Well-Being and the War

“We love and miss Berlin so much that we decided not to wait until we find ourselves there again . . .”
Samotechnaya Square, Moscow, April 2025. Photo: anatrrra (used with their permission)

Despite being hit with unprecedented Western sanctions, the war with Ukraine has been accompanied by a noticeable increase in the well-being of Russians. A new study has revealed the extent of the domestic feel-good factor, with economists at the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economics (BOFIT) finding the level of Russians’ satisfaction with their household and personal circumstances has hit its highest in a decade.

  • To understand how the restructuring of Russia’s economy during wartime affected Russians, economists Sinikka Parviainen (BOFIT) and William Pyle (Middlebury College, USA) used data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Service (RLMS), which has been conducted by the Higher School of Economics almost every year since the 1990s. This research tracks the economic well-being of Russian households and individuals with a sample size of around 6,000-8,000 households and 17,000-21,000 people.
  • The economists looked at RLMS data from 2013-2023, scrutinising responses to the questions: “how satisfied with life are you right now?” and “how satisfied with your financial circumstances are you right now?”. They also looked at whether households had made large purchases over the past year, how much they spent on cultural events and how long they could maintain their current lifestyle if they lost their main source of income.
  • They concluded that the first two years of Russia’s invasion — 2022 and 2023 — saw the highest levels of general satisfaction, and specific financial satisfaction had also returned to 2014 levels for the first time. That year is seen as a benchmark before Russia was plunged into an economic crisis following the annexation of Crimea, imposition of Western sanctions and an oil price crash.
  • Large purchases fell to a minimum in 2022 but demand for non-food goods has since increased faster than inflation and wages, in line with The Bell’s earlier  calculations. There was also a sharp rise in the proportion of households spending money on entertainment: in 2023 this reached 2018 levels, the researchers noted. The number of respondents who said they would be able to last more than a few months on their savings reached a 10-year high.
  • These findings correspond with Russia’s official statistics which also point to improved financial circumstances since the start of the war. In 2023, real incomes in Russia not only returned to 2013 levels after a decade of lost living standards, but surpassed the pre-Crimea level by 5%, the researchers highlighted.
  • There are no surprises as to the cause — a huge increase in state spending on the invasion and the military-industrial complex that has driven record labor shortages and pushed wages up across the economy. The high salaries offered by the state to people sent to work at the front, as well as those paid to soldiers (from 200,000 rubles a month) have played a big part, and the main winners have been residents of Russia’s poorest regions, which have recorded an unusually sudden increase in bank deposits.

Why the world should care

Putin’s regime is unlikely to face any internal threat as long as Russians’ well-being and overall happiness is on the rise.

Source: “Russians’ wellbeing levels surge in face of war, sanctions and repression,” The Bell, 2 April 2025


KVS, “SouthTown: The Olympic Quarters” (YouTube, 8 June 2021)

Today’s developers pay no less attention to creating comfortable residential environments in their projects than they do to configuring apartments, for example, and sometimes they pay even more attention to this.

In recent years, the concept of beautifying the area around residential buildings has been transformed from elementary landscaping of yards and equipping playgrounds to creating theme parks within residential complexes, divided into different activity zones, as well as designing additional spaces where residents of the neighborhood can gather, get acquainted, relax, play sports, and organize their own or their children’s leisure activities.

The role of such spaces is most often played by neighborhood centers, and planning these centers has recently become a real trend among developers.

The neighborhood center at the SouthTown development, designed by Anton Rudnik. Photo: KVS Group, via Delovoi Peterburg

The reasons

Residents of apartment buildings have always needed to socialize and spend time together. Back in Soviet times, people would often gather in courtyards to play dominoes, bingo, and table tennis. At some point the tradition was lost, but after the restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic were lifted, it literally sparkled with new colors.

In their article [sic: no link in the original] on communities, neighborhoods, and neighborliness, researchers from the Higher School of Economics noted that the first contemporary attempts to unite people living near each other into groups were especially noticeable after 2015, when people all over Russia began celebrating Neighbors Day. From a holiday in the classic sense of the word, Neighbors Day has quickly evolved into a multifaceted know-how for working with residents and getting them involved in such community work as spring cleanups and decorating yards for the New Year’s holidays.

With the emergence of urban agglomerations and the integrated development of new estates by developers, the need for communication among the people living there has increased. There is a logical explanation for this. In her time, Birgit Krantz, a Swedish sociologist, architect, and expert on neighborhood relations, argued that the ideal apartment complex contains between fifty to eighty apartments. If a complex has more apartments, it is difficult to manage it and maintain good neighborly relations.

There are many more apartments in new large residential projects, however, even if they are low-rise developments. This is where neighborhood centers come to the rescue. Consequently, they have become an integral part of people’s everyday lives in entire neighborhoods, functioning, per the American sociologist Ray Oldenburg, as “third places” (between home and work or school), as social anchors which facilitate creative interactions among individuals.

A clear demand

Today, the neighborhood centers running in new residential neighborhoods are literally bustling with life, and they are usually open seven days a week from early morning to late evening.

Delovoi Peterburg talked to residents at the KVS Group’s SouthTown development, where such a neighborhood center has been up and running for over six months. The center offers sports classes; clubs for children, including preschool prep; nanny services; rooms for business meetings and negotiations; and movie screenings. A puppet theater also periodically comes to the center on tour, and a planetarium was once even recreated in the space.

According to Anzhelika Alshayeva, director general of the KVS Real Estate Agency, all activities were free of charge for residents during the center’s first three months of operation; the tab was picked up by the developer. Now, the cost of classes is only 200 rubles, and the interest of residents continues to grow. With this in mind, the decision was made to launch the second stage of the neighborhood center — a teen club, which will be equipped with ping-pong and billiards tables, which will undoubtedly appeal to local youngsters.

The teen club at the neighborhood center in the SouthTown development, designed by Anton Rudnik.
Photo: KVS Group,
via Delovoi Peterburg

An important social role

Most importantly, such neighborhood centers, in addition to creating stable communities of around particular interests and hobbies, offer residents various opportunities for professional and personal growth. As practice shows, neighborhood residents themselves provide professional services, working as nannies, coaches, and teachers. Thus, another important issue for the neighborhood as a whole — job creation — is solved. And the concept of the 15-minute city is implemented in the particular housing complex: without leaving home, a person can comfortably take advantage of the full range of social services and work in the same place.

In this sense, co-working spaces can be an important component of neighborhood centers, serving not only as a pleasant but also as a useful feature for buyers and future residents. In addition, a co-working space can potentially generate revenue, thus covering the costs of its own upkeep.

And it does not necessarily have to be a classic room with computers and a coffee machine. For example, in the aforementioned neighborhood center, in the amphitheater of Olympic Hopes Park, the developer decided to create a beauty co-working space — a space with work areas which can be leased by beauty industry professionals. The project promises to be an important element of the neighborhood’s infrastructure, contributing to the growth of small business and strengthening the local community. This comprehensive approach to neighborhood development and neighborly relations was also recognized by Delovoi Peterburg, which awarded it the newspaper’s award for Residential Environment Project of the Year in Creating Versatile and Comfortable Neighborly Infrastructure.

The beauty co-working space at the neighborhood center in the SouthTown development, designed by Olga Fedotova.
Photo: KVS Group, via Delovoi Peterburg

When speaking about the importance of neighborhood centers for residential developments, the experts interviewed by Delovoi Peterburg generally voiced confidence that adding such facilities to residential developments does not make projects much more expensive, but it can increase an an apartment’s per meter cost, as well as make a developer stand out from the competition. The experts recognized that the trend toward neighborliness, according to psychologists, will continue to grow, especially among residents of new neighborhoods.

Source: “Focusing on uniting residents of new neighborhoods,” Delovoi Peterburg, 31 March 2025. Translated by the Russian Reader

Russian Fertilizer

The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) has called for increased economic pressure on Russia as well as secondary sanctions on companies supporting its war efforts in a new report, released Monday, timed with the Munich Security Conference kickoff. The public policy institution states that the former U.S. administration’s foreign policy had been too cautious, resulting in a “war of attrition that neither side can win.”

Despite heavy sanctions on gas and oil, the EU has continued to buy commodities such as fertilizer from Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Data from Eurostat shows that some 3.9 million tonnes of Russian fertilizers were imported to the EU in 2023 and 3.7 million tonnes were imported in the first nine months of 2024. In July 2024, 574,000 tonnes of fertilizers were imported to the EU, up 50 percent from July 2021, the summer before the war.

Last month, the European Commission finally proposed raising tariffs on fertilizers from the current 6.5 percent in proportion to the value to 100 percent in three years. If implemented, this means Russian fertilizers will likely continue to be imported until 2026. The proposed tariffs would bring a tonne of nitrogenous fertilizers to the sum of €315 and other fertilizers up to €430 per tonne. The measure is intended to support domestic production, allow for diversification of supply and cut off a financial flow to Russia’s economy. Until now, the EU has been resistant to placing sanctions on agricultural products from Russia due to global food security concerns.

While the proposal includes protective measures, European farmers warn of the risks associated with increased production costs as well as concerns over whether domestic production will be able to meet demand in time.

Source: Anna Fleck, “EU Has Continued to Buy Russian Fertilizer Throughout War,” Statista, 12 February 2025


Every day Russian fertilisers move from the Vainikkala border crossing point to the Port of HaminaKotka in southeast Finland, where the major Russian fertiliser company Fosagro [sic] operates.

For food security reasons, the EU has allowed the import of Russian fertilisers since Moscow invaded Ukraine. This is why a freight train owned by North Rail Oy, a subsidiary of the Finnish logistics company Nurminen Logistics, makes daily transports of Russian fertilisers from the eastern border to the southeastern port.

These fertiliser-filled trains continue to run despite Russia’s nearly three-year war in Ukraine and the European Commission’s recent decision to impose import tariffs on Russian fertilisers in the bloc.

The Kremlin is now generating record-high revenues from fertiliser exports. Seven of the world’s ten largest fertiliser exporters are Russian companies, which collectively earned an estimated $1.4 billion last year.

Fosagro, with its presence in Kotka, is one of the world’s largest producers of phosphate-based fertilisers. It is backed by Andrei Guryev, a Russian oligarch and Vladimir Putin ally. He stepped down from the company’s leadership in 2022 after the EU sanctioned his son. Later, both the US and UK imposed sanctions on Guryev himself.

According to business magazine Forbes, Guryev and his family still own nearly half of Fosagro.

Yle asked how a sanctioned fertiliser oligarch’s exports are still flowing via Finland.

While Finnish Customs director general Sami Rakshit declined to comment on individual companies, he said that if a sanctioned individual holds a controlling stake in a company, the sanctions will also apply to the company.

At the same time, if Customs cannot demonstrate that the product, person, or company is subject to sanctions, the agency will not intervene.

“Fertiliser transport through the Port of Kotka is possible primarily for food security reasons,” Rakshit told Yle.

“When sanctions are being circumvented, shell company arrangements are often complex, making it very difficult to identify the true beneficiaries,” he added.

Russian connections

At the Port of HaminaKotka, Finnish firms Rauanheimo and Fertilog load the fertiliser onto ships. According to information obtained by Yle, Fertilog’s subcontractors employ Russian-background Finnish citizens and workers from the Baltic states.

The chairman of Fertilog Group’s board is Aleksei Sladkov, a Russian national living in Austria. The rest of the company’s leadership also has Russian-sounding names, though Yle does not know their nationality or whether they hold Finnish citizenship.

Fertilog has stated that it accounted for ten percent of the Finnish port’s traffic in 2020.

Most of the Russian fertilisers passing through Kotka are exported to North African countries and South America. Some also travel to other European countries, as long as they are not subject to sanctions.

In addition to Finland, Russia also exports fertilisers through Estonia and other Baltic countries.

In communicating with Fertilog via email, the company said its focus is on business and does not take a position on politics.

“We only handle fertilisers that are not subject to sanctions,” the company said via email.

The firm also claimed to have invested 80 million euros in the HaminaKotka port over the past 15 years.

“We’re a significant taxpayer and job creator in Kotka, both directly and indirectly,” the company stated.

According to Fertilog, the fertilisers they handle are exported to developing countries, where they play a crucial role in global food security, as well as to EU countries, where they contribute to the EU’s preparedness and security supply.

Source: “Russian fertiliser exports continue flowing through Finland,” Yle News, 11 February 2025. Thanks to Delovoi Peterburg for the heads-up.


PhosAgro freight cars. Photo: Pyotr Kovalyov/Delovoi Peterburg

PhosAgro is a Russian chemical holding company producing fertilizer, phosphates and feed phosphates. The company is based in Moscow, Russia, and its subsidiaries include Apatit, a company based in the Murmansk Region and engaged in the extraction of apatite rock. The company is Europe’s largest producer of phosphate-based fertilisers.

Ownership history

The original owner of PhosAgro’s assets (most notably Apatit, a Soviet-era mining company) was exiled Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky via his company, Menatep. In 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested for tax evasion and fraud; the charges against him were ostensibly connected to Menatep’s purchase of shares in Apatit. However, some have seen the charges as punishment for publicly clashing with Vladimir Putin.

During Khordorkovsky’s trial, the state seized Menatep’s stake in Apatit. In 2004, Andrey Guryev, who at the time ran Apatit on behalf of Khodorkovsky’s Menatep and was also a Russian senator [sic], wrote a message to Khodorkovsky in prison to convince him to sell his remaining 50% stake in PhosAgro to Guryev. Khodorkovsky sold his shares to Guryev for a low price.

In July 2011, PhosAgro raised $538 million in a London IPO.

In 2012, PhosAgro paid $344 million at a state tender to buy back a 26.7% share in Apatit, bringing the company’s ownership to 76%.

As of 2012, Andrey Guryev and his family owned 5.47% of PhosAgro via various trusts.

PhosAgro is 19.35% owned by Vladimir Litvinenko, who oversaw Vladimir Putin’s plagiarized doctoral thesis in 1996.

In 2022, the company’s revenue amounted to 164 billion rubles.

Source: “PhosAgro,” Wikipedia


In early 2015, current CEO Andrei Guryev Jr, Andrey Guryev’s son, was reported as saying, “PhosAgro is the most profitable phosphate fertilizer company in the world.”

PhosAgro is structured so that Guryev and his family are recipients of a trust, rather than outright ownership in their names, though Evgenia Guryev, Guryev’s wife, owns 4.82% of PhosAgro in her own name.

In July 2016, Forbes estimated his net worth at US$4.3 billion.

He is vice president of the Russian Union of Chemists.

[…]

Guryev is married to Evgenia and they have two children, Andrey Guryev, Jr. and Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov. Andrey Guryev, Jr, is CEO of PhosAgro. Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov is married to hedge fund manager Alexei Motlokhov, they have twin sons, and live next door in Highgate.

The Guryevs own Witanhurst in Highgate, London’s second largest house after Buckingham Palace, through an offshore company registered in the British Virgin Islands. He owns the five-storey penthouse of St George Wharf Tower in London. Guryev has never given an interview to the press.

Guryev owned a yacht, Alfa Nero, through an offshore company which is planned to be auctioned off in Antigua and Barbuda due to his sanctions.

Source: “Andrey Guryev,” Wikipedia

Who Wants to Be a Ruble Millionaire?

“A first-year salary of 5,000,000 rubles [approx. 48,000 euros]. A one-time [signing bonus] of 2,500,000 rubles. Monthly pay starting at 210,000 rubles [approx. 2,000 euros] in the special military operation zone. THE HERO CITY HAS ITS OWN HEROES. 16 Republican Street, Saint Petersburg, +7 931-326-8943.”

The signing bonus for volunteering for combat duty has been raised to 2.5 million rubles in Petersburg

The amount was increased by 400,000 rubles. Previously, those wishing to go to the front were paid a lump sum of 2.1 million rubles. On the poster, which was published in the Red Guards District administration’s chat group, the amount that can now be earned for a year of service in the war zone is listed as 5,000,000 rubles.

Judging by the information on the Smolny’s [Petersburg city hall’s] website, the signing bonus was increased three days ago, at the expense of the city budget. Rotunda was told the same thing at the military service recruiting center in the Central District.

Source: Rotunda (Telegram), 20 January 2025. Translated by the Russian Reader


Nizhny Novgorod: sales assistant-cashier

Low-price chain store seeks a sales assistant-cashier.

Responsibilities: serving customers at the cash register; restocking products in the sales area; maintaining order and cleanliness. The candidate should be energetic, trainable, and ready for intensive work.

On-the-books employment. Schedule: two days on, two days off. Salary: 56,000 rubles [a month, i.e., approx. 540 euros a month].

The employer pays for training and a medical examination, offers corporate discounts at all stores in the chain, provides material assistance in difficult situations, and arranges for gifts for children.

Source: Natalya Suvorova, “Ten vacancies for no-experience jobs with a wage of up to eighty thousand rubles per month,” Rabota.ru, 20 January 2025. Translated by the Russian Reader


[…]

In 2025, Russian authorities are continuing to increase payments for contract soldiers participating in the war in Ukraine. 

From January, men who sign a military contract in the Samara region will receive a one-time payout of up to 4 million rubles ($38,900) — the highest of any region in the country. 

In addition to these one-time payouts, which vary by region, military personnel also receive a monthly salary of at least 210,000 rubles ($2,000). In the event of a soldier’s death, their family is entitled to a “funeral allowance,” which can amount to up to 5 million rubles ($48,600), according to a presidential decree.

The substantial payouts to contract soldiers are part of the authorities’ efforts to turn the military into the country’s new elite, says historian Dmitry Dubrovsky. 

“One of the key outcomes of the ongoing war is the attempt to construct a ‘Putin Elite 2.0’ to replace the original elite that emerged in the early 2000s, built on oil and gas revenues,” Dubrobsky said. “This process began as early as 2014, when the ‘heroes of the Russian Spring’ gradually started integrating into Putin’s regime. However, it became fully evident with the onset of the full-scale aggression [against Ukraine].”

In addition to million-ruble payouts, the state also provides military personnel with subsidized mortgages and free university education for their children, including at prestigious institutions such as Moscow State University and the Higher School of Economics

Nearly 15,000 soldiers who fought in Ukraine, as well as their children, were admitted to Russian universities under this program in 2024 — almost double the number from 2023. And increasingly, Ukraine war veterans are being appointed to political roles, though not on a wide scale.

“The privileges of military personnel are evident in the growing practice of integrating ‘veterans’ into various political projects and regional administrations, often as deputy governors,” says historian Dubrovsky. “Overall, the families of military personnel see themselves as part of a superior class, a perception eagerly reinforced by Putin’s propaganda.”

[…]

Source: Angelina Trefilova, “‘I’m a Real-Life Katyusha’: As Russia Hikes Payments for Soldiers, Their Wives Flaunt Newfound Affluence,” Moscow Times, 16 January 2025

Drones over Aprashka

As Ukrainian drones attacked the surrounding Leningrad Region this past weekend, life went on, seemingly unaltered, at downtown Petersburg’s notorious, glorious Apraksin Market aka Aprashka. Thanks to anatrrra for kind permission to reprint their stunning photo reportage from the market.


“Chinese bistro”
“Islamic goods”
Continue reading “Drones over Aprashka”

Severe Employee Shortages on the Homefront and Staggering Casualties on the Battlefield

How much have Petersburgers’ wages grown over the past year? How do companies and experts explain the shortage of personnel? How will the tightening of migration laws affect employers? Bumaga looked at the numbers and talked to online recruiters hh.ru to give you a picture of the main trends in St. Petersburg’s labor market in 2024.

Bike couriers emerging from a pedestrian underpass in downtown St. Petersburg. Photo: Nikolai Vinokurov/Lori via Bumaga

Petersburgers’ salaries grew by over thirteen percent during the year according to both official stats and hh.ru’s data

Analysts at hh.ru told Bumaga that the average monthly salary advertised to Petersburgers in early October 2024 had increased by nineteen percent compared to last year’s figures — up to 79,300 rubles a month [approx. 750 euros]. Petrostat cites similar dynamics, although it cites different overall numbers. According to the city’s statistical agency, the average monthly salary in St. Petersburg increased by 13.1% in August 2024 compared to last August, amounting to 99,800 rubles.

Top managers enjoyed the biggest increase in their average pay — 20,600 rubles a month — Maria Buzunova, head of hh.ru’s press service for the Northwest Federal District and the Central Federal District, told Bumaga. Consulting and strategy professionals, whose average income increased by 20,000 rubles [approx. 190 euros], came in second place.

“Wages in agriculture, insurance, raw materials extraction, the auto business, and auto repair have also been on the rise. Amid the unfolding personnel deficit, employers are still trying to catch applicants in construction and laborers with the money hook. That said, there is not a single sector where advertised salaries have fallen,” Buzunova says.

According Buzunova, average salaries in agriculture, investment and consulting, the auto business, raw materials extraction, and management have exceeded the 100,000 ruble per month mark. Analysts at hh.ru recorded average monthly salaries of round 100,000 rubles in the information technology, transportation, construction, and real estate fields.

Petrostat’s numbers would lead us to believe that the growth of salaries in the city has already stopped. According to the department’s data, the average monthly salary of Petersburgers was higher in the period from April to June than it is now, amounting to approximately 103,500 rubles [approx. 985]. Data from hh.ru suggest the opposite. The online recruiters told Bumaga in mid April that they had estimated the average advertised salary at 72,500 rubles per month. Thus, in five and a half months, this indicator has increased by 9.4%.

Employers are facing a shortage of employees. Demand for teachers and medics has grown in the city

The experts at hh.ru argue that the main reason for wage growth has been the stable growth of demand for staff on the part of employers. The total number of vacancies in St. Petersburg reached 750,000 from January to early October, which is eighteen percent higher than for the same period in 2023.

“Consequently, the problem of staffing shortages has been deepening. This is confirmed by our survey of employers, which we started a couple of years ago. According to the majority of company reps both in Russia as a whole and in St. Petersburg, staffing shortages remain the fundamental problem of the labor market,” the online recruiters told Bumaga.

Demand for teachers and tutors (up twenty-six percent compared to last year), sales clerks and other retail workers (up twenty-five percent compared to last year), and medical personnel (up twenty-three percent compared to last year) has risen the most in St. Petersburg. One of the reasons for the shortage of teachers and medics is their declining interest in staying in their professions and their leaving for other sectors with better working conditions, hh.ru noted.

However, entrepreneurs from other sectors — for example, owners of restaurants, bars and cafes — have also spoken out about staffing shortages. “There is a shortage of absolutely everyone, both waiters and managers,” Vitaliya Dolinskaya, operations director at the restaurants Chang and Che-Dor, told Bumaga.

According to the heads of the companies surveyed by hh.ru, one of the reasons for the shortage of personnel is the demographic situation in the country. Other factors that negatively impact the labor market are the lack of qualified personnel, the low labor mobility of Russians, and insufficient inflows of foreign migrant workers.

Stricter migration laws may aggravate shortages of sales clerks, drivers and couriers. Companies’ costs will be borne by consumers of their goods and services

The shortage of migrant workers can be explained, among other things, by the actions of the Russian authorities after the terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall music venue outside of Moscow. The State Duma continues to tighten migration laws, foreign nationals have been increasingly deported from the country, quotas for temporary work-and-residence permits have been reduced, and the police regularly carry out “anti-migrant” raids.

The attitudes of Russians towards labor migrants have also changed. Eighty percent of Petersburgers surveyed by hh.ru believe that there are too many migrants in the city. At the same time, only thirty-six percent of respondents would agree to take “migrant” jobs. Most often this opinion was voiced by workers in the restaurant and hotel business, logistics and transportation, sales, construction, and the retail trade.

Yulia Sakharova, hh.ru’s director for the Northwest Federal District, claims that the upshot of all this is a shortage of people to fill the most high-demand vacancies — for sales clerks, drivers, and couriers.

“The tightening of migration policy may complicate recruitment for companies. In most cases, the depletion of an already scarce resource leads to an increase in its cost. Employers will have higher recruitment costs. They will be forced to compete against each other by raising wages, and further shift the increased costs onto the price of their services, a price that will be paid by the end consumer,” Sakharova explained to Bumaga.

Factories are looking for young skilled workers, and IT salaries have stabilized. A few more trends in the labor market

Here are five more trends in the Petersburg labor market:

  • St. Petersburg has become less attractive for employment. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the city dropped from fourteenth to twenty-sixth place in hh.ru’s ratings. This happened due to increased competition and an increase in the number of Petersburgers willing to move to other regions. “This does not mean that the city has become a worse place to work. It means that labor conditions have not improved so dynamically in St. Petersburg compared to other regions,” Maria Buzunova.
  • Petersburg enterprises have been forty-nine percent more likely to offer jobs to young skilled workers than in 2023. Since the beginning of the year, the city’s factories and other production facilities have posted more than 14,000 vacancies which are open to recent graduates and personnel without work experience.
  • There were about one thousand vacancies for cab drivers in St. Petersburg in August 2024, which was fifty percent more than a year earlier. And yet, there are fewer applicants: on average, one or two people apply for each vacancy (the lower limit is four people per vacancy), hh.ru noted. This circumstance also affects the price of cab rides, which we examined in more detail here.
  • In 2023, the salaries of IT workers in St. Petersburg decreased for the first time in several years. In 2024, incomes in the IT sector increased again, according to hh.ru. For example, the salaries of developers have grown by seven percent, while those of analysts have risen by fifteen percent. “However, we have also seen a transition from a jobseeker’s market to an employer’s market. According to our research, the overheated market for IT professionals has reached its limit and will gradually stabilize as more and more companies refuse to give employees dynamic salary increases,” hh.ru explained.
  • Petersburgers are more and more often quitting stressful jobs that negatively affect their emotional state. Given these conditions, employers are forced to introduce practices for handling their employees with care and patience, hh.ru noted.

Source: “Companies compete by raising wages as Petersburg’s personnel shortage grows. Which sectors have the fewest skilled workers,” Bumaga, 4 November 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


Russian casualties in Vladimir Putin‘s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have surpassed 700,000, according to Kyiv, which trolled Moscow over the round number of such a grim milestone.

In its daily update, Ukraine’s military said on Monday that over the previous day, Russian forces had suffered 1,300 personnel losses, taking the total number since the start of the full-scale invasion to 700,390.

“‘Perfect numbers like perfect men are very rare.’ Rene Descartes,” Ukraine’s defense ministry posted on X referring to the French philosopher.

Newsweek has contacted the Russian defense ministry for comment. An accurate number of casualties, which Ukraine says are “approximate” and include those who are both dead or injured, is difficult to ascertain, with both sides remaining tightlipped over their losses.

Russia has not updated its figures since September 2022 when it said that just under 6,000 had been killed, while Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky said in February that 31,000 Ukrainian troops had died, although this was lower than Western estimates.

U.S. officials told The New York Times that September was the bloodiest month of the war since its start in February 2022 and that more than 600,000 were dead and wounded, with the spike caused by assaults in the east of Ukraine where Putin’s forces have made slow gains but at a great cost in personnel.

An unnamed U.S. official cited by The New York Times said that more than 57,500 Ukrainian troops had been killed and 250,000 wounded.

Estonian intelligence estimated that Russia may have lost around 40,000 soldiers in October alone, a figure backed up by other estimates and higher than the 30,000 new soldiers that Ukrainian military intelligence believes are being recruited per month.

In its update in mid-October, independent Russian news outlet Mediazona said that 75,382 killed Russian troops had been identified, an increase of 2,483 since the start of the month.

Source: Brendan Cole, “Russia Hits Grim Troop Loss Milestone,” Newsweek, 4 November 2024

Teachers’ Day in Bryansk

A martial dance performance, given, allegedly, at the recent Teachers’ Day celebration in Bryansk

Source: Kolokol XXI (Telegram), 6 October 2024


Distinguished teachers awarded for their many years of work and achievements

On October 5, the country and the Bryansk Region celebrate Teachers’ Day. This is the day when our teachers are thanked and given flowers, and concerts and matinees are organized in their honor.

Celebrations were also held at Prep School No. 27 in the Bryansk Region’s Fokino District. District head Alexander Gavrilov, Department of Education director Alevtina Andreyeva, and others made welcoming speeches.

All of them noted the importance of pedagogical labor, and the huge role which educators and teachers play in the life of every individual. Distinguished teachers were given awards for their many years of work and for their achievements.

A warm atmosphere and positive emotions reigned at the event. The festive mood was supplied by artists from the Railroaders Cultural Center and the village of Belye Berega.

Source: Marina Frolova, “On eve of Teachers’ Day in Bryansk, celebrations held at Prep School No. 27,” Bryansk bez formata, 3 October 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


“Happy Teachers’ Day!”

On October 3, on the eve of Teachers’ Day, a festive event was held in Bryansk to honor the region’s pedagogical workers — teachers, educators, master trainers, and continuing education instructors. The event was held at the Yuri Gagarin Bryansk Regional Governor’s Palace of Children’s and Youth Creativity. Among the honored guests were Valentin Subbot, chair of the Bryansk Regional Duma, and Alexander Bogomaz, head of the region, as well as representatives of the government, trade unions and educational organizations.

Teachers’ Day is a holiday celebrated in Russia on October 5, coinciding with World Teachers’ Day. The quality of education is annually improved, innovative technologies are introduced, new schools are built, and modern educational centers are opened annually in the Bryansk Region. These achievements have been recognized at the federal level and generate favorable conditions for teachers and students.

In his address to the teachers, Governor Alexander Bogomaz, who himself grew up in a family of teachers, emphasized the importance of their profession. He noted that, thanks to the supreme professionalism and wisdom of teachers, patriots ready to serve their Motherland were being brought up in the Bryansk Region.

The Governor also touched upon the issue of awarding teachers. Seven years ago, the law on awarding the title “Honored Educational Worker of the Bryansk Region” was adopted, but only three such titles are awarded per year. The head of the region proposed increasing this number to ten, taking into account the difficult conditions in which teachers work, especially in border areas. This decision would be a well-deserved recognition of their contribution to the development of education in the region.

Source: Yulia Sumner, “Teachers honored on eve of Teachers Day in Bryansk,” Moi Bryansk, 3 October 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader. The emphasis is mine.


Prices for flowers have skyrocketed in Bryansk in the run-up to Teachers’ Day. This holiday, like March 8, is one of the key days for the flower business. The same picture is observed throughout the country.

According to Izvestia, the average check for a bouquet for Teachers’ Day comes to about three thousand rubles (approx. 28 euros), while the demand for flowers has increased by thirty percent. They note an increase in flower sales on online platforms as well.

The newspaper writes that consumers are increasingly choosing more expensive and complex arrangements, including original bouquets and mono bouquets.

A “teacher’s” bouquet in Bryansk will cost between two and three thousand roubles, on average. Roses, especially bush roses and peonies, as well as chrysanthemums and lilies are traditionally popular on Teachers’ Day.

Earlier, we reported that the Governor of Bryansk Region had proposed amending the regional law on awarding the honorary title “Honored Educational Worker of the Bryansk Region.” The head of the region said that he considers it fair to increase the number of awards to ten per year, as the teachers of the region do a tremendous job.

Source: “Flower prices in Bryansk predictably increase before Teachers’ Day,” Bryanskie novosti, 4 October 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


The Russian government has submitted a draft federal budget for 2025 and budget projections through 2027 to the State Duma. Although it is called a “draft” budget, no major changes will be made to it, of course. Budget revenues are supposed to increase by 11.6%, while expenditures will rise by only 5.2%. However, before this happens, both revenues and expenditures will grow, especially expenditures: up to 39.4 trillion rubles, against the planned 36.7 trillion.

A year ago, approximately the same people in the government were determined to curb military expenditures in 2025, hoping to end the war in Ukraine. Now it is clear that the war may not end in 2025 either, so the projections for the next two years do not provide for a significant reduction in defense spending. In 2025, 32.4% of Russia’s money will be blown up, buried, shot, crushed, pulverized, etc.: 13.49 trillion rubles! In last year’s forecast, defense spending also took a huge chunk — 29.4% (10.77 trillion rubles) — but it was still not that much.

Projected Russian federal budget expenditures for 2025, in trillions of rubles. “National defense” tops the list, at 13.49 trillion rubles (approx. 128 billion euros), while education (ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ) warrants a meager 1.58 trillion rubles (approx. 15 billion euros). Source: Kommersant, via the Moscow Times Russian Service

Economist Igor Lipsits argues that it will be quite difficult for the financial authorities to cope with this task. It’s not that they won’t find the money; it’s that the conditions under which they find the money will hurt the populace. But the populace is no stranger to that!

As they say, to buy something you don’t need, you have to give something up. The list of things that will have to be given up includes support for Russia’s regions, and money for them has in fact been cut. Although they won’t get any money, they will have their budget debts canceled. The Jesuitic twist here is that they probably wouldn’t pay them back anyway. That’s the practice. In other words, that’s how the federal government supports the regions.

Another funny thing is that the funding for civilian drones has been cut. On the one hand, this is understandable: what do they need civilian drones for? They need military drones! On the other hand, this money has been partially used to finance “voluntary” designs, which subsequently, again in a voluntary fashion, make their way to the front and play a quite significant role there.

If we return to the revenue part of the budget, as usual, almost a third of it derives from oil and gas revenues. Oil and gas analyst Mikhail Krutikhin explains that not all is rosy with these revenues; they may even go downhill. The fact that some of the most unprofitable Russian companies are state-owned gives some insight into what the prospects for taxing Russian business might look like. And when analysts speak about dividends from oil companies, they argue that they will decrease. The trend, as described by oil and gas experts, is that prices will decline in 2025.

Brent Oil Futures, March 2024–October 2024. Source: Investing.com, via Moscow Times Russian Service

Prices probably would have continued to fall, but then Israel launched a war against Hezbollah, and oil reacted sensitively, triggering a rise in futures prices.

Source: Moscow Times Russian Service, weekly newsletter, 6 October 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader

No Picnic?

Is Picnic frontman Edmund Shklyarsky wielding a Ukrainian trident in this concert poster?

PICNIC
One on One

The band Picnic’s new concert program is entitled “One on One.”

Imagine a magic crystal with three facets. The first one is the eponymous new album. The second is video sequences and a laser show. And the third is the band’s musical calling cards: “The Egyptian,” “Kingdom of Curves,” “The Shining,” and others.

Since “the show must go on” (as the famous song says), it must go on not just any old way. The best minds from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok have been working on how to amaze you. Those who attended our concerts during The Future Awaits Us tour probably know already that Picnic’s bold claims are no empty threat. Of course, we will pull back the veil of secrecy, but only at the concert will all our secrets be revealed.

Source: Bileter.ru


[…]

Both of these stances, however, involve a lack of agency, a factor that is borne out in other research we have conducted. Indeed, reviewing nearly 100,000 substantive war-related texts from across six Telegram channels—including three generally pro-war and three anti-war channels—suggests that a lack of agency is common both to supporters and opponents of the war.

On the pro-war channels—which were dominated by reports from the front and patriotic rallying cries, but also included a number of discussions of mobilization and ways out avoiding military service—attribution of “credit” for the war was mixed. Often, the war was highly personalized: something was ordered by Putin, said by his spokesman Dmitry Peskov, or carried out by (then) Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

When discussing mobilization, the discussion was dry and procedural, with no discernible consideration of justice or fairness (or the irony of pro-war channels discussing ways of avoiding the fight). Almost never did commentators use the first person: things were done, said or thought by others, but not by them.

On the anti-war channels, the war was largely de-personalized. To the extent blame was attributed to Putin, it was mostly implicit: because it was Putin’s war, his role appeared to require little overt discussion. Perhaps surprisingly, discussion of military mobilization, similarly to the pro-war channels, focused on procedural consideration[s] and avoided issues of justice and fairness. Unlike in the pro-war channels, however, there was considerable use of the first person, but predominantly the first person singular, as commentators discussed their own thoughts and experiences. Use of the first person plural—“we”, with connotations of collective responsibility and action—were rare.

Given the roles played both by “system justification” and “agreeableness” among war supporters—psychological motivations that encourage people to get in line and discourage difference—the lack of a sense of agency is not surprising. Even those who write openly of their support for the war on Telegram don’t tend to see the war as something over which they have any control; while the war may be prosecuted with their support, it is prosecuted without their involvement.

It is perhaps somewhat more jarring that this lack of agency seems to extend to much of the anti-war community, however. To be certain, anti-war Russians clearly claim responsibility for their own lives and, in many cases, for assisting Ukrainian refugees, for example. Moreover, there are individuals and small groups who have attempted acts of resistance ranging from anti-war graffiti and solitary protests to outright sabotage. But there is little discussion of any potential agency over the war itself, or the idea that, if they acted, Russian citizens might be able to bring the war to an end.

Source: Bryce Hecht, Graeme Robertson, and Sam Greene, “Yes In My Name? The Problem of Agency in Russians’ Response to the War,” Russia.Post, 7 June 2024


In the first half of 2024, the average bill for entertainment tickets (excluding movies) amounted to 3,400 rubles [approx. 35 euros], which is 18.8% higher than a year earlier, reported Yandex Afisha. According to the service, this economic indicator rose by 14% last year. The largest increase in the average bill was recorded in theaters, which rose by almost a quarter, up to 3,800 rubles. The average price of concert tickets on Kassir.ru [a online ticket purchasing service] increased by 20% compared to last year, and the total price increase for the first six months of the year amounted to 16%. Market participants say the increase in ticket prices has been caused by the growing costs of organizing events, as well as by increased demand for performances by domestic artists after the departure of many foreign performers. This has led to an increase in the fees sought by Russian artists and, consequently, to an increase in ticket prices.

Source: Moscow Times Russian Service, 16 August 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


[…]

But the continued damage to Putin’s authority after a catastrophic war and repeated shocks does not translate to an internal threat to his power. Nor is there a risk his regime might collapse in the foreseeable future, according to analysts.

Stanovaya said that many Russians, particularly members of the elite, had come to expect the worst in the war but realized that there was no alternative to Putin in Russia’s repressive political system.

“They are so used to shocking events. They’re so used to living in a very unpredictable situation, so it’s very difficult to surprise them. And they are also used to the feeling that they don’t have the power to affect anything, and they are helpless,” she said.

The crisis, she continued, had certainly undermined Putin’s authority — without necessarily undermining his grip on power.

[…]

Source: Robyn Dixon, “Kremlin response to Kursk incursion shows how Putin freezes in a crisis,” Washington Post, 18 August 2024

NUMB3RS (Wages of War)

Illustration by Danny Berkovskii for Mediazona. Source: New Tab

Aided by a team of volunteers, journalists at Mediazona and the BBC’s Russian Service have identified 41,731 Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine using open sources. This number includes employees of the Wagner mercenary group, but it does not include those who fought on Russia’s side in military units fielded by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” the BBC noted in an article published on Friday, 12 January.

According to the article, more than 1,100 Russian military personnel killed in the war were under 20 years of age. Since the State Duma approved amendments to the relevant laws, in April 2023, thus permitting 18-year-old high school graduates to sign military service contracts, 48 Russians born in 2004 and five born in 2005 (who were thus “barely 18 years old” when they enlisted) have perished in the war.

As of 11 January, 2,377 airborne troops, 913 marines, 537 members of the Russian National Guard’s special forces, 450 members of the GRU’s special forces, 206 military pilots, and 77 FSB and FSO officers have been killed in combat operations.

The BBC points out that the number of casualties among those who voluntarily signed a contract to serve in the Russian armed forces has increased in recent months. Thus, volunteers, prisoners, and private mercenary company “recruits” now account for 37 percent of all confirmed losses 0n the Russian side. Another 12 percent of the identified casualties were draftees (of whom 5,005 died in Ukraine and 62 in Russia).

Source: Yevgeny Zhukov, “Journalists have confirmed the deaths of 41,700 Russian soldiers in Ukraine,” Deutsche Welle Russian Service, 13 January 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russian forces in Ukraine currently consist of 462,000 military and 35,000 National Guard troops, responsible for the functioning of the occupation regime. This number of troops allows the Russians to carry out rotation — to withdraw units and subdivisions and bring them to the front line.

Source: Monique Camarra, “Jan 13: E-Stories,” EuroFile, 12 January 2024


When looking for a new advertising/PR agency in Ukraine in autumn 2023, PepsiCo made it a condition for a potential partner to exclude any mention of the war, or support for Ukraine and its army in future communications, according to a brief seen by B4Ukraine.

“NO: mention of war, hostilities, aggression, military personnel (from Brand side), Armed Forces of Ukraine. NO: support Ukraine and the army. NO: negative connotation, creating a feeling of ‘unsafe,’” states the “Pepsi restrictions” section of the brief.

The B4Ukraine Coalition contacted Pepsi offices in Ukraine and the US to ask for comment on this article but at the time of publication had not received any response.

In the meantime, the October 17 message on PepsiCo’s Instagram page announced that “PepsiCo volunteers distributed food kits to 1,200 families in the city of Borodyanka, whose homes were destroyed.” The message does not specify who exactly brutally destroyed the homes of these people.

Perhaps because PepsiCo’s Russia net profit increased by 333% to $525 million last year and the company paid about $115 million in taxes to the Kremlin? Treating such contributions as support for the economy of the aggressor state, Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) in September included PepsiCo in the list of international sponsors of war.

PepsiCo produces soft drinks, juices, chips, snacks, dairy products and other food products under the main brands Chester’s, Chipsy, Lay’s, Mirinda, Pasta Roni, Pepsi, Propel, Sandora, 7Up, Simba, Snack a Jacks, Sonric’s, Tropicana, etc.

The company has 19 factories, about 20,000 employees, 40,000 agricultural workers, and 600 open vacancies in Russia, according to the NACP.

The company announced the cessation of advertising activities and the production of some beverages in Russia in March 2022, while still allowing other products, such as infant formula and baby food to be sold, in order, as PepsiCo put it, “stay true to the humanitarian aspect of its business.” Yet in fact, the company continues the production and distribution of chips, snacks, and soft drinks. According to Bloomberg, PepsiCo’s revenue rose 16% in Russia and profits quadrupled, and the soda maker said operations in Russia accounted for 5% of consolidated net revenue for 2022, up from 4% a year earlier.

Now the iconic Pepsi cola is sold under the Evervess-Cola brand, although regular Pepsi Cola is still easy easily purchasable in Russian supermarkets due to the so-called parallel imports, when goods are imported without the manufacturer’s permission.

At the beginning of September last year, PepsiCo came under fire over its Russian business when the firm’s products were dropped by the Finnish parliament and Scandinavian Airlines’ operator SAS, and already on September 21, ironically, [a] Russian missile damaged a PepsiCo plant near Ukraine’s capital Kyiv.

A global [c]oalition of civil society organizations, B4Ukraine, is calling on PepsiCo to exit Russia ASAP and for the US government to issue a business advisory, warning US businesses of the growing legal, reputational, and financial risks of doing business under military control in Russia.

Source: “‘No support for Ukraine and its army’: PepsiCo restricts mentions of war in its PR,” B4Ukraine. Thanks to Monique Camarra (EuroFile) for the heads-up.


The war has markedly changed the Russian economy. Moscow has had to adjust its policy to fund its armed conflict against Kyiv, maintaining its military apparatus and police force, and integrating the territories it has annexed from Ukraine. These priorities have necessitated significant spending commitments that collectively threaten Russia’s economic stability. The Kremlin will spend six percent of GDP (more than eight percent when combined with spending on national security) on the war in 2024. This is more than the 3.8 percent of GDP that the United States spent during the Iraq war, although it falls short of the prodigious sums the Soviet Union allocated during the years of stagnation and its invasion of Afghanistan (18 percent of GDP).

Military spending has even eclipsed social spending—currently less than five percent of GDP—for the first time in Russia’s post-Soviet history. This pivot toward a militarized economy threatens social and developmental needs. The four annexed regions of Ukraine have already received the equivalent of $18 billion, and in 2024 almost $5 billion is expected to be transferred from the federal budget to regional budgets. No other regions in Russia receive this level of investment, which only increases interregional inequality. Rather than restore dilapidated housing in Russia, the Kremlin prefers to spend money on building houses and roads in annexed territories, to replace the houses and roads that Russian troops destroyed during their brutal invasion.

Russian industry has been transformed, with defense sectors now overshadowing civilian industries. The defense sector’s enterprises are now operating at a fever pitch and, as a consequence, any surge in demand is likely to force prices to rise because of the sector’s inability to increase supply. The military sector is receiving a disproportionately high amount of government spending, and it is also siphoning off labor from the civilian workforce, leading to an abnormally low unemployment rate of 2.9 percent. Before the war, Russia’s unemployment rate typically stood at around four to five percent. The military and public sectors now employ 850,000 more people than in late 2022–23. The invasion of Ukraine also prompted about 500,000 Russians to emigrate in 2022, driving shortages of qualified specialists and blue-collar workers.

Meanwhile, living standards have risen across Russia, and the percentage of Russians living below the poverty line has dropped to 9.8 percent, the lowest since 1992. Naturally, there are regional variations, and areas that have sent a significant number of their men to fight in Ukraine—including Altai Krai, the Altai Republic, Buryatia, Chechnya, and Dagestan—have witnessed the fastest income growth in low-income groups. This relative increase in prosperity can be expected to continue as Moscow disburses funds to the families of the deceased and wounded.

Overall, the Kremlin wishes to maintain an illusion of normality and even increasing prosperity for its citizens. The distortions in the labor market have pushed up salaries in military industry, as well as in civilian manufacturing, because of the need to compete to attract workers from well-paying military plants. Moscow is, meanwhile, making high payments to soldiers and people mobilized to fight in Ukraine, which are driving consumption. At the same time, thanks to a supply of cheap credit, the government is handing out subsidized mortgages, that are, for the moment, shielding families from economic reality.

Source: Alexandra Prokopenko, “Putin’s Unsustainable Spending Spree: How the War in Ukraine Will Overheat the Russian Economy,” Foreign Affairs, 8 January 2024


Elsewhere there are signs that the invasion of Ukraine may have disrupted the Russian economy more severely than the frothy party scene suggests. The Olivier salad, a mayonnaise-drenched confection of root vegetables, sausage and boiled eggs, is a staple at every table during the holidays. This winter the price of eggs suddenly rocketed (no one is quite sure why, but it may have been because farms were short of labour since so many workers have been conscripted or left the country). In some regions people cannot afford a box of six eggs and have to buy them individually. One pensioner even raised this with Putin during the president’s annual end-of-year call-in with the public. Putin promised to look into it.

Source: Kate de Pury, “Gucci is cheap and eggs are pricey in Russia’s surreal economy: War spending has Russians partying like it’s 2021. But some are also stockpiling dollars,” 1843 Magazine (The Economist), 10 January 2024


In the two years that have passed since the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, residents of Ukraine have become less likely to use the Russian language, according to a press release on the outcome of research done by the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich in cooperation with the University of Bath and the Technical University of Munich, which was published on Wednesday, 10 January.

Language plays a leading role in the identity of post-Soviet Ukraine, the authors of the study say. Many Ukrainians are fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian. And yet, only a few years ago, 50 to 60 percent of the country’s residents called Ukrainian their principal language of communication. After the Maidan protests in late 2013, sparked by then-Ukrainian President [Viktor] Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the EU, and Russia’s subsequent  annexation of Crimea in 2014, more Ukrainians abandoned Russian.

[…]

The researchers explore this trend in a study published in the journal Communications Psychology. Using artificial intelligence and statistical analysis, they examined more than four million messages posted by 63,000 Ukrainian users on the social network X (formerly Twitter) between January 2020 and October 2022.

According to the study’s authors, users began switching from Russian to Ukrainian even before the large-scale Russian invasion, but this trend increased dramatically after the war began. In their opinion, this change in user behavior was a political reaction to events. Users wanted to distance themselves from both support for the war and Russia as such, so they started using Ukrainian en masse.

Source: Sergei Gushcha, “Ukrainians use Russian less since war began,” Deutsche Welle Russian Service, 10 January 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader


The full-scale war in Ukraine, which began almost two years ago, has led to increased violence in Russia itself. Military personnel with PTSD and criminals recruited into combat return from the front and maim and kill people in civilian life. Sometimes conversations about the war even end in violence. Mediazona and New Tab have uncovered over thirty criminal convictions for assaults and murders that occurred during quarrels about the “special military operation.” (The courts use the official wording for the war as mandated by the authorities.)

In Berdsk, Novosibirsk Region, draftee Khuler Mongush stabbed Nikolai Berezutsky, a passerby. The latter had asked Mongush why he was going to Ukraine. Saying that he was going there “to defend the Motherland,” the mobilized man attacked Berezutsky. Mongush was sentenced to eight years in prison for murder.

In the Irkutsk Region, farmer Maxim Khalapkhanov was drinking with an acquaintance, who began ridiculing the state of the Russian army during the war. Khalapkhanov eventually got angry and killed the acquaintance with a knife, whose handle was decorated in the colors of the Russian flag, and drew the letter Z on his stomach with a fireplace poker. Khalapkhanov was sentenced to seven years in a high-security penal colony.

Anton Rakov, a resident of Orenburg, was drinking with a new acquaintance. They began arguing about the war. Rakov did not like what his interlocutor was saying and killed him. While his victim breathed his final breaths, Rakov recorded a video with the dying man in the background, shouting, “This is what will happen to anyone who disagrees with me!”

Viktor Konnov of Zlatoust beat up a friend who said something nice about Ukraine, while Ivanovo resident Mikhail Vitruk received two and a half years in a penal colony for beating up his girlfriend, who allegedly called him a “Nazi” while they were watching the news.

In 2020, Mikhail Taskin attempted to shoot three people over a parking space and was sentenced to nine years in a penal colony, whence he was freed by the Wagner Group. Taskin spent several months in combat, where he lost a leg, eventually returning to his native village of Nerchinskiy Zavod in the Transbaikal Territory. In August 2023, he got into a fight at a local cafe. Taskin mocked the waitresses and promised to “hump all of them.” The incident ended in a brawl, and the police detained five people, but not Taskin was not among them. His sister and the local authorities argued that the disabled man had been assaulted by “opponents of the war.” But the news website Regnum discovered that two of the detainees were certainly not against the war because they had been involved in patriotic campaigns in the region.

It is not only drinking buddies and casual acquaintances who quarrel and fight over the war. Mediazona and New Tab turned up no less than seven court rulings in cases where the defendants and the victims were members of the same family. Vladimir Tofel from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky killed his nephew during an argument about the war. Yuri Makarkin stabbed his son, while Anna Cheremnova, a resident of the Altai Territory, stabbed her husband.

The experts asked for comment by Mediazona and New Tab argue that these are signs of a deep split within society, and the policy of the authorities does not help society to overcome this fissure. On the contrary, the hysterical rhetoric of propaganda only heightens the degree of intolerance, and people are increasingly willing to maim and kill each other.

Source: WTF (Mediazona) newsletter, 10 January 2024. Translated by the Russian Reader

Small Acts of Defiance

Image courtesy of Civic Council

The town’s coroner and mortician, Dr. Ivan Malinin, a Russian immigrant who barely spoke English, performed the autopsy on Williams at the Tyree Funeral House. Malinin found hemorrhages in the heart and neck and pronounced the cause of death as “insufficiency of [the] right ventricle of [the] heart.” Malinin also found that, apparently unrelated to his death, Williams had also been severely kicked in the groin during a fight in a Montgomery bar a few days earlier in which he had also injured his left arm, which had been subsequently bandaged. That evening, when the announcer at Canton announced Williams’s death to the gathered crowd, they started laughing, thinking that it was just another excuse. After Hawkshaw Hawkins and other performers started singing “I Saw the Light” as a tribute to Williams, the crowd, now realizing that he was indeed dead, followed them.

Source: “Death of Hank Williams,” Wikipedia


Hyvästi Suomi!

This can be translated as “Goodbye, Finland,” or it can be translated as “Adieu, Finland.” The correct translation will depend on our neighbors.

Source: “News Roundup” email newsletter (Delovoi Peterburg), 24 November 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader


Finland has temporarily closed all but one of its eight passenger crossings to Russia in response to an unusually high inflow of migrants for which the Nordic country accuses Moscow.More than 700 migrants from nations such as Yemen, Afghanistan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria, have in the past couple of weeks entered Finland via Russia. Helsinki says Russia is funneling migrants to the border, a charge the Kremlin has denied.

Having last week closed four border stations, Finland overnight closed all remaining passenger crossings except its northernmost one, Raja-Jooseppi located high north in the Arctic region, for a month.

Raja-Jooseppi opened its gates for traffic this morning and will continue to accept asylum applications during its four daily opening hours, the Finnish Border Guard said.

No migrants arrived overnight outside opening hours, it added.

The Border Guard is stepping up patrolling along the length of its 833-mile frontier with Russia.

It will get additional resources for the task from the European Union’s border agency Frontex, which said on Thursday it would deploy 50 border guard officers and other staff to Finland along with equipment such as patrol cars to bolster control activities.

Source: “Finland closes passenger border crossings with Russia,” NBC News, 24 November 2023


What are the benefits for Russia?

HS: Russia wants to create an image of a hostile West that is of benefit to the Russian leadership. Finland has not fit this image in the past, but now they are trying to build it. Relations between Finland and Russia are at a turning point. The Russians have realised that they do not know Finland after all. They want to see who Finland cooperates with and at the same time try to stir up discord within Finnish society. Building a new relationship will be a long-term process.

JS: Russia can create a fortress mindset due to a perceived ‘threat’ from the West. Finland’s eastern border is becoming a useful confrontational narrative for the Kremlin. When the same narrative is repeated, a kind of protection mechanism kicks in and even sceptics will start to believe it.

Source: “What is Russia hoping to achieve with hybrid tactics on the Finnish border?” Yle News, 21 November 2023


The Front Lawn, “Claude Rains” (1989)


Claude Rains in Casablanca

He was the French Police Inspector

A functionary through and through

A small man

Remember at the end out on the airstrip

He could have tried to stop them

Ingrid Bergman and her friend from the French Resistance

But he pretended not to see

It was a small act of defiance

As the storm broke in the distance

He was on their side after all.

Claude Rains gave the order to collect the usual suspects

And the camera came in close up on his face

He watched as the plane left the airstrip

Like hope leaves a dying man

But he hung on to the choice he’d made

Claude Rains

Claude Rains

Claude Rains

Claude Rains

I saw a new film the other day

And it was set at the start of a nuclear war

The actors weren’t as good as Claude Rains

But then there was nothing that they could do

All of their small acts could count for nothing

As the storm broke in the distance

Not much to make a film about

Source: “Claude Rains,” The Front Lawn: Lyrics


Civic Council named “undesirable organization” in the Russian Federation

The Prosecutor General’s Office added us to this list on November 3, exactly one year after we announced the creation of our Mobilization Center. We have openly stated that we are working to ensure that the Russian Federation in its current form, with its current government and all that this government calls the state, ceases to exist.

Today it is the Russian state that is criminal, and armed struggle against it is legitimate and necessary. So the Prosecutor’s Office and the Justice Ministry are formally correct: we are their enemies.

In fact, our status as an undesirable organization has not changed anything. Supporting the Civic Council within Russia was also a criminal offense before we were give this status, just like all other independent political and civic activities. The Russian authorities hand down approximately the same prison sentences for making [anti-war] comments on social media and engaging in armed resistance. So, we propose fighting effectively, rather than commenting in vain.

We have to resist intelligently, so we suggest that our supporters inside Russia observe the rules of information security and be vigilant.

We do not accept donations payable to Russian bank cards and do not have accounts in Russian banks.

We are not urging you to attend protest rallies right now. The time to go to the public squares will come later.

We invite those who are ready to take up arms to fight, fully aware of the consequences.

For those who do not want to stay on the sidelines but cannot fight for various reasons, there are other ways to support our cause:

  • donating money, including anonymously through crypto wallets (including Monero)
  • providing information to our OSINT service
  • disseminating information about the opportunity to volunteer

To volunteer for the Siberian Battalion, fill out this form.

Anyone who wants to make a donation should go here. All options are a help to us.

Anyone who wants to help with information or other work inside the Russian Federation should write to us at civic_council@proton.me.

Sincerely yours,

Civic Council, an undesirable organization in the Russian Federation

@obserwujący

P.S. We suggesting giving us the special status of “an organization readying the overthrow of the Putin regime.”

Source: Civic Council (Facebook), 23 November 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader


Foreign luxury brands are closing their flagship stores on Nevsky Prospect, but they could be replaced by Russian fashion retailers, say market participants.

Analysts expect a reduction in rental rates on Nevsky Prospect.

According to sources cited by Kommersant-SPb and NF Group, Breitling, Fendi, Omega, Rolex, and Salvatore Ferragamo have already vacated their spaces in downtown Petersburg. Louis Vuitton has the same plans. Market participants ascribed the mass exodus of luxury sellers to political pressure in the brands’ home countries and logistical and supply chain challenges.

“Luxury retailers initially took a wait-and-see attitude, but now it has become clear that there are no prospects for stabilizing the economic situation in the medium term,” said a source who spoke to Kommersant-SPb.

KNRU development director Polina Fiofilova noted that western brands that have been operating in the fashionable part of Nevsky Prospect for years have driven rents “sky-high” and inflated the expectations of landlords.

In the first half of 2023, the rates per square meter in this locale ranged from 2,600 to 6,700 rubles per month (VAT included), while in the adjacent Telezhny Lane they amounted to 2,500 to 5,200 rubles per square meter per month. Local fashion retailers simply would not be able to afford such rents, analysts said.

Nevsky Prospect is still empty. Despite a reduction in vacancies compared to the peak period, their level remains quite high, thus generating pressure on rental costs, added Mikhail Burmistrov, CEO of the agency Infoline Analytics.

As Delovoi Peterburg wrote earlier, despite the departure of a number of foreign brands, fashion retail sales increased by nine percent, a nineteen percent increase compared to the same period last year. But the average receipt remained at the level of last year or even decreased.

In period from July to September, ten international brand stores opened in Petersburg shopping centers. Most of the new boutiques belong to the fashion segment.

Three new Turkish clothing brand stores opened in Petersburg, along with Quiksilver (Australia), Mark Formelle (Belorussia), Woolrich (USA), Yamaguchi (Japan), Liu Jo (Italy) and two Stockmann’s stores (Finland).

We reported in October that the Italian clothing brand OVS would return to Petersburg after a ten-year hiatus.

Source: “Western luxury brands close Nevsky Prospekt boutiques en masse,” Delovoi Peterburg, 20 November 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader


Rosstat reports that the retail price of bananas increased to 143 rubles per kilo for the first time since it has been tracking their price. Compared to October last year, the cost of bananas increased by 47 percent, which was the biggest single-month increase since 2000. Oranges led the price growth among fruits: in October, they rose in price to 209 rubles per kilo, or by almost 80% year on year. Fruit prices were affected by the weakening of the ruble, which led to an increase in suppliers’ purchase prices and a rise in the cost of logistics, according to market participants. Albina Koryagina, a partner at NEO, a consulting company, says that last year the Russian authorities controlled the growth of retail prices for socially significant products, including bananas (aka “the poor people’s fruit”), as much as they were able, but this year retailers can no longer afford to hold down prices “even when pressured.”

Source: Moscow Times Russian Service, daily news roundup, 24 November 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader


4,121 criminal absence without leave [AWOL] cases have been delivered to Russia’s military courts since the start of the military mobilization in September 2022, as reported on Friday, November 24, by Mediazona, which studied information available on the websites of the military courts.

The courts have already made rulings in 3,470 of the cases. “Most AWOL cases result in suspended sentences. The percentage of such rulings is sixty-three for volunteer soldiers, while for mobilized [conscripted] soldiers, it is slightly lower—fifty-six percent,” the article says. A suspended sentence, it notes, makes it possible to return a serviceman to the front.

In addition to criminal AWOL cases, Mediazona found 317 cases of disobeying orders, 96 cases of desertion, 54 cases of assaulting a commanding officer, and 42 cases for other offenses on which the authorities have doubled down during the mobilization.

According to the infographic published by Mediazona, the most cases were launched in the Moscow Region (309), the Rostov Region (224), and the Maritime Territory (181). 123 cases were launched in Moscow, and 116 in St. Petersburg.

Source: Jan Roffe, “More than 4,000 criminal AWOL cases launched in Russia,” Deutsche Welle, 24 November 2023. Translated by the Russian Reader

The Ad Campaign

Sergey Abashin writes: “All of Petersburg is covered with ads like this.”

This ad says that on the day you sign a contract to serve in the Russian army you’ll be issued a plot of land (for building your own house) near Petersburg whose market value is around two million rubles. You’ll also (?) get a one-time payment of 500,000 rubles. Your monthly pay in the army (if you serve in the “special military operation zone,” says the fine print) starts at 200,000 rubles.

According to the municipal statistics agency Petrostat (as cited by business daily Delovoi Peterburg), the average monthly wage in the city was 101,155 rubles in August. At current exchange rates, that amounts to around 1,056 USD. ||| TRR