would honor the U.S. national security position of support for Ukraine and our European allies, Trump is openly backing Russia’s president Vladimir Putin.

Asked today by a reporter about concerns that his dropping of sanctions against Russian oil yesterday would funnel money to Putin’s war on Ukraine, Trump blamed Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky for prolonging the war:

“Zelensky could have settled this war many times. Many, many times,” Trump said, “And he chooses not to.” Trump blamed Zelensky for the high cost of diesel because Ukrainian forces have targeted Russian oil refineries, although since Russian oil was sanctioned, the actual chokepoint for diesel prices is the Strait of Hormuz, largely closed because of Trump’s war on Iran.

Trump accused Zelensky of wanting “to make problems for the world. He wants to make problems for our farmers, our ranchers, with diesel fuel, because Russia supplies a large portion of the diesel fuel throughout the world.” Ukrainians have hit Russian oil refineries to stop the flow of money into Russia as it evades sanctions and sells oil through its so-called shadow fleet. Russia, in contrast, has been striking civilian targets in violation of the laws of war.

Trump continued with a warning to Zelensky, saying “he’d better damn well stop.”

Ukraine continues to fight against Russia because Russia has invaded Ukraine and is trying to occupy Ukraine’s eastern industrial area in violation of the United Nations charter that vows no country will use threats or force against another’s territorial integrity. Until Trump took office, the United States was the key guarantor of this principle.

The U.S. has stood against Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine not only because of the principle of territorial sovereignty, but also because of security guarantees the U.S., along with the United Kingdom and Russia, gave to Ukraine in 1994. After the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991, Ukraine had the third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world. In exchange for Ukraine’s giving up those weapons, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia agreed to secure Ukraine’s borders. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, they agreed they would not use military force or economic coercion against Ukraine.

Then Russian leader Vladimir Putin worked to bring Ukraine under the sway of the Russian oligarchs who rose to replace the region’s communist leaders, monopolizing formerly publicly held industries as those industries were privatized. American journalist Paul Klebnikov, the chief editor of Forbes in Russia, was murdered in 2004 after calling attention to what the oligarchs were doing.

In that same year, a Russian-backed politician, Viktor Yanukovych, appeared to be elected president of Ukraine. But the election was so full of fraud—including the poisoning of a key rival who wanted to break ties with Russia and align Ukraine with Europe—the government voided the election and called for a do-over. Yanukovych needed a makeover fast, and for that he called on an American political consultant with a reputation for making unsavory characters palatable to the media: Paul Manafort.

For ten years, from 2004 to 2014, Manafort worked for Yanukovych and his party, trying to make what the U.S. State Department called a party of “mobsters and oligarchs” look legitimate. He made a fortune thanks to his new friends. In 2010, Yanukovych finally won the presidency on a platform of rejecting NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through which Europe joined together to oppose first the USSR, and then the rising threat of Russia. Immediately, Yanukovych turned Ukraine toward Russia. Then, in 2014, after months of popular protests, Ukrainians ousted Yanukovych from power in what is known as the Revolution of Dignity. He fled to Russia.

Shortly after Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia invaded Ukraine’s Crimea and annexed it, prompting the United States and the European Union to impose economic sanctions on Russia itself and also on specific Russian businesses and oligarchs, prohibiting them from doing business in the United States and in its territories. These sanctions hurt Russia and froze the assets of key Russian oligarchs, including Putin.

Now without his main source of income, Manafort owed about $17 million to allies of Yanukovych and Putin, especially Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. By 2016, his longtime friend and business partner Roger Stone was advising the presidential campaign of Donald Trump, and Manafort was happy to step in to help. He did not take a salary. He began as an advisor in March 2016 and became the campaign chairman in late June, after meeting on June 9 with Don Jr., Jared Kushner, and Russian operatives.

It turned out that Russia was looking for a way to grab the Ukrainian land it wanted without continuing to fight. Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s 2019 report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election explained that Manafort and his partner, Russian operative Konstantin Kilimnik, in summer 2016 “discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas, and having [Russian-backed Viktor] Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.”

The Mueller Report continued: “That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a ‘backdoor’ means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.” The region that Putin wanted was the country’s industrial heartland. He was offering a “peace” plan that would carve off much of Ukraine and make it subservient to him. This was the exact opposite of U.S. policy for a free and united Ukraine, and there was no chance that former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, who was running for the presidency against Trump, would stand for it. But if Trump were elected, the equation changed.

According to the Republican-dominated Senate Intelligence Committee, Kilimnik wrote: “[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from D[onald] T[rump] saying ‘he wants peace in Ukraine and Donbass back in Ukraine’ and a decision to be a ‘special representative’ and manage this process.” Kilimnik further suggested that Manafort “could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia ([Yanukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level, cutting through all the bullsh*t and getting down to business), Ukraine, and key EU capitals,” and that “once then–Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko understood this ‘message’ from the United States, the process ‘will go very fast and DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration.’”

According to the Senate Intelligence Committee, the men continued to work on what they called the “Mariupol Plan” at least until 2018. Trump could not make it happen during his first term, although his operatives spent a great deal of time messing around in Ukraine and trying to smear Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden from there, and after Biden took office, Putin invaded Ukraine again in 2022.

As Jim Rutenberg wrote in his coverage of the Mariupol Plan in the New York Times Magazine, once his troops were in Ukraine, Putin claimed he had annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, two of which were specifically named in the Mariupol Plan, and instituted martial law in them, claiming that the people there had voted to join Russia.

Biden pulled together countries from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with other allies and partners, to stop Russia’s attack and to support Ukraine’s heroic efforts to repel the Russian invasion. Russia’s troops, meanwhile, have committed atrocities and are attacking civilians. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted several Russian officials and commanders, including Putin himself, for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

But once Trump was back in office in 2025, he promptly tried to swing the U.S. behind Russia. His appointees insisted that the real story of the 2016 campaign was not Russia’s support for Trump, but rather a Democratic conspiracy to push the story of the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia. Repeatedly, Trump has threatened Zelensky and tried to cajole him into surrendering the territory Russia wants.

After the ICC indictment, Trump welcomed Putin to American soil in Alaska in August 2025, ordering U.S. soldiers to roll out a red carpet for him, and he has invited Putin to a gathering of the Group of 20 nations with advanced economies at Mar-a-Lago in December. Yesterday, the U.S. announced sanctions on the ICC itself, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has vowed to take the organization apart “brick by brick.”

Meanwhile, Putin has behaved like someone who has a strong hand over Trump. In August 2025, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov showed up at the Alaska meeting wearing a sweatshirt with the Cyrillic letters “CCCP,” which translates to USSR, suggesting that the Soviet Union had won the Cold War after all.

On Friday, despite the fact that Russia is backing Iran, whose military is killing U.S. soldiers, Trump proudly announced he was removing sanctions to let Russia sell its oil on global markets. Ukrainian attacks have curtailed Russian production, so the amount it has available to help the diesel squeeze in the U.S. is negligible, but the ability to rake in cash as the world’s current oil shortage has driven up prices is invaluable to Putin for his desperate war effort.

Also yesterday, Trump asked the Supreme Court to weigh in on a lawsuit over the 2016 election that he brought in 2022 against Hillary Clinton and former members of the Department of Justice, including former director of the FBI James Comey, Clinton’s campaign chair, and a grab bag of others. Trump sued them for conspiring to tie him to Russia in order to undermine his campaign.

As John Fritze of CNN reported yesterday, a federal court dismissed the lawsuit as “frivolous” and ruled that Trump’s attorneys were liable for nearly $1 million in sanctions. The 11th U.S. Circuit of Appeals upheld most of that decision last year. “This case should never have been brought,” U.S. District Judge Donald Middlebrooks of the Southern District of Florida wrote. “Its inadequacy as a legal claim was evident from the start. No reasonable lawyer would have filed it.” Now Trump is appealing to the Supreme Court.

But at this point, how much more evidence is necessary to assess that Trump has undermined U.S. national security and is working for Russia? And how much longer will Republicans in Congress continue to protect him as he does it?

—

Notes:

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-kuzhugetovich-shoigu-and

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and

https://www.jurist.org/news/2026/07/us-to-seek-dismantling-of-international-criminal-court-rubio-announces

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/15/lavrov-ussr-russia-trump-putin-ukraine-summit-alaska/

https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/24/politics/trump-sues-hillary-clinton

​​https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/09/politics/trump-supreme-court-hillary-clinton-lawsuit

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-russia-sanctions-trump-congress-b322eec6b33610ebf4048daa5d621483

https://ia903105.us.archive.org/10/items/mueller-report/mueller-report.pdf

https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-report-volume5.pdf, pp. 99 and following

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/23/trump-putin-g20-miami-01089850

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html?searchResultPosition=111

https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/U-S-journalist-author-shot-to-death-in-Russia-2742901.php

Bluesky:

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ssiderod.bsky.social/post/3lwje6wb7gc2n

anne.sheshed.rocks/post/3lwjrlxxals22

Trump’s Truth:

statuses/42215

Source: Heather Cox Richardson, Letters from an American, 10 October 2026


[…]

First, the big news on U.S. foreign policy was that Trump announced that he was buying 300,000 tons of Russian diesel. He’s not allowed to do this: Sanctions preventing purchase of Russian oil are law, not a choice on Trump’s part. But under Trump laws are suggestions at most, so it might happen anyway. In any case, the main lesson here, as Phillips O’Brien explains, is that Trump isn’t even hiding the fact that he is supporting Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

But being a nerdy economist, my first printable reaction to the announcement was, 300,000 tons??? That’s a bit over 2 million barrels. America consumes approximately 4 million barrels of distillates — diesel (mostly) and heating oil — every day.

So Trump is betraying an embattled democracy, demonstrating our faithlessness to the whole world, seriously damaging whatever is left of America’s leadership in the world, for the sake of maybe 12 hours’ worth of diesel. Really?

Of course, Trump and those around him don’t care about the national interest. But I would strongly guess that they didn’t do the math, that 300,000 tons sounded like a lot to them and that they had no idea that it was trivial for an economy the size of America’s. I might add that this is general issue with Trump: he often touts trivial policies as major achievement, and it often seems obvious that he has no idea how big America and the world are.

Arithmetic, I guess, suffers from Trump derangement syndrome.

[…]

Source: Paul Krugman (Substack), “Arithmetic Suffers from Trump Derangement Syndrome,” 12 October 2026


A bipartisan group of six senators on Sunday called for President Donald Trump’s administration to “immediately reverse course” on a plan to purchase diesel from Russia as part of an effort to lower high fuel prices.

Trump shocked lawmakers when he announced on social media Friday that he struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call. He said Russia will immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to the American and global market, followed by an additional 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons “immediately thereafter.” Russia will deliver an additional 3 million tons “within a short period of time” after that, he wrote.

Four Republican senators and two Democratic senators signed onto the statement released Sunday in protesting the deal. They said the administration failed to consult with Congress or submit any explanation to justify its decision as required by statute.

“The United States should not provide Putin with a financial lifeline while Russia continues to kill Ukrainian civilians. The Administration must immediately reverse course,” they wrote.

The Republican senators who signed onto the statement are Sens. Susan Collins of Maine, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Thom Tillis of North Carolina and John Curtis of Utah. The Democratic senators are Sens. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut.

Tillis, in an interview that aired Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” said there’s a legitimate case for saying the president is not following the law if the administration goes through with its diesel purchase plan.

“We were very clear that Russia is the aggressor. Russia is the one who can end this war by backing out of territory that they occupied,” Tillis said.

Trump’s announcement came just a few weeks after Congress passed legislation that directed Trump to impose substantial tariffs on the top importers of Russian oil or natural gas, with an exception for countries that import less than 15% of Russia’s natural gas exports and have taken significant steps to reduce those imports.

The congressional effort was aimed at cutting the flow of money Russia receives from oil and gas sales to finance its war against Ukraine.

The lawmakers also noted that Congress explicitly banned Russia energy imports in 2022 to prevent the United States from financing the war.

“Congress was clear: the U.S. should not import oil from Russia until it ends its aggression against Ukraine and ceases threats against our NATO Allies,” the six lawmakers wrote in their statement. “President Trump’s decision to allow Russian diesel imports to the U.S. runs directly counter to that law.”

Sen. John Barrasso, R-Wyo., said Trump is focused on reducing the cost of energy when asked whether the president’s action would be in violation of U.S. law.

“The president is balancing and has to make tough decisions,” Barrasso said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

He also encouraged Trump to enforce the sanctions law that Congress passed last month.

“This is just another point of leverage for the president to use against Putin in an effort to get a long-term solution in that part of the world,” Barrasso said.

Energy experts say the Russia deal is unlikely to make a dent in high prices at the pump.

Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, noted that the total amount of diesel appears to be less than what the U.S. uses in a day.

Nephew argued that Iran and Russia might benefit more than the U.S.

“The Iranians are probably very excited because it shows that there’s a lot of pressure still on the U.S. And the Russians are excited because it puts a big hole in the sanctions regime,” he said.

Trump has recently sought to blame record U.S. diesel prices on Ukraine rather than the U.S.-led war in Iran, which has elevated world energy prices.

Source: Kevin Freking, “Six senators call for Trump administration to ‘immediately reverse course’ on Russian diesel plan,” Associated Press, 11 October 2026

Elena Kostyuchenko: We’re No Longer Eyeless in Gaza

I just saw NAZA at the New York Film Festival. There were a dozen cops outside the theater checking people’s bags. Protesters were anticipated but there were no protests—just a car with the message “NO PROOF” plastered on its door, circling the block.

Several people spoke briefly before the screening. One of them was Harry Davies, an investigative reporter at the Guardian, which co-produced the film. Harry reminded the audience that investigative reporting is based on information obtained from sources whose anonymity is a vital institution. He also said the Guardian’s investigations department (that is, he and his colleagues) had fact-checked all the assertions made by interviewees in the film and had corroborated all of them. Many of the things recounted in the film had been previously published in the Israeli-Palestinian online magazine +972 (whose journalists I know personally). The film itself was the result of nearly three years of work by this team.

As for the film, I can’t say whether it’s great or not. It is staggering. People talk about the work they do with Tel Aviv in the background: we see people in the windows and imagine other people in other windows sixty kilometers down the coast. The interviewees describe a well-oiled machine for murdering people, not a one-off totally fucked-up incident amidst the war. Many of the film’s critics have overlooked the Israeli army’s use of AI to select its targets for murder. According to their own estimates, the system is now approximately eighty-five percent effective, meaning that a minimum of fifteen percent of its targets had nothing to do with Hamas. Moreover, a target doesn’t equated to a victim, hence the term NAZA itself, which is an acronym for “collateral damage” [in Hebrew]. The [IDF] officers in the film explain that a NAZA value of twenty is the threshold of hesitation. Killing twenty bystanders to take out a single alleged insurgent could be problematic, but any number below twenty is a-okay. And yet the officers recall instances where NAZA values of 500 and 200 were green-lighted. Why such [high] numbers? Because alleged or genuine members of Hamas are killed at night, in residential buildings, along with everyone in their vicinity. The estimate of potential victims can be made quite accurately due to the total system of surveillance [used by the IDF]. They can hack a telephone and use it as a microphone. Do you hear a baby crying in the background? The baby is only a single NAZA.

There are many other harrowing details in the film.

The Israeli secret services will have a tough time identifying the interviewees. We don’t see their faces, and sometimes even their heads are hard to make out; their voices have been altered, and their handwriting has been blurred. Many of the interviews draw and caption on paper what they saw on their [computer] screens. Many of them are involved in combat remotely. One of the interviewees had been in Gaza itself, burning down houses.

There was no ovation [when the screening ended]: no one applauded at all, so the credits rolled down the screen in profound silence. I could hear several people crying, and the person to my left intoned, “Oh Jesus, Jesus.”

Something else that struck me as vital is the extent to which war is no longer waged blindly, the extent to which every decision, every step in this war, and in all contemporary wars, is weighed and documented, and yet people continue to make those decisions nonetheless.

Some of the interviewees describe their role as a technical one, while others speak of the prestige of working in reconnaissance, about their mission, about [being part of] the speartip pointed at the enemy. One person talks about having “fun.” Judging by what they say, nearly none of them feels hatred. Hatred isn’t obligatory for committing murder, nor is ignorance. Remember the parable about the smoke constantly streaming from the crematorium and how “we were looking the other way”? You can’t say that anymore.

The film will soon be viewable on the Guardian’s website. I heartily recommend that everyone see it. Don’t be in a hurry to sound off now [about this post]: you might feel like an idiot only a couple of weeks later. Wait and see the film, and then we’ll talk.

Source: Elena Kostyuchenko (Facebook), 27 September 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader, who thanks Simon Pirani for the suggestion.

Simon Pirani: What’s Left of the Left When It Comes to Ukraine?

What, really, have socialists learned from the Russian war on Ukraine? Has it changed our understanding of the way that imperialism works? Tell us we were right all along?

Reflecting on the first four years since the invasion, Oleksandr Kyselov, a Ukrainian socialist based in Sweden, wrote in February that Ukrainians found themselves “trying to safeguard our future free from foreign dictates, and simultaneously sacrificing any chances to actually have one”.

Subjected to polarising propaganda, exposed to the attacks by Russian ‘liberators’ on our homes and core infrastructure, watching arrogant sticky-fingered moralising elites surprisingly exempt from ‘common duty’, learning about a striking dependence of our ability to fight back on the political expediencies abroad, we may find out that a fragile ‘least unjust peace’ is the best we can get.

And still, even seeing all of this, too many of the European left are busy stretching familiar old frameworks over a changed world. As if continuing to hope that, should they just deny, condemn, and denounce loudly enough, selectively pontificating about internationalism while reinforcing the borders of their national units, they will be spared the new reality of the world.

This reinforced my scepticism about “the left” as a category. Its historic failure to consider, or draw lessons from, the tragedy of the Syrian revolution, emptied the term of much meaning. That’s how I saw it nine years ago, anyway – and Ukraine has made things worse.

Demonstrators outside a court in Moscow, where Lidia Moniava, founder of a children’s hospice, was on trial for social media posts about the war. Photo from Bereg

This, in turn, raises another question. What about those sections of the “left” claiming to be Marxists? Can we seriously use the term “Marxist” to describe people who, during the largest military conflict of our lifetimes in Europe, have – as Kyselov puts it – kept denying, condemning and denouncing, in the hope of being “spared the new reality”?

I do not have a comprehensive answer to that. But here’s a contribution: comments on a lengthy article about “geopolitical fractures and the Marxist critique of imperialism” by Alex Callinicos, a well-known Marxist writer. I read it, hoping to find the theoretical underpinnings of the political stance of the Socialist Workers Party, of which Callinicos is a member, on the war. The SWP recognises Ukrainians’ right to resist the Russian invasion in words, but opposes it in practice (see Feature 5 below); since 2022, it has called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, but did not do so during the eight years (2014–22) that they propped up the tinpot Donbass dictatorships.

Callinicos deals with imperialism as a global phenomenon, referring as examples to the wars in Ukraine and Palestine. My comments focus only on Ukraine, and what that tells us about imperialism generally. Five features of his analysis stood out for me.

Feature 1. Callinicos dissolves the particular into the general.

Callinicos writes:

February 2022 [i.e. the all-out invasion of Ukraine] marked another, more threatening step-change in this conflict [between the western powers on one side and China-Russia on the other], with the outbreak of a major war on the European continent and the polarisation of the state system resulting from the mobilisation of [‘liberal internationalist’ scholar G. John] Ikenberry’s ‘global West’ behind Ukraine and China’s support for Russia. Rather than treat this fracturing of the international system as a series of discrete events, it is better to understand it as a developing global process of confrontation among the main imperialist powers. (My emphasis, SP.)

This is important, methodologically, in my view.

Surely the “global process of confrontation” is actually made up of “a series of discrete events”. Surely, our understanding of any global process has to be rooted in a convincing analysis of its parts. Instead of this, Callinicos proceeds from his understanding of the global process – a clash of imperialist camps – and, where the parts don’t fit, presents a flawed and inaccurate view of them.

Feature 2. Callinicos imagines an “expansion of Russian power” that does not accord with reality.

Callinicos sees Russia not as a declining empire, or as a subimperialist power with aspects of dependence on global capital, but as a would-be great power. He approvingly quotes Sergey Radchenko, who writes that “even though the Soviet Union collapsed under its own weight, its successor, Russia, still eyed a position of prominence in the global order”, and goes on to claim that Putin

[…] used Russia’s position in the global economy as one of the main energy producers to rebuild its military power and geopolitical influence externally.

Callinicos then surveys the activities of the Russian armed forces and the Wagner group in  the Middle East and Africa, and asks, “What made possible this expansion of Russian power into MENA and beyond?” Answer: two “interconnected determinants”: (1) Russia exploited a gap left by the Obama administration’s efforts, after defeat in Iraq, to reduce US involvement in the Middle East; (2) regional powers based in the Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia and others) have become more self-assertive “with the emergence of new centres of capital accumulation in the region”; “global energy production adds a further dimension to these interstate manoeuvres”; and “Russia figures as an important partner to Saudi Arabia in the OPEC+ cartel”.

This creates the impression that over the past two decades Russian imperialism has become stronger. In reality, the opposite is true.

First: Russia’s position as a big energy producer is in many respects a source of weakness, not strength. In the early 2000s, Russia consolidated its position in the global economy as a highly dependent exporter of oil, gas and metals. Low oil prices in the 1990s exacerbated the post-Soviet economic crisis; in 2000-08, Russian capitalism strengthened as those prices rose, but the 2008 crash, and falling prices, exposed its extreme vulnerability.

Azerbaijan and its oil had been lost to Russia in the 1990s; in the 2000s it was replaced as the economically dominant power in central Asia by China and the western powers. And it was losing ground to the European powers in Belarus, the Baltic states, and of course Ukraine. The Russian elite was well aware of this and obsessed throughout the 2000s about the dangers of dependence on oil revenues and the need to diversify the economy. That did not happen.

It could be argued that Russia’s dependence on commodities revenues was a key factor that eroded its “great power” status. To suggest, as Callinicos does, that its status as an energy producer enhanced that status is mistaken.

Second: as for Russia’s military adventures in the Middle East and Africa, look how they ended. Bashar al-Assad’s regime was toppled in Syria, in large part because Russia was unable and/or unwilling to provide the military support needed to protect him.

Putin faced the Maidan uprising in Ukraine in 2014 as the leader not of a power gaining in economic or political strength, but of a weakening power that had to compensate for its subordinate position in the global economy, and the fragility of its social base at home, by ramping up nationalist rhetoric and shifting towards a more authoritarian method of rule.

It is noteworthy that Rob Ferguson, another writer in SWP publications, does not share Callinicos’s eccentric view of Russian power. In 2022, he concluded, in an analytical article – with a measure of understatement, but still – that “Russia’s energy and raw material base was still insufficient to overcome the vast disparity in economic and military power with NATO – as well as China”. This, Ferguson argued, “intensified the pressure on the Russian state to demarcate its regional hegemony, putting the question of the states along the Eurasian faultline at the fore of Russia’s concerns”.[1]

Feature 3. Callinicos imagines western military support for Ukraine as a cause, not an effect.

Proceeding from the general (“global process of confrontation”) to the particular (“a discrete series of events”), Callinicos presents a version of one aspect of these events – western military support for Ukraine – that does not bear serious scrutiny. Referring to the all-out invasion of 2022, he writes:

The war itself thus represented a radicalisation of the global struggle that was already developing between Washington, Beijing and Moscow.

He then qualifies that statement, in three sentences that I deal with below (Feature 4), where he acknowledges that “traditional Great Russian nationalism” may have played a part in causing the war, but hastily insisting that it is “no simple struggle for self-determination”. And then he writes:

The US and other Western powers were heavily involved in training and supporting the Ukrainian military from 2014-15 onwards.

Then he quotes newspaper articles detailing cooperation between the Ukrainian intelligence services and the CIA in gathering intelligence on Russia. And then:

The massive surge in weapons supplies to Ukraine by the NATO powers and closely aligned states such as Australia must be seen in this context. From the Western side, the Ukraine conflict has been a proxy war waged to weaken and drain a potential challenger, an inter-imperialist conflict in the kind of terms that Lenin and Luxemburg characterised in the first world war.

This is playing ducks and drakes with reality. Its inclusion in a theoretical article shows how shaky its foundations are.

For a start, the intelligence operations referred to are only one part of a larger picture. From 2014 Ukraine was fighting a war, the prosecution of which required not just intelligence but heavy weapons. It received utterly negligible supplies of these from the western powers until 2022. As the chart shows, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute registered US arms exports to Ukraine as zero until 2015. Note that the chart, sourced from SIPRI’s database, measures exports with the institute’s standard method, the trend-indicator value (TIV).[2] In 2015 US arms supplies to Ukraine were 4 TIVs, compared e.g. with 92 TIVs to Greece and 112 TIVs to Norway. In 2021, when all those CIA agents referred to were well aware of the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine’s border, US arms exports to Ukraine remained negligible: 20 TIVs compared with 39 TIVs to Canada and 139 TIVs to Singapore.

The graph shows US arms exports to Ukraine, with those to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Singapore included for comparison. The table shows the top 20 recipients of US arms exports in 1993–2025; even including three years of war (2022–25), Ukraine only gets to 16th place.

The negligible level of western arms supply to Ukraine between 2014 and 2021, when it was fighting a defensive war against a larger aggressor, was preceded by more than two decades during which (1) in 1994 the US helped to convince Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal, (2) NATO accepted eastern European countries into membership, and (3) NATO forces in Europe were substantially reduced from cold war levels (the number of US tanks in Germany fell from 5000 in 1990 to zero in 2013).

Callinicos says the US and UK are “training and supporting the Ukrainian military”, without saying that this “support” included starving Ukraine of weapons supplies. He refers to a “massive surge in weapons supplies”, but omits that this was a reaction to the 2022 invasion. Cause and effect are reversed. Such game-playing does not deserve to be taken seriously. 

Feature 4. Callinicos refers only once, and in passing, to the social dynamics in Ukraine, and in Russia, during the period under discussion.

Having stated that the 2022 invasion was a “radicalisation of the global struggle”, the next three sentences read:

Pace the [“realist” scholars John] Mearsheimer and [Sebastian] Rosato, the Russian invasion seems [“seems”!] not to have been simply an instrumentally rational response to NATO expansion and Ukraine’s increasingly close alignment with the US, but arises also from an ideological investment, certainly on Putin’s part, in traditional Great Russian nationalism that denies Ukraine a distinct identity. The assertion of that identity informed the Ukrainian national mobilisation that helped to block and push back the initial advance on Kyiv. But this war is no simple struggle for self-determination. 

This is the only reference to the Kremlin’s nationalism, and the only reference to Ukrainian society, in the entire article of 12,500+ words.

Callinicos does not even discuss the idea that the social turbulence reflected in the Maidan – from socially progressive, to pro-European, to outright reactionary – needs examining. Nor the social dynamics in Russia that have pushed the elite towards an authoritarian, near-fascist style of rule, and – in the view of many Marxist writers – towards all-out war.

Callinicos acknowledges that Ukraine’s assertion of “a distinct identity” “informed the national mobilisation”, but does not comment on what the significance of that might be, either historically or in the twenty-first century. He writes that the war is “no simple struggle for self-determination” (not many wars are “simple”), but only to return to his erroneous portrayal of the extent of western involvement.

This is where dissolving the particular into the general (see Feature 1 above) becomes a problem.

Would you look at Brexit as part of the “developing global process of confrontation among the main imperialist powers”, without also considering the social dynamics in the UK – the advance of neo-liberalism, the surge of right-wing populism, the travails of the labour movement, the effects of de-industrialisation and dependence on financial and service industries?

Would you look at the Malvinas war as part of the “developing global process of confrontation among the main imperialist powers”, without also considering the class struggles in Thatcher’s Britain and Galtieri’s Argentina?

What, then, is the credibility of an “analysis” of the Russian war on Ukraine that starts from a preconception about the “global process of confrontation”, and fails to mention the class struggle and other forms of social change in either Russia or Ukraine?

This approach says something about the development of Marxism, in my view. The stated aim of Callinicos’s article is to show how the Marxist critique of imperialism “can encompass empirically aspects of the present conjuncture that liberalism and realism are unable to account for”. He does not explain why the social forces at work in Ukraine, and in Russia, should not be treated as one of these aspects.

This not only holes his argument below the water-line in the ways I have mentioned. It also misses an important opportunity to engage with the body of serious Marxist scholarship – by Ilya Matveev (Russia), Daria Saburova (Ukraine), Yassin al-Haj Saleh (Syria), Kavita Krishnan and Rohini Hensman (India)[3] and many others – who see these social forces, and the Kremlin’s reaction to them, as central to the causes of the Russian war.

It would be a cheap shot to criticise Callinicos or anyone else for something they have not written, and that is not my point. Rather, that the reluctance to engage with other Marxists can only obstruct the development of Marxism as a living body of ideas.

Feature 5. Callinicos separates analysis from politics.

Of course many Marxists working in universities have in recent decades increasingly detached analysis of politically urgent issues from political commentary that might inform the labour movement and social movements. So this is a much wider problem than one for Callinicos alone. But in his article, published by a non-academic socialist journal, he takes this to an extreme.

The SWP, of which Callinicos is a member, (i) between 2014 and 2022, made no call for the withdrawal of Russian troops, and raised no challenge to those “lefts” who vigorously supported the Russian-backed tinpot dictatorships in the Donbas,[4] (ii) condemned the Russian invasion of 2022, but, along with post-Stalinists, portrayed NATO expansion as its primary cause, (iii) acknowledged the right of Ukrainians to defend themselves from invasion in words, but opposed it in practice, and (iv) supported calls in the UK labour movement to end arms supplies to Ukraine.

A drone workshop. Photo from Solidarity Collectives

It is worth considering what the SWP actually means by the Ukrainian people’s “right to resist the invasion”, as a statement by the international network they belong to put it, since this is combined with a demand on western governments for “no arms shipments to Ukraine!”

How are people to resist an invasion, without arms from western governments? Some people favour arms provided by civil society (inevitably a tiny supply compared to what the state provides). And so Ukrainians living abroad, and civil society groups, have raised millions of euros to support civil defence (drone factories, medical supplies, etc). Trade unionists and e.g. anarchist groups participate – but the SWP does not.[5]  

For some SWP members, the “right to resist the invasion” does not even extend as far as the right to ask for weapons, let alone to receive them.

For example, SWP members worked hard but unsuccessfully to defeat a resolution passed by the National Education Union conference in April last year, supporting not the export of arms to Ukraine by the UK government but “the right of Ukraine to self-defence and to resist Putin’s occupation, including the right to seek arms to defend itself”.

Similarly, when the Universities and Colleges Union conference decided in 2024 to endorse an appeal by the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine to western governments to send military aid, SWP members sought through conference procedure to block that call from being heard.[6]

Of what does the “right to resist the invasion” consist, if not of the right to ask for weapons, be it from western governments, Ukrainians abroad, or anyone else? This is not just about politics, but about socialist morality.

Callinicos does not comment on this in his article. Its function, rather, is to provide these damaging, and I would say immoral, politics, with a “theoretical” justification: the fragile, general assertions about the “global process of confrontation”, the false picture of Russian imperialism, the reversal of cause and effect, and the blank spot where society should be.

In my view, the development of Marxism as a meaningful approach to the problems that capitalism is throwing at us in the twenty-first century will mean rejecting this kind of imposition of political dogma on to analysis – what Kyselov calls “stretching familiar old frameworks over a changed world”. 7 September 2026

□ Thanks to Links journal for reposting this article.


[1] Robert Ferguson, “Imperialism, war and the Eurasian faultline”, International Socialism 175, June 2022.

[2] SIPRI has over decades of research developed the TIV as a common unit, “based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer”. There is a full explanation here.

[3] See, for example, Ilya Matveev, “The War in Ukraine and Russian Capital: from military-economic to full military imperialism” (Alameda Institute, 2023) and “Between Political and Economic Imperialism: Russia’s Shifting Global Strategy” (Journal of Labour and Society, 2021); Daria Saburova, Travailleuses de la résistance. Les classes populaires ukrainiennes face à la guerre (Autonomies, 2024); Yassin al-Haj Saleh, “Why Ukraine is a Syrian Cause” (Dawn, 2022); Kavita Krishnan, “Our indifference to Ukraine did harm to our struggle in India”, Commons, 2023; Rohini Hensman, Indefensible: Democracy, Counterrevolution, and the Rhetoric of Anti-Imperialism (Haymarket, 2018).

[4] In 2014, Eamonn McCann, for many years a leading figure in the SWP’s sister organisation in Ireland, argued that, with regard to Ukraine, “If we have to take sides […] Ireland should side with the Russians”. For the SWP’s newspaper, war crimes by Russia and its allies, e.g. the shooting down of the MH17 civilian aircraft, were to be blamed on “imperialist rivalry” (see also here and here).     

[5] I expressed my own view of these difficult issues e.g. here.

[6] For those interested in trade unions’ arcane conference procedures, see motion 29 (moved by pro-Ukrainian activists) and amendment 29A (moved by SWP members) here.

Source: Simon Pirani, “Russian empire, social dynamics and where Marxism goes from here,” People and Nature, 7 September 2026

The Realities of Russia’s Brutal War Against Ukraine and Europe


Independent war journalist and streamer Dylan Burns joins hosts Ryan Geddie and Adam Gurri to talk about his experience embedding in Ukraine since the early months of the war. They discuss his journalistic heroes, how radically the battlefield has changed since 2022 (and what it means to be “the most transparent battlefield in history”), the politics of military and foreign policy, and Dylan’s personal and professional history.

Source: Out of the Jaws (Liberal Currents), YouTube, 25 September 2026


Yesterday I had a very interesting discussion with students after class. I wanted to hear their takes on the war and the prospects for peace.

I began with the way a lot of surveys ask whether they would prefer Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire or keep fighting. Those questions don’t do much unless you specify what “negotiations” and “peace” are supposed to mean, and the students were quick: what do you mean, negotiated ceasefire? Is that actually peace?

Now, these are highly educated kids at one of the best institutions in Ukraine, so I was not surprised they would flag it. By the same token, they are not like the rest of the population so their answers might not be necessarily representative. What they did with the question only made that clearer.

I said, fair enough, let’s make it concrete. The Ukrainian government has proposed an unconditional ceasefire, which would mean freezing the war on the line of contact and leaving Russia in possession of what it has already taken. The Russians have rejected that more than once. But suppose, for some reason, they accepted. Would you support a settlement on those terms?

That is when it got interesting. What followed was about ten minutes of analysis I am not going to reproduce.

The first thing, they said, is that a ceasefire is not necessarily peace. The Russians want more than they have, and so would likely come back for it after they recover. They put that more as a fact than as a forecast. I said we cannot really know what they would do. They said we can, because they have done it more than once already, and lied about not doing it, so they cannot be trusted. They were also very skeptical that Western security guarantees would actually function.

So the question became what happens in the period between a ceasefire and a Russian attempt to finish the job.

Both sides would try to prepare, but on the balance Russia would have the advantage. It could prepare better and faster, and fighting, if it resumed, would start from a worse position for Ukraine than the one it is in now.

I asked them to spell out why they thought a pause would favor Russia.

The Russian economy is larger, and they can produce most of what they need, while Ukraine is very dependent on foreign finance. If there is a ceasefire, sanctions get looser, and Russia can do all of this more successfully than it can during the war. The world is already losing interest in Ukraine — they said that flatly, though you could hear the bitterness under it — and if the war stops, the attention goes with it, the money dries up, and the West starts making deals with Russia again.

Taking the pressure of the war off would also make domestic corruption worse. They already steal, but the necessities of the war still limit them. In a peace, that limit is gone, preparedness gets worse because of it, and although the military would try to keep things from sliding too far, the politicians and the businessmen are a different problem.

They also said this is not the only view they hear. Some people they know just want to go about their lives without getting bombed. Those people favor peace and do not much care where the line ends up.

I said the Russians want to limit the size of the army.

That produced laughter. It was the one thing they seemed sure would not happen, if only because they see the army as the only reason to hope things can still get better.

Still, I said, there is a lot of uncertainty in how any of this would develop. Russia might come out of a ceasefire in worse shape. The Europeans might not just switch back to dealing with it. They might invest a great deal in Ukraine; there would be opportunities for sizeable returns.

True, they said. There is uncertainty, so you cannot be sure. But the Russians have shown they cannot be trusted, we all know how politicians work, and we understand that some people in the West already have an interest in cutting deals with Russia, so on balance they thought the trajectory that does not favor Ukraine was the more likely one.

Since they would not support a ceasefire along the line of control without some serious protection against the war starting again, I said I was guessing they also would not support giving up the rest of Donbas without a fight.

They would not.

But, I said, what if after another year of fighting you lose it anyway? Would it not make more sense to give it up now?

That, they said, is another big uncertainty. Who knows whether they can take it. They have been trying for a while.

So what is the hope, then?

They shrugged.

Don’t know.

That something will change.

I didn’t have a better answer.

Source: Branislav Slantchev (Facebook), 24 September 2026. Thanks to AL for the heads-up.


Marc Polymeropoulos and Michael Weiss examine the growing Russian threat in Europe, separating the real danger of Russian sabotage and state terrorism from the media panic over a potential Russian invasion of NATO territory. They discuss the intelligence briefing that sparked concerns across Europe, how the assessment has since been revised downward, and why Russia’s escalating sabotage campaign could still lead to a dangerous mass-casualty event. They also examine how Europe can respond to Russian aggression, the role of NATO and Article 5, and why Russia may be testing how willing the West is to push back.

Source: The Bulwark (YouTube), 25 September 2026


Images of Michael Weiss, Branislav Slantchev, and Dylan Burns, above, courtesy of Wikipedia, UC San Diego, and Instagram

Something I Learned Today: Drones, Diesel, and Don Jr.’s Russian Bankroller

Just as Ukraine was learning how to parry Russia’s drone attacks, Moscow has moved the goal posts with a new generation of innovative jet-powered weapons.

New Geran drones and Banderol cruise missiles are lethal reminders that Russia still has the resources and supply chains to field fresh threats, this time packed with advanced electronics that allow them to find targets accurately and evade interception. Crucially, the leap forward was enabled in large part by components sourced from China, in violation of international sanctions, say Ukraine and others, based in part on wreckage from the few shot down so far.

China has said it regulates exports of technologies that could be used in war. 

Russia’s new and relatively inexpensive weapons show its military remains adaptable and innovative, say analysts and diplomats. Russia developed and fielded both weapons within a couple of years by modifying earlier models, combat-testing them and quickly starting mass production, say analysts.

In doing that, Moscow stole a march on its adversaries. Ukraine has shown it can move quickly—it developed one of the first effective jet drones—but lacks production resources and much capacity to think beyond the near future. 

The U.S. and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meanwhile, are struggling to increase production of vital arms such as Patriot interceptors. Western governments are also grappling with how to accelerate turning innovations into mass-produced equipment.

“Here in the West, we tend to underestimate Russia, but they can go very fast from idea and experimentation to production,” said Kateryna Bondar, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Wadhwani AI Center in Washington. “This loop is something Western militaries should learn from Russia.”

Russia has largely directed its weapons at Ukraine, part of a campaign against civilian life and infrastructure. Some Russian drones and missiles have also entered NATO airspace, either accidentally due to electronic warfare or intentionally in an attempt to probe NATO defenses. Either way, say military analysts, NATO must learn from—and be ready for—Russia’s ability to unleash a range of aerial weapons at different altitudes, speeds and cost levels.

Moscow’s developments also directly affect the U.S. because Russia, Iran and North Korea share military know-how. Innovations from the war in Ukraine are appearing in America’s war with Iran and vice versa.

Moscow has managed to field its new weapons despite Ukraine’s increasingly damaging strikes on critical nodes in Russia’s economy. President Vladimir Putin has used his iron grip on the country to largely reorient it behind his conquest of Ukraine, allowing him to funnel cash from the budget and state-owned banks into the defense sector. He has mobilized in a way that NATO’s democracies haven’t considered doing since World War II.

Banderol and Geran both address a need for cheap yet capable one-way weapons—an economic middle ground that Ukraine and Western countries are also pursuing. The new weapons are a mix of upgraded low-end arms and simplified high-end ones. They each represent a different mix of cost, range, speed, explosive power and ability to reach a target without interception.

Banderol and Geran-5 are both estimated to cost around $100,000 each. High-end U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles and comparable Russian models cost more than $2 million each.

Geran drones began as versions of relatively slow, propeller-driven Iranian Shahed drones, which Ukraine has become adept at intercepting after heavy investment in equipment and training to counter the threat. Russian engineers, through successive iterations, added speed and survivability thanks to better electronics for navigation and communications, overcoming much of Ukraine’s defenses.

DroneSec analysts concur with Ukrainian assessments that Russia relies heavily on Chinese components including jet engines, navigation computers and communications electronics.

“Russia is critically dependent on Chinese components” for its drone program, said Monnik.

Most of the Chinese gear is commercially available, so-called dual-use components made for civilian or military applications, say analysts. Russian engineers are skilled at exploiting off-the-shelf equipment to maximum benefit, such as in creating antennas that thwart electronic countermeasures and communication networks that overcome jamming. 

Once designs are adopted, Russian companies quickly move to large-scale production, which fulfills another strategic goal of all sides today: volume. Since the Cold War, the U.S. and its rivals have largely pursued expensive, exquisite weapons systems, which proved effective in limited conflicts.

“Now we see that mass is a huge part of success,” said Bondar.

For Ukraine, Moscow’s advances are confounding because it also faces Russian ballistic missiles, which carry massive explosive payloads and are especially difficult to intercept. Russia is also pummeling Ukrainian troops with glide bombs dropped from warplanes, which Ukraine has almost no way to stop. The pounding threatens Kyiv’s ability to maintain its front lines.

“While the drones are a problem, by far the biggest problem for Ukraine is glide bombs,” said Justin Bronk, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

For the U.S. and its allies, Russia’s improved drones create an economic headache. American forces in the Persian Gulf and NATO have resorted to using expensive equipment like Patriots and jet fighters to intercept inexpensive drones and missiles. Kyiv and Western governments are seeking cheaper ways to thwart low-cost attacks.

Western military-tech companies that have been developing interceptors for propeller drones are scrambling to create faster models. Merops interceptors, produced by a company backed by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and deployed by U.S. forces both along NATO’s eastern flank and in the Persian Gulf, are now being redesigned in a jet-powered version. Auterion, a leading software supplier to Ukrainian drone makers, is working with partners on high-speed propeller interceptors and jet-powered ones, said CEO Lorenz Meier.

Sourcing inexpensive jet engines for interceptors is a big challenge for the West. Chinese jet engines for Gerans cost $45,000 or less, DroneSec estimates, and defenders generally fire several interceptors at each incoming weapon.

Blurred lines among classes of weapons call for defenses that are more integrated and prepared for a spectrum of threats aiming to overwhelm air defenses, say military specialists. Bronk said NATO would be well served to set up a specialized multinational counterdrone force that constantly trains to down all kinds of drones and missiles. He said this could be done using relatively affordable equipment like radar-guided antiaircraft cannons and simple jet planes used to train combat pilots.

“It’s not an inherently difficult problem,” said Bronk. “It’s just not one we’re optimized for.”

U.S. and NATO officials say they are tackling the problem.

“We must apply and adapt all available tools and capabilities to the realities we face today,” said Army Col. Martin O’Donnell, spokesman for NATO’s top military commander, Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich. He said that NATO members at their recent summit pledged to invest more than $40 billion over five years in counterdrone capabilities.

Anticipating future development waves will be critical, said Bondar. She noted that Ukraine has had indications for several years that Russia was working on jet-powered drones and inexpensive cruise missiles, yet Kyiv has been unprepared for their large-scale use.

“It was obvious quite a while ago that we’d end up here,” said Bondar. “I’m surprised everyone is surprised.”

Source: Daniel Michaels, “Russia Is Churning Out Smart, Cheap New Weapons Faster Than Ukraine or the U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, 13 September 2026. I am paid subscriber to the digital edition of this newspaper, and so I am happy to share articles like this with my own readers. }}}}} trr


As wars in the Middle East and Ukraine drive the price of diesel to record highs, inflation-weary consumers can expect to pay more for practically everything.

As of Friday, the average retail price of diesel fuel stood at $6.06 per gallon, according to AAA, up from $3.71 a year ago.

The New England average price is virtually identical to the national average, but far lower than that in California, which at $7.98 is the highest in the nation.

“It makes us a lot more expensive than we used to be,” said Charlie Itz, president of Itz-Ohlson Transport, a trucking company in Lynnfield.

It’s happening because, even though the US is the world’s leading producer of diesel, much of the nation’s production is exported to countries that can no longer obtain fuel from refineries in the Middle East or Russia due to military conflicts.

“The United States is experiencing this because it’s part of a global, interconnected market,” said Mason Hamilton, vice president of economics and research at the American Petroleum Institute, or API.

The pervasive effects from those higher prices shows up across the economy. On Friday the US Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that inflation for August ran at a 3.4 percent annual clip, with gas and fuel oil major culprits in keeping consumer prices elevated.

Consumers usually pay closer attention to gasoline prices, which climbed 3.9 percent last month according to Friday’s inflation report.But diesel is just as vital to the US economy, because it’s the primary fuel for the large trucks and freight trains that deliver most of the nation’s goods. Diesel also powers many seagoing ships. Higher diesel pricesmean we pay more for products shipped to homes and retail stores.

Moreover, the price of diesel has climbed much faster than that of gasoline, which is up by about $1 a gallon from last year. That’s largely because many US refineries are optimized to produce gasoline, helping to keep prices in check.

It all means higher fuel prices for truckers such as the independent contractors who drive for Itz-Ohlson Transport.

The company mostly handles short-range jobs, like moving shipping containers in and out of the Port of Boston. The company charges a base rate of $401 for trips within 30 miles of the port, then adds a surcharge to cover the cost of diesel. In March, the surcharge stood at 38 percent of the base rate, or $152. Now it’s up to 57 percent, or $228.

“Our customers are pretty understanding,” said Itz. “I think they’re resigned.”

Costly diesel is bad news for James Knott, chief executive of Riverdale Mills, a Northbridge-based maker of steel wire mesh used in products ranging from fences to lobster traps.

“High diesel costs affect us at virtually every stage of the supply chain,” said Knott. The company uses steel from US and Canadian suppliers, then ships its wire mesh to customers throughout the US and around the world.

When diesel gets more expensive, “those costs do not simply disappear,” Knott said. “Manufacturers must absorb them, find efficiencies elsewhere, or eventually pass some portion along to customers.”

Dean Croke, principal industry analyst at DAT Freight & Analytics, an online marketplace for truckers and shippers, said the impact of higher diesel may depend on the value of the goods being shipped. For instance, if a company is shipping costly computers, a price increase to cover fuel is hardly worth noticing. “A few hundred dollars of fuel,” said Croke, “is like a rounding error.”

But it’s a different story with lower-cost products shipped over long distances, he said. Consumers can expect to pay a significant fuel premium for iceberg lettuce shipped from California, for instance.

While the nominal price is the highest on record, diesel is still going for well below the all-time high reached during the 2008 financial crisis, which after adjusting for inflation to today’s dollars, topped out at $7.20, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

The diesel price hikes have arrived just as the US trucking industry had begun to recover from a four-year slump. A spike in demand that began during the COVID pandemic put hundreds of thousands of new drivers on the roads. But demand fell again, pushing down the price of truck deliveries and driving many small- and medium-sized truckers out of business.

Croke said the slump would be even worse if not for the recent surge in construction of data centers to support artificial intelligence systems.These huge buildings require thousands of truckloads of construction materials and electronic gear.

“Absent that,” said Croke, “demand would be way down.”

But the trucking market has begun to recover, as a shortage of workers means fewer trucks on the road. One major reason: the Trump administration’s crackdown on noncitizen drivers, who now must have visas that allow them to workand prove they speak English well enough to drive safely on US highways. The Department of Transportation estimates that enforcing those standards will force 200,000 drivers off the roads. That’s around 9 percent of the 2.2 million tractor-trailer drivers in the US workforce, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

“We’re seeing the largest single-driver-removal event in modern history,” said Croke.

As a result, spot rates for shipping a truckload of merchandise have hit their highest levels in four years. And now, the cost of diesel is driving prices even higher.

The increase stems from tight supplies worldwide. The 2022 diesel price spike was driven by a halt in US purchases of diesel fuel from Russia. The European Union followed suit. But Russia was still able to sell its oil in other countries including Turkey and Brazil.

In all, Russia once exported over 800,000 barrels of diesel per day, making it the world’s second-largest exporter after the United States, which increased shipments to the EU to cover for lost Russian oil.

But this year Ukrainian airstrikes against Russian refineries have forced Russia to halt virtually all diesel exports. That means a big decline in worldwide diesel production, and upward pressure on prices.

The battle over the Strait of Hormuz has also had an impact. A Goldman Sachs analyst recently estimated that despite US government efforts to keep the strait open, shipments of refined oil products like gasoline and diesel are only at 35 percent of their prewar levels.

And then in March, China, a major exporter of diesel to Asian markets, halted all foreign sales to protect its domestic supply, though the Chinese government this summer allowed some exports to resume.

The US produces over 5 million barrels a day of distillate fuel oil, which includes diesel and home heating oil. That’s more than any other nation.

But there’s no way to open the tap any wider. “Basically every single refinery in the United States right now is running full out,” said Hamilton of API.

And much of their output is exported to Europe and Latin America. The US imports millions of barrels as well, with, ironically, much of New England’s diesel coming from Canada, with whom President Trump has just started a massive trade war. So far, diesel has not been caught up in the tit-for-tat retaliations by either country.

In short, the market for diesel is global and supply shortfalls anywhere lead to high prices everywhere, even in New England.

Source: Hiawatha Bray, “Diesel prices soar past $6 a gallon, affecting the cost of nearly everything else,” Boston Globe, 11 September 2026. I am paid subscriber to the digital edition of this newspaper, and so I am happy to share articles like this with my own readers. }}}}} trr


U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday called on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries and other infrastructure used to produce and distribute diesel, saying the attacks are causing a global shortage. He spoke after diesel prices in the U.S. hit a record on Friday, soaring past $6 a gallon on average.

Ukraine has for months been targeting Russia’s oil and gas industry with long-range strikes, prompting fuel rationing across the country and causing Moscow to ban diesel exports in July, removing supplies from the already tight global market.

But the global crunch also came after the war on Iran curtailed oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

Fuel prices are weighing on Americans as they prepare to vote in midterm elections in November.

Trump was asked by a reporter if he had spoken with Zelenskyy following his recent conversation with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. He responded by calling on Zelenskyy to halt strikes against Russia.

“Mr. Zelenskyy has to do one thing. He has to stop knocking out diesel fuel in Russia,” Trump told reporters on the sidelines of the Irish Open, which is being played at his Doonbeg golf club.

“We spoke to Mr. Zelenskyy about it. There are plenty of other targets. Don’t hit diesel fuel, because that’s hurting, that’s hurting the world,” he said.

According to a report published Friday by the International Energy Agency, net exports of diesel and gasoil from the Gulf countries in August stood at “just over a quarter” of what they were before the war on Iran began in February.

“Disruptions to Russia’s refining system and a near-halt to product exports following intensified Ukrainian attacks have compounded these losses,” the IEA wrote. It added that in February, combined next exports of diesel and gasoil from the Gulf and Russia “accounted for almost 45% of global seaborne trade.”

Kyiv says Russia’s oil industry both funds and directly fuels Moscow’s more than four-year-old invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has ramped up its air campaign against Ukraine in recent weeks, using ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones to pierce Ukraine’s defenses. Moscow’s attacks have targeted Ukraine’s power grid ahead of winter in what officials say is meant to demoralize civilians.

Civilians were killed and injured overnight into Sunday as Russia and Ukraine exchanged large-scale drone strikes.

Two people were killed and 14 more wounded near an oil and industrial hub in Russia’s Tatarstan, according to local officials, while Ukrainian authorities reported on Russian drones pummeling the Black Sea port of Odesa and starting a fire near a border crossing with Poland.

The two Russian civilians died after a drone slammed into a tree near their parked car in the city of Nizhnekamsk, according to the office of regional head Rustam Minnikhanov. Nizhnekamsk houses a key cluster of oil refineries and other industrial plants. Mayor Radmir Belyaev said that a fire had broken out at an unspecified “enterprise.”

Ukraine also claimed to have hit a major oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, in Russia’s Krasnodar region near Crimea. The Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) agency said its drones struck a key oil processing unit and the refinery’s tank farm overnight into Sunday.

Krasnodar authorities said the strike on “an enterprise” in Slavyansk-on-Kuban injured three people and damaged an oil pipeline.

Russian forces shot down 389 Ukrainian drones during the night, Russia’s defense ministry said Sunday.

In Ukraine, at least nine people were injured in a “massive” Russian nighttime attack on Odesa, according to Serhii Lysak from the city’s military administration. Odesa is home to Ukraine’s main port hub on the Black Sea and has faced sustained drone and missile strikes, with Kyiv accusing Moscow of trying to choke off its exports.

A Russian drone attack on Saturday struck a residential high-rise in Odesa, killing two people and injuring 26 others, Ukrainian officials said.

Russian overnight strikes also pounded western Ukraine, though there were no immediate reports of casualties. One drone set fire to a gas station near the Yahodyn-Dorohusk border crossing with Poland, according to Ukraine’s top diplomat and a spokesperson for the local customs force.

“This is Putin’s terror ‘knocking’ directly on the doors of the EU and NATO. Russian barbarians are at your gate, dear partners,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X.

Ukraine’s border crossings with Poland are a conduit for much of the military and humanitarian aid sent by Western allies.

Valentyna Chernysh, a spokesperson for the Volyn Customs Office, told The Associated Press that the Yahodyn crossing was intact and no one was harmed.

Earlier this week, two people died when Russian drones hit the Starokozache border crossing between Ukraine and Moldova on Tuesday. The following day a “direct threat” to a Polish-Ukrainian crossing point was avoided due to the cooperation between Warsaw and Kyiv, according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

Ukraine’s air force said its air defenses shot down or suppressed 409 Russian drones of various types overnight, including a newer jet-powered version that is faster and more difficult to intercept. It said Russia had attacked Ukraine with 453 drones in total.

Source: “Trump calls on Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian diesel fuel, citing a global shortage,” Associated Press (via ABC News), 13 September 2026


On May 24, Donald Trump Jr. was celebrating in the Bahamas, as scantily clad dancers in stilettos and sailor caps performed for him and his guests. It was the last night of his wedding, a lavish, three-day party held across a pair of ultra-exclusive private islands. A five-tier funfetti cake had been airlifted in from Florida, and helicopters and seaplanes descended on the islands before guests settled into their oceanfront villas. That night on the beach, Trump Jr. lifted his bride into the air while fireworks launched from a barge over the sea.

“It was everything we dreamed of and more,” his wife later wrote on Instagram.

That dream was heavily funded by a secret benefactor: Umar Kremlev, a Russian oligarch close to President Vladimir Putin.

Kremlev footed the bill for hundreds of thousands of dollars of wedding expenses, according to records reviewed by ProPublica and interviews with three people familiar with the event. The oligarch paid to rent out one of the private islands, where a reception was held and where guests slept. He also covered other big-ticket items, like the fireworks show, and his team helped plan the event. Kremlev is the head of the International Boxing Association, a scandal-plagued sports group that has been financed by the Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom. The wedding payments came from an IBA-affiliated entity in Dubai that the boxing association uses for financial transactions.

The guest list numbered around 50. It included Trump Jr.’s brother-in-law Jared Kushner, Eric Trump — and Kremlev, an imposing man with a shaved head who speaks limited English. The oligarch was part of a large group whose presence puzzled other attendees. They sometimes stood off by themselves, speaking Russian.

“It was really small, like, just really close friends,” Trump Jr. later said on his podcast. “Tried to keep it really tight. And it was just awesome.”

Kremlev’s previously unreported relationship with Trump Jr. represents an extraordinary development: a member of Putin’s circle financially supporting the president’s son and gaining intimate access to the Trump family. For a decade, Putin’s government, regarded as a chief adversary of the U.S., has been accused of efforts to influence American elections. Attempts by Russia to make inroads with the Trumps before the 2016 election exploded into controversy that dogged much of the president’s first term.

National security experts expressed alarm at Trump Jr. accepting the oligarch’s largesse, saying it raised an urgent question: What motivated Kremlev to spend a fortune cultivating the connection? 

“If I’m paying for your wedding, at some point, you’re going to owe me something,” said Frank Montoya Jr., a retired career FBI official who held senior counterintelligence roles. Oligarchs like Kremlev often act in coordination with the Russian government. While it’s unclear if that happened here, Trump Jr. put himself in a precarious position, Montoya said. “This should be unthinkable for the son of the president. End of story.”

Holden Triplett, who served as Trump’s counterintelligence director on the National Security Council during his first term, said Russian intelligence frequently seeks to build ties with U.S. government officials and their family members. “Money is a tried-and-true method to gain access,” said Triplett, who also worked for the FBI in Moscow.

In the days leading up to Trump Jr.’s wedding, Kremlev was in China as part of the delegation accompanying Putin, according to Chinese state media. The month before, Putin had bestowed him with a state honor, the Order of Friendship. The Ukrainian government has imposed sanctions on Kremlev personally, citing his closeness to Putin and Russian security services.

It’s not clear why Kremlev helped pay for Trump Jr.’s wedding. The men appear to have met only recently. Public reporting suggests Trump Jr. could have afforded it himself, with Forbes recently estimating his net worth at roughly $300 million. 

In response to detailed questions, a spokesperson for Trump Jr. did not dispute the wedding payments from Kremlev. “Umar is a personal friend of Don,” he said. The spokesman said that Kremlev is “not someone he has a business relationship with” and that the men met through a mutual friend in the hunting world and bonded over their love of boxing and the outdoors.

A spokesperson for Trump Jr.’s brother Eric said of Kremlev: “Eric has absolutely no clue who this person is, nor has never heard his name.” 

In a statement, Kremlev’s press office said, “Mr. Kremlev and Mr. Trump Jr have a friendly relationship” and they first met “a couple of years ago.”

The press office described Kremlev as a businessman and philanthropist, adding, “Mr. Kremlev has never discussed political matters with any of his American friends and acquaintances,” including Trump Jr. They said the boxing organization itself did not incur expenses for the wedding but did not comment on the payments from the Dubai entity. The press office also said that when Putin and Kremlev were in China recently, Kremlev was not part of Putin’s “official delegation.”

Kushner, who has been helping lead the U.S. government’s negotiations with Russia over Ukraine, did not respond to requests for comment. The White House and the Russian government did not respond either.

The revelations come as Trump Jr. has emerged as a political power center in his own right. Beloved by the MAGA base, he reportedly played an active role in vetting White House cabinet picks for Trump’s second term and was dubbed his father’s “most essential political adviser” by The Wall Street Journal. “I certainly don’t think I’d be sitting here as the VP nominee without Don’s help,” Vice President JD Vance told the outlet in late 2024.

This account is based on records and interviews with dozens of current and former IBA officials and contractors, wedding attendees and other people in Trump Jr.’s and Kremlev’s circles.

Trump Jr. exchanged vows with socialite Bettina Anderson on a private island that was featured in “Pirates of the Caribbean” and the 2006 James Bond movie “Casino Royale.” They had their first dance on a second private island nearby that can rent for around $100,000 a night, paid for by Kremlev. The company that put on the fireworks display charges around $70,000 for such shows. (Kremlev did not attend the ceremony itself, which was held on the first day and had just 18 guests, Trump Jr.’s spokesperson said.)

The atmosphere was Monte Carlo meets frat party — helicopters in and out, a beachside DJ set, beer pong tournaments. One day, the men went spearfishing. Artisans at the London fashion house Safiyaa spent 150 hours embroidering Anderson’s bespoke silk reception outfit. The president’s son had undergone treatment to better define his jawline for the occasion.

Some longtime friends of Trump Jr. told associates they were disappointed not to be invited, though a few of his closest business partners — executives at the Trump family crypto company, World Liberty Financial, and the venture capital firm 1789 Capital — did make the cut. President Trump himself skipped it. (“He’d like me to go, but it’s going to be just a small, little private affair,” the president told reporters beforehand. “I said, you know, this is not good timing for me.”) But many of the guests were immediate family of the bride and groom.

That made the large contingent of Russians all the more conspicuous. “What are they doing here?” one person recalled thinking. At least one of the Russian guests had been with Kremlev on his China trip: Alexander Lagutin, a businessperson who has served in senior roles at a Russian defense contractor and a state-backed energy company. Kremlev’s right hand at the IBA, Elena Sobol, attended the wedding too. 

Since the wedding, the Trumps have released scores of photos and videos of the festivities. While they show many of the guests, the Russians have been absent from all of them. (The top of Kremlev’s head is visible in the back of one group photo posted on Instagram by a friend of the bride.) After the party was over, on his “Triggered” podcast, Trump Jr. emphasized the event’s privacy: “The people that were there — if you’re on that list, you weren’t talking.”


In 2009, Umar Kremlev did not yet exist.

He was in his late 20s, with a criminal record for extortion and battery, still going by his birth name, Umar Lutfulloyev, according to the Russian independent news outlet Proekt. But he was about to rapidly ascend in Russia to a position of wealth and influence, with the help of a powerful friend. (“Mr. Kremlev has a completely clean legal record,” his press office said.)

In 2010, he changed his name to Kremlev. He soon joined a Russian government-backed biker gang called the Night Wolves, eventually taking a leadership role, according to news reports. That is what first brought him close to Alexei Rubezhnoi, who now leads Putin’s presidential security service, Proekt reported. In 2017, Kremlev took over the Russian Boxing Federation, after Rubezhnoi personally intervened to put him at the helm.

In 2020, Kremlev became president of the IBA. The association was something akin to FIFA but for boxing and had long overseen the sport in the Olympics. But it had been beset by corruption allegations and was on the brink of insolvency. Kremlev brought money to the table from Gazprom, the state-owned company that operates as an arm of Putin’s government. Gazprom publicly became the IBA’s financial backer, filling its coffers with tens of millions of dollars.

Former high-level IBA officials said that Kremlev had a clear political agenda. “Umar is guided by Putin. It was using the sport for soft political power,” a former IBA board member told ProPublica. “It’s geopolitics. That it’s boxing is just happenstance.” Kremlev, 43, is also heavily involved in an organization called Healthy Fatherland, run by his 23-year-old wife’s twin sister. The group — which promotes healthy eating and youth sports — is under Ukrainian sanctions for its alleged role in a program of abducting Ukrainian children from occupied territories and relocating them under the guise of “rehabilitation.” (Healthy Fatherland did not respond to a request for comment.)

Kremlev’s cozy relationship with the government has made him rich. Putin used the levers of the state to make Kremlev a dominant player in the Russian sports betting industry, according to Proekt, and one of his companies was chosen to operate the national lottery. After Putin nationalized Russia’s largest car dealership company in 2023, Kremlev became the owner of that too.

He now flaunts that wealth through his boisterous public persona. In one video Kremlev posted on social media, he surprises a young mother by giving her a free car. In another, he criticizes his young female aide’s outfit as not feminine enough and makes her change. He shadowboxes with ostriches and brings in celebrities like Rick Ross and Naomi Campbell for IBA events; he praises Stalin and rides private jets.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the U.S. began to indict Russian oligarchs and seize yachts and other assets. Kremlev repeatedly told associates he was worried about being targeted by a U.S. government probe, according to a person close to IBA leadership. “He was very afraid of American sanctions,” the person added. (Kremlev does not appear on public U.S. sanction lists.)

With the business environment in Europe growing more hostile to Russia, Kremlev moved much of the IBA’s operations from Switzerland to the United Arab Emirates. A new Dubai entity, IB Challenger, would later pay wedding expenses for Trump Jr. The current sources of the IBA’s funds are murky, and, in recent years, top executives have given conflicting accounts of the status of its relationship with Gazprom. (Kremlev’s press office told ProPublica the IBA’s sponsorship contract with Gazprom “expired long ago.”) People close to the organization said they understood that its money still comes from Russia.

In 2023, the International Olympic Committee stripped Kremlev’s IBA of its role organizing Olympic boxing. It has cited a host of governance issues and the group’s refusal to “transparently explain the sources of its financing or to explain its full financial dependency, at the time, on a single state-owned company.” 

It was a major setback that deprived the IBA of a key source of its international influence. Kremlev has raged against the Olympic committee ever since and has said that his IBA predecessor, who he blames for the problems, “must be shot.”

Kremlev saw a potential ally in President Trump. After Trump’s second inauguration, in January 2025, Kremlev sent an open letter to the president asking him to look into the Olympic committee’s actions in advance of the 2028 Los Angeles Games. “We look forward with great optimism to the possibility of working together to make the Olympic movement great again,” he wrote.

In September 2025, the IBA brought in Trump Jr. for a panel discussion in Istanbul about boxing. With his then-girlfriend, Anderson, sitting offstage, he criticized transgender women competing in women’s sports and reminisced about watching Saturday night fights as a child. Trump Jr. shared the stage with Kremlev, the boxer Manny Pacquiao and Muhammad Ali’s daughter Rasheda. (Trump Jr.’s spokesperson said he was not paid for the appearance and was already in Turkey for an unrelated event.)

The president’s son had reason to be attuned to the sensitivity of cozying up with a Putin associate, especially while his father navigates the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump Jr.’s June 2016 meeting with a Russian attorney in Trump Tower became a major focus of the Robert Mueller investigation.

The Trump Tower meeting was arranged after an email offering Trump Jr. damaging information about Hillary Clinton as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” Trump Jr. famously responded, “If it’s what you say I love it especially later in the summer.” Trump Jr. later dismissed the matter as a “witch hunt,” and the Mueller report concluded that there was not enough evidence to convict him of a crime.

Recently, Kremlev has been working to expand into the U.S. market. In July, his group hosted a bare-knuckle boxing event in Miami, a chance to showcase a particularly bloody form of the sport in which contenders fight without gloves. But the debut was overshadowed when manosphere influencer Andrew Tate, who the IBA had brought in to host, was arrested by U.S. Marshals outside the arena. (Tate is facing rape and sex trafficking charges in the United Kingdom, which he has denied.)

Much about Kremlev’s relationship with Trump Jr., and where it is headed, remains unknown. In a press release after the Istanbul panel, the IBA hinted there was more to come. 

“President Kremlev and Donald Trump Jr made it clear – this alliance will not remain symbolic,” the press release read. “More joint initiatives will follow.”


Do you have any information we should know about Donald Trump Jr., his businesses or Umar Kremlev? Justin Elliott can be reached by email at justin@propublica.org and by Signal or WhatsApp at 774-826-6240. Brett Murphy can be reached by email brett.murphy@propublica.org and by Signal or WhatsApp at 508-523-5195. Josh Kaplan can be reached by email at joshua.kaplan@propublica.org and by Signal or WhatsApp at 734-834-9383.

Source: Justin Elliott et al., “Donald Trump Jr.’s Bahamas Wedding Was Secretly Bankrolled by Russian Oligarch Close to Putin,” Pro Publica, 14 September 2026. I just made a donation to ProPublica to thank them for this and other groundbreaking investigations they have published over the years. }}}}} trr

Where Apocalypse Is Now

Utkina Dacha, St. Petersburg, 17 June 2012. Photos by the Russian Reader


Last week on a bus to Leningrad, as a bottle was passed around, I got angry for Finland. The Finns aboard found this very funny. For three hours we jolted on atrocious roads through [the] Karelia[n Isthmus], former Finnish heartland gobbled by Stalin in the Winter War of 1939, then regained and lost again during the Second World War. Amid forests of birch and pine, I glimpsed a long disaster. This was my first time in the USSR (my fourth in Finland). I was unprepared for the brokenness of every human thing, the old Finnish farmhouses and lakeside villas collapsing or collapsed, the travesties of farming apart from neat kitchen gardens. The once famously cosmopolitan Baltic port of Vyborg (Viipuri in Finnish), which could be the prettiest small city in the world, felt post-nuclear, its citizens (non-Finns, with whose forebears Stalin replaced the native population) listlessly wandering. Some gaped as our fancy tour bus wallowed by. The single purposeful activity I saw in [the] Karelia[n Isthmus] was that of a man painting an ornamental fence around a roadside ammunition bunker. The contrast to Finland’s grace and bustle was unbearable.

“Vyborg,” I said to the Helsinki art critic Markku Valkonen, who has Karelian roots. “You want it back.”

“Sure, I would like it back,” he said softly, “but I do not want to spoil my life with bitterness.”

[…]

I thought of it again in Leningrad, where apocalypse is now. The city is huge and grand beyond anything I expected. Its nineteenth-century buildings by C. L. Engel, who also worked in Finland, gave me a first impression of an imperial Helsinki, with aspects of Paris and Amsterdam thrown in. But the beauty is a patch that unravels within a block of the Winter Palace, exposing uniform squalor. The tour went to the Hermitage. There I was overwhelmed by the Rembrandts and by a room of Matisses that nearly forced me to my knees. Like other lovely things in Leningrad, the staggering holdings end abruptly in 1914. Meanwhile, in a separate building of the Hermitage, there was a show of—get ready—Peter Max. I wish I could find that amusing. But the evidence of near-term Soviet vulnerability to Western hustlers is too awful. With its stupid Revolution finished, the USSR may be in for a flood of imported stupidities.

Source: Peter Schjeldahl, “Baltic Views” (Village Voice, 11 June 1991), in Hot, Cold, Heavy, Light: 100 Art Writings, 1988–2018 (Abrams Press, 2019)

Russian Embassy Uses Fort Ross State Historic Park and Kashia Band of Pomo Indians to Whitewash Russia’s Bellicose Genocidal Regime with Connivance of U.S. State Department

On 25 July [2026], the Russian Cultural Heritage Festival [sic] took place at Fort Ross [State] Historic Park in California for the first time in six years, with the involvement of [Nina Abramian], cultural attaché from the Russian Embassy, whom the U.S. State Department had authorized to travel from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco for the occasion.

This revived unique celebration, designed to keep alive the historical memory of Russian America, brought together our compatriots and concerned Americans from across the United States, as well as members of Indigenous tribes.

Ninety-nine-year-old Otis Parrish, chief [sic] of the [Kashia Band of Pomo Indians], was invited as guest of honor to the celebration, which featured performances of folk songs, Russian cuisine tasting, displays of arts and crafts, and a round dance set to the music of traditional instruments.

Guests immersed themselves in an atmosphere of unity and a sense of connection to Russian history. The legendary settlement on the coast of Northern California, 140 kilometers north of San Francisco, and founded on 11 September 1812 by the Russian-American Company for fur hunting and trade, was a part of this history.

Ivan Kuskov, an explorer, merchant, and government official, was appointed commandant of the colony. Under his command were twenty-five Russian colonists and eighty Aleuts who had arrived from Russia’s colonies in Alaska. Construction, however, was only possible after Kuskov obtained permission from the indigenous people, the Kashaya Pomo tribe, to use the land for the settlement.

Despite the passage of time and the ocean winds, the fort’s original structures—the administrator’s house, outbuildings, and defensive towers—have survived to this day. In its time, Fort Ross was a hub of innovation: California’s first windmills and shipyards were built there.

These historic sites were at the heart of the plot of Alexey Rybnikov’s renowned [rock] opera Juno and Avos, and they inspired future generations to create works of art, including the famous portrait of Conchita Argüello by the Russian painter Anatoly Sokoloff, which the artist’s family donated to the State Historical Museum in Moscow in September 2001.

As Fort Ross approaches its 215th anniversary, which will be celebrated in September 2027, it remains in operation. It attracts tourists, scholars, historians, and politicians, serving as a reminder of Russia and America’s shared historical and cultural heritage and the significant contribution of our fellow countrymen to the conquest of America, while remaining a vivid example of the intersection and peaceful, harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures, beliefs, and traditions.

We are grateful to everyone who sincerely contributes to the preservation of this unique architectural landmark. Preserving the memory of the shared milestones in the history of Russia and the United States is an important element in restoring an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding between our nations and peoples.

Source: Embassy of Russia in the USA (Facebook), 1 August 2026. Translated by the Russian Reader