Kyrgyzstan: Pro-Russian Outpost in Central Asia and Cannabis Heaven?


When Sadyr Japarov took power in Kyrgyzstan in 2020, he was a young, energetic nationalist president determined to build his own authoritarian power vertical—the first leader to pull it off since Askar Akayev. For decades the country had been notoriously unstable: storming parliament was practically a standard feature of the political repertoire.

Japarov had already begun edging closer to Moscow before 2022, but Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine handed him a historic opportunity. Kyrgyzstan quickly became one of the Kremlin’s main cryptocurrency hubs for shadow trade. The scheme was orchestrated by Ilan Shor, the fugitive Moldovan oligarch notorious for the “billion-dollar theft” from Moldova’s banking system. At the same time, Moscow and Shor built a propaganda network in the country under the brand “Eurasia.”

Yet loyalty to Moscow has so far delivered Bishkek surprisingly few tangible dividends. Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia face the same harassment and discrimination as other Central Asian labor migrants. The only concrete assistance the Kremlin has provided is a few hundred school buses and plans to build nine Russian-language schools.

The War and “Our Own”

Which post-Soviet state drew markedly closer to Moscow after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Georgia immediately comes to mind—and for good reason. After years of rule by the “Georgian Dream” party, society proved unable to resist a corrupt system that had steered the country toward Moscow. Politicians warned citizens that any show of solidarity with Ukraine could turn Batumi into another Mariupol. Today Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze openly recounts how he was pressed to open a “second front” against Russia, even as the Georgian Border Police simultaneously denies entry to both anti-war Russians and residents of Crimea and Donbas carrying Russian passports.

But there is another mountainous nation that has followed a strikingly similar path. Once the most volatile and politically turbulent state in Central Asia—where pro-Russian and pro-Western media and NGOs coexisted—Kyrgyzstan has transformed into a textbook post-Soviet autocracy.

You can still enter Kyrgyzstan on a Russian internal passport, but if you are an opposition activist the authorities may simply hand you back. The human-rights project “Ark” advises its clients not to remain in the country even temporarily. This is not standard practice among Moscow’s formal allies: in Kazakhstan, the odds of avoiding deportation are noticeably better, and local activists are far more willing to assist Russians.

telling case is that of a young Kyrgyz man named Samat. He held dual citizenship—his parents had obtained Russian passports while he kept his Kyrgyz one. After completing compulsory military service in 2019, he signed a contract with Russia’s Defence Ministry and failed to terminate it before the war began, despite trying. In March 2022 he managed to flee back to Bishkek. Smart cameras linked to the CIS wanted-persons database spotted him at the airport. He was arrested and taken to a pre-trial detention center in Bishkek. What happened to him next is unknown; no media outlet ever followed up.

Ironically, local residents who volunteered to fight for Russia—whether as regular contract soldiers or Wagner mercenaries—have also ended up behind bars. Outcomes vary. Askar Kubanychbek uulu was sentenced to ten years for mercenaryism but was released on a three-year probation period. He promptly returned to Russia and signed another Defence Ministry contract.

Such legal contradictions are common across Central Asia, but they have flourished most extravagantly in Kyrgyzstan thanks to pervasive corruption and a weak judiciary. Even so, Bishkek still maintains a certain distance from Moscow’s direct orders. In Tajikistan, for example, not a single citizen has been charged with mercenaryism for fighting in Ukraine; the prosecutor-general explained last year that anyone who accepts Russian citizenship must “observe the requirements and obligations of that state.”

Reliable data on Central Asians recruited into the Russian army come from the Ukrainian project “I Want to Live“: Uzbekistan (4,955), Tajikistan (3,489), Kazakhstan (2,420), Kyrgyzstan (1,474), and Turkmenistan (581). The relatively modest Kyrgyz figure reflects simple demography—a small country with a modest population. Yet by every other measure of loyalty, Kyrgyzstan now ranks among Moscow’s most reliable post-Soviet partners, second only to Belarus.

Just Don’t Irritate Them

In the first days after the invasion, every Eurasian state felt the ground shift. Even in Central Asia, where leaders usually comment on global affairs only in the vaguest terms, governments were forced to take a position.

Japarov, then in office for barely a year, chose the safest possible tone. “The situation is complex and has worsened in recent days,” he told parliament. “We are a small country with no influence to stop the conflict, so we must remain neutral. We are already seeing rising food and fuel prices and a stronger dollar. In these difficult times we need unity.”

He repeated the “small country” line in an April interview with the state news agency Kabar. That appears to be Bishkek’s genuine stance: no hidden agenda, no double game. Claims that Japarov “condemned Kyiv’s failure to implement the Minsk agreements” or “supported Russia’s decisive actions” should be left to the Kremlin’s press service.

Kyrgyzstan’s version of neutrality, however, has its own flavor. Compare it with neighboring Kazakhstan, where President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev consistently affirms international law and maintains contact with Volodymyr Zelensky. Even after the lavish welcome he gave Putin in Astana in May 2022—calling the Russian leader’s mission “fateful for the Russian people and the Russian state”—Kazakhstan’s position could still be described as neutrality, albeit with a clear northern tilt.

In Bishkek, neutrality is simpler: do nothing that might annoy those who can make life difficult. Above all, that means Moscow and Beijing. The Japarov government regards relations with those two capitals as the only ones that truly matter.

Kyrgyzstan cannot expect serious Western investment anytime soon, so it has little to lose by keeping its head down. Besides, Japarov built his political career in large part by confronting Western capital. One of his signature achievements was the nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine from Canada’s Centerra Gold. The mine passed fully under state control in 2022, though experts question how effectively the new owners are running it.

Japarov has continued tightening state oversight of foreign investment, limiting the list of deposits open to foreigners and drafting a new Mining Code. Curiously, he has proposed using British law to resolve disputes; a special International Dispute Resolution Centre based on UK rules opened in February 2025 in the Tamchy investment zone on Lake Issyk-Kul.

Had Japarov’s background been different, he might have joined the conversation about rare-earth metals that Donald Trump loves so much. But at the first Central Asia-US summit in Washington, the Kyrgyz president was noticeably more restrained than his colleagues. While Tokayev told Trump he was “sent from above” and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev declared that only the American president could stop the war in Ukraine, Japarov spoke through a Kyrgyz-language interpreter and focused on the digital economy and artificial intelligence—both in the main session and in his brief one-on-one meeting with Trump.

Among the issues raised by Sadyr Japarov was hydropower—in particular, preparations for launching the Kambarata hydroelectric power station. Mining was conspicuously absent from his remarks. That is hardly surprising: Kyrgyzstan has virtually no remaining deposits attractive enough for the kind of large-scale joint ventures Donald Trump prefers.

The Authoritarian Turn

Kyrgyzstan’s growing distance from the West has allowed its new elites to extract maximum value from Russia while consolidating domestic power without apology. Japarov’s rise in 2020 marked the republic’s decisive shift to a rigid vertical of power and full-blown authoritarian rule. According to Freedom House, Kyrgyzstan was still rated “partly free” in 2019 with a score of 38 out of 100. It has since fallen to 25 points—firmly in the “not free” category.

During this period the country adopted a new constitution that dramatically expanded presidential authority, along with a law on non-commercial organizations that many describe as a local version of Russia’s foreign-agent legislation. The logic is identical: any NGO receiving foreign funding must register as a “foreign representative” and be placed on a public list. The registry went live in September 2024 but has grown slowly—starting with three organizations and now standing at just five. For now, NGOs apply for inclusion themselves. The law is also easily circumvented by re-registering as a limited-liability company (OOO), the Kyrgyz equivalent of an LLC.

A vivid illustration of Bishkek’s loyalty to Moscow came during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Bishkek in November 2025. The new presidential residence sits next to the Ukrainian embassy. To ensure that Putin, walking along the avenue to the main entrance, would not see the Ukrainian flag—and that Ukrainian diplomats would not see the leader of the aggressor state—authorities erected a massive screen directly in front of the embassy. It displayed the flags of Russia and Kyrgyzstan along with greetings to the Russian president.

The Kremlin’s Financial Hub

Kyrgyzstan’s self-proclaimed “neutrality” has turned the country into a convenient instrument for Moscow to evade Western sanctions, including in the military-technical sphere. Setting up a legal entity in Kyrgyzstan is straightforward—especially an LLC. Russian businesses no longer need local partners; they can simply incorporate their own company and route transactions through it. Corrupt customs procedures and notably liberal currency and cryptocurrency regulations only add to the appeal.

In 2022, Kyrgyz exports to Russia jumped 2.5 times to $920 million. The subsequent surge never materialized; trade volumes stabilized. By the end of 2025, exports had actually declined 13.4 percent. Analysts attribute the drop to a deliberate reduction in re-exports.

Western sanctions began hitting Kyrgyz firms in 2023, when the U.S. Treasury added Weitmann Handeln Allianz LLC—a supplier of computers to Russia—to its list. Other equipment exporters followed, but banks only came under fire in 2025.

The first and most prominent target was the state-owned Keremet Bank. According to the U.S. Treasury, it assisted Russia’s Promsvyazbank (PSB) with overseas operations. PSB is the financial backbone of the Russian military and defense industry; its chairman is Pyotr Fradkov, son of former prime minister and ex-SVR chief Mikhail Fradkov.

The same Treasury notice mentioned another notable name: Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. After siphoning roughly a billion dollars from Moldova’s banking system, Shor relocated to Russia and threw himself into political projects. He has worked with PSB since at least 2024, using the bank to funnel money into Moldova ahead of elections. It was therefore no surprise that Keremet appeared in the same schemes.

Later, the Financial Times published an investigation into the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5, created by PSB specifically to circumvent sanctions. Trading in the coin took place on Grinex, an exchange registered in Kyrgyzstan. In April 2025 the exchange suffered a cyberattack that wiped out roughly a billion rubles’ worth of user funds. By then, its ties to both PSB and Shor were an open secret. Project head Oleg Ogienko had stated in February that up to 10 percent of Russia’s foreign-trade settlements flowed through the coin.

A parallel instrument with a similar name also exists: the payment agent A7, another PSB-linked project that allows businesses and individuals to transfer money abroad without SWIFT. Its CEO is likewise Ilan Shor.

After the U.S. sanctions, Britain and the European Union followed suit against Keremet. London also targeted two other Kyrgyz banks—Capital and the Eurasian Savings Bank—along with the state brokerage firm and a virtual-asset issuer. The same institutions (plus Tolubay) appeared in the EU’s 19th and 20th sanctions packages.

The most significant consequence of the EU’s 20th package for Kyrgyzstan was the introduction of sectoral restrictions: the bloc now prohibits exports of CNC machine tools and data-transmission equipment (switches and routers). This is the first such precedent and could have a noticeable deterrent effect on the willingness of regional states to provide Russia with technical assistance. While Kyrgyzstan itself has few high-tech industries, the restrictions could deliver a serious blow to neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

According to Moldovan outlets Rise Moldova and IPN, Shor has become deeply embedded in Kyrgyz elites; President Japarov himself has reportedly used aircraft from Shor’s companies. The Russian investigative outlet Proyekt claims that Roman Abramovich serves as Shor’s patron within Russian elite circles. It was with Abramovich’s backing, the outlet asserts, that Shor launched both the A7 project and the large-scale sanctions-evasion scheme built around cryptocurrency in Kyrgyzstan.

The Humanitarian Dimension

When asked about helping Russia circumvent sanctions, Kyrgyz officials usually respond with flat denials. Last year President Japarov reframed the issue in familiar terms—combating “foreign agents.”

“We suggested that Ambassador [of the United States] Vigeri invite independent auditing firms to examine Keremet and Capital banks, review the results together, and then make a decision,” he declared. “They refused… They simply claimed to have certain information. But we know perfectly well where it comes from. It comes from local NGOs and our internal adversaries who send them anonymous false reports.”

There was one notable exception. Speaking at SPIEF-2025, Temir Sariyev, chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, openly acknowledged that “when the special military operation began, the first country that extended a hand without fear was the Kyrgyz Republic. Others followed later. This prompts Russia to regard the KR as its most reliable partner—in both business and politics. Reliability is a very rare and scarce commodity.” Sariyev did not spell out the nature of the assistance, but everyone in the room understood: he was referring to the provision of loopholes for gray imports and parallel financial transactions.

Such candor is driven by straightforward pragmatism. Bishkek had hoped that loyalty would bring tangible benefits for Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia. Officials have repeatedly complained that EAEU membership has not delivered the expected advantages—particularly access to medical care and schooling for children.

The introduction of mandatory Russian-language testing made the situation worse for all children with foreign citizenship living in Russia. Kyrgyz representatives raised the issue without success. From next year onward, Russia is imposing even stricter rules on migrants, with an exemption granted only to citizens of Belarus. In all regions except Moscow and Moscow Oblast, the hiring of foreigners will be permitted solely through organized, targeted recruitment programs.

At the same time, Moscow announced in 2023 plans to build nine joint Russian-Kyrgyz schools in Kyrgyzstan with mixed teaching staffs. Three are promised for 2027. Any mention of the project reliably irritates Russian nationalists, yet the Kremlin uses the rapprochement with Bishkek to bolster its image among the Kyrgyz population as well.

It is in Kyrgyzstan—according to the limited polling available—that public solidarity with Moscow over Ukraine is highest. A 2024 Paper Lab survey found that 36 percent of respondents blamed Ukraine for the war, 14 percent blamed Russia, and 13 percent blamed the United States. These figures largely reflect media consumption patterns: Russian outlets dominate the foreign-media landscape. In 2024 Bishkek launched the pro-Russian television channel Nomad, which is linked to both Ilan Shor and RT and is headed by a former RT employee.

Another Shor project, the non-profit organization Eurasia, has also expanded significantly. In other post-Soviet states it has mainly organized propaganda tours for young people, flying selected students and schoolchildren to Moscow for lectures by pro-Kremlin speakers. In Kyrgyzstan, thanks to the authorities’ accommodating stance, the organization has been able to operate locally. Bishkek now boasts an Eurasia Park, a Russian-language support center, and a network of social stores under the same brand. In September 2024 the organization donated 50 school buses to rural districts.

The newest objective of ANO Eurasia in Kyrgyzstan is the creation of a unified educational space with Russia. The initiative, according to Kyrgyz officials, came from Bishkek rather than Moscow—and specifically from President Japarov. At SPIEF-2025, First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev stated: “Vladimir Vladimirovich supported the initiative of our president. I know that ANO Eurasia is already working on this issue; let us define our joint next steps.”

One practical outcome appears to have been the recent meeting of the Russian-Kyrgyz expert-consultative council on history, organized in Moscow by the Russian Military-Historical Society. Scholars from both countries discussed the content of school textbooks and clashed sharply over whether the period of Russian imperial rule in Central Asia should be described as the “colonization” of the Kyrgyz people. The Russian side, as expected, insisted on alternative wording—”administration” or “administrative measures”—that the Kyrgyz scholars found unacceptable. Academician Abylabek Asankanov remarked: “You are setting us an extremely difficult task—to abandon the word ‘colony.’ That is very hard to do.”

Such friction was predictable. Despite Bishkek’s calculations that closer ties with Moscow would solve financial problems and provide protection, nationalist and anti-imperial sentiments remain strong in Kyrgyzstan. They are also an important part of Sadyr Japarov’s own political brand. In April, for example, he promised to rename the remaining villages that still bear Russian names—only for his press service to disavow the statement the following day.

In seeking to consolidate personal power in a traditionally turbulent country, Japarov has bet on Moscow as a source of external legitimacy. While some of his efforts have been appreciated in the Kremlin, he should not count on serious long-term support. Years of experience have shown that the Kremlin never clings to any particular politician in Kyrgyzstan; it assumes the country is already firmly within Russia’s orbit. Yet by his actions Japarov is helping Moscow entrench itself still more deeply in the republic.

The combination of Russian propaganda among the population and the corrupt ties linking local officials and banks to Russian structures provides a sufficiently reliable guarantee that Kyrgyzstan will remain the most pro-Putin country in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. The price is secondary sanctions and the risk of falling behind in the development of genuinely competitive economic sectors.

Source: Roman Chernikov, “Putin’s Outpost in Central Asia,” Riddle Russia, 6 June 2026


In his 1986 novel Plakha, translated into English as The Scaffold, Chingiz Aitmatov, Kyrgyzstan’s great writer, tells the story of Avdiy Kallistratov, an idealistic young man who joins a group of drug smugglers travelling to a remote corner of Central Asia. To Kyrgyzstan, to be precise, where large swathes of cannabis grow wild in the picturesque Issyk-Kul region.

Aitmatov describes in vivid detail the brutal process of harvesting and trafficking the drug by a criminal group. But how close is this depiction to reality?

This is a question I put to Gulzat Botoeva, Associate Professor of Criminology at Swansea University and an expert on illegal economies in Eurasia, including cannabis production in Kyrgyzstan. We discuss how the harvesting began, who benefits from it, and how local authorities respond to the phenomenon. Is there any incentive in Kyrgyzstan to legalise the crop?

Here is a list of Gulzat’s publications on the topic:

Botoeva, G. (2014). Hashish as cash in a post-Soviet Kyrgyz village. International Journal of Drug Policy, 25(6), 1227-1234.

Botoeva, G. (2019). Use of language in blurring the lines between legality and illegality. In Governance Beyond the Law: The Immoral, The Illegal, The Criminal (pp. 67-83). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Botoeva, G. (2021). Multiple narratives of il/legality and im/morality: The case of small-scale hashish harvesting in Kyrgyzstan. Theoretical Criminology, 25(2), 268-283.

Source: Agnieszka Pikulicka, “Episode 41: Hashish and survival in rural Kyrgyzstan,” Turan Tales, 4 June 2026


Botoeva, G. (2015). The monetization of social celebrations in rural Kyrgyzstan: on the uses of hashish money. Central Asian Survey34(4), 531–548. https://doi-org.mpc.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/02634937.2015.1092742

This article focuses on the embeddedness of hashish production in the local economy of Toolu, a village in Kyrgyzstan. It explores how transformations in social relationships and the monetization of gift giving put constant pressure on families to find cash in a semi-subsistence agricultural economy. Although not produced on an industrial scale in the community, hashish is used as a cash crop in times of deficit. Based on a mixed-methods study combining ethnographic fieldwork with survey data, I show how the hashish economy is intertwined with different forms of reciprocal relationships based on gift-giving practices and the monetization of social relationships. In doing so, I illustrate how the hashish economy is embedded in local livelihoods and shapes emerging forms of economic morality in Kyrgyz society.

Source: EBSCO Host


This documentary is an ethnobotanical and cultural exploration. It does not promote or facilitate the sale of cannabis or cannabis-related products. In Episode 3, the expedition moves deeper into Kyrgyzstan’s highlands as the Strain Hunters cross paths with one of Central Asia’s most iconic cultural gatherings — the world-famous Nomad Games. Set against the dramatic mountain landscape, the games offer a rare glimpse into the traditions, skills, and nomadic heritage that have shaped life in this region for centuries. Leaving the celebrations behind, the team continues their journey into increasingly remote terrain. As they explore valleys and high-altitude environments shaped by wind, cold, and time, the Strain Hunters encounter some of the most promising wild cannabis populations of the expedition — plants that show clear adaptation to their harsh surroundings. Through careful observation and documentation, the team identifies ancient landrace traits that reflect cannabis’ long history in Central Asia. These encounters represent a key moment in the journey, deepening our understanding of cannabis diversity and reinforcing the importance of preserving rare genetics before they disappear. This expedition is brought to you by Green House Seed Co. and GH Medical, continuing our mission to explore the planet, preserve rare genetics, and document cannabis culture worldwide.

Source: Strain Hunters and Green Seed Co (YouTube), 25 December 2026


BISHKEK — Kyrgyz cannabis is reputed to be among the most potent in the world, making it a lucrative cash crop for drug traffickers.

It appears ironic, then, that a homegrown addiction specialist in Bishkek wants marijuana to be legalized to reduce the number of Kyrgyz drug addicts, fight organized crime, and increase tax revenues.

Jenishbek Nazaraliev, a former presidential candidate who opened Bishkek’s first private narcology clinic in 1993, wants the Kyrgyz government to consider a pilot program for the legal production of cannabis near Lake Issyk-Kul.

Rivaling the potency of marijuana from Afghanistan, international experts say cannabis is already being harvested by about two-thirds of all the families in Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul and Chui regions.

Pot plants grow wild on thousands of hectares of land there. During the first eight months of 2013, up through the annual August harvest, Kyrgyz authorities say they destroyed more than 154 tons of cannabis in the Issyk-Kul region alone.

Nazaraliev says more effective regulation over the production and sale of marijuana is an issue that eventually must be tackled by the government.

He says the illegal drug market in Kyrgyzstan is now “fully controlled by the black economy.”

Nazaraliev also argues that the producers, sellers, and consumers of cannabis could be better controlled — and that the government would bolster its tax revenues — if pot were legalized.

But Kyrgyzstan’s State Drug Control Service disagrees. Authorities there say winning the battle against drug traffickers is the key to social stability and development in Kyrgyzstan.

And they argue that legalization won’t rein in organized criminal traffickers because Kyrgyz-grown cannabis is exported through a network that extends far beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders — a smuggling route for illegal Afghan cannabis, opium, and heroin that passes through Kyrgyzstan on its way to Russia and the European Union.

Naked Harvest

RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service has spoken with villagers in the Tiup and Ak-Sui districts around Lake Issyk-Kul who are involved in the harvest and sale of Kyrgyz cannabis.

For centuries, cannabis has been harvested in Central Asia by horsemen who would ride naked through wild cannabis patches and then scrape the resin from their skin and the hair of their horses.

But most villagers around Lake Issyk-Kul now harvest the drug by rubbing cannabis plants between their palms to get a layer of black resin that they scrape off with a knife and package in matchboxes.

Local dealers buy the drugs from the harvesters and then sell them to bigger dealers who tour the area, forwarding their purchases abroad through international trafficking channels.

Kyrgyz villagers who harvest cannabis every August make no secret about paying bribes to police who turn a blind eye.

For their part, local police tell RFE/RL it would be impossible to eradicate a trade that is integral to the survival of so many people.

Former Kyrgyz Vice President and Prime Minister Feliks Kulov — who also headed the National Security Service — suggested during the 1990s that state-managed cannabis farms near Lake Issyk-Kul could help the authorities control drug production in the country.

But Kulov’s proposal was derailed by critics who cited the negative experiences of opium growers in Afghanistan.

Nazaraliev, the narcologist who wants the authorities to reconsider legalization, ran in Kyrgyzstan’s 2009 presidential election under the campaign slogan “Everything is Within your Reach.”

He is now asking the authorities in Bishkek to consider whether “progressive European countries” and U.S. state governments that decriminalize marijuana care more about the health and welfare of their citizens than Kyrgyzstan.

Source: “Addiction Doctor Wants Kyrgyzstan To Legalize Pot,” RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, 7 January 2014

The Cards

Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been a paranoid man. We know, for example, that he has long eschewed the use of a personal cellphone, all too aware of how easily they can be tracked.

Yet a Kremlin document recently leaked to the press by a European intelligence service lays bare a whole new level of suspicion. Visitors can only approach him after they’ve gone through two layers of screening. His bodyguards now exercise full control over his schedule of appearances; they’ve essentially eliminated visits to any location that has to do with the military. And as for mobile phones: No one who works near Putin is now allowed to have one—they can only carry devices that aren’t connected to the internet. Surveillance systems have been placed in the homes of the cooks, drivers, and cleaners who work for him; they are prohibited from using public transportation. Most revealingly, he and his family members no longer live in their customary residences. Instead, they are sticking to secret locations with extra layers of protection. The document claims that Putin now works only in bunkers dispersed around southern Russia.

It is possible, of course, that the spies who passed this document along to the media are playing a game of their own—perhaps using disinformation to sow dissension and mistrust within the Kremlin. But the details revealed by the leak make perfect sense given the constraints that Putin suddenly finds himself facing.

In January, U.S. forces succeeded in snatching Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro out of his compound without suffering a single fatality. At the end of February, the Israelis killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war against Iran—and a host of other top Iranian leaders as well. Nor was it the first time that they were able to finger individual targets in Tehran. The Americans and Israelis have pulled off these operations through a combination of carefully cultivated human sources and signals intelligence, tracking the cellphone calls and internet use not just of the people targeted but also of their aides, guards, and support staffs. All this means that dictators can no longer sleep as easily as they used to.

The former head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov—now chief of staff to President Volodymyr Zelensky—is known to be a student of Israeli targeted killings. His studies have paid off: The Ukrainians have assassinated a string of Russian military officers, politicians, and propagandists—some of them in the heart of Moscow.

In December, a car bomb in the capital took out Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov. That particular hit seems to have sent a collective shiver through Russia’s power elite, allegedly—according to that leaked document—prompting a meeting of top security officials that had them blaming each other for lapses real and imagined. Given that Russia has repeatedly attempted to assassinate Zelensky, Putin has every reason to believe that he, too, has a target on his back.

Putin may well fear internal enemies as much as he does the Ukrainians; rumors of coup plots are rampant in Moscow. But the Russian president’s problems are actually bigger than that. He’s managed to stay in power for 26 years by always keeping a few steps ahead of his enemies. Now he may be running out of room to maneuver.

A Russian offensive planned for this spring has been derailed before it’s gotten off the ground. The Ukrainians claim to have inflicted 35,000 casualties on the Russians in March alone—the fifth straight month, according to Kyiv, that the number of Russians killed and seriously wounded has exceeded the Kremlin’s rate of recruiting fresh soldiers. Perhaps more importantly, the sacrifices of those soldiers were entirely in vain; no major objectives were achieved. “Ukraine is not just doing better than expected,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Time is not on Russia’s side in this war.”

Indeed, the Ukrainians have now actually pushed the Russians back along several stretches of the front. Putin’s military leaders appear to have no new ideas on how to alter the fundamental dynamic on the battlefield. Unless they can change that, throwing fresh manpower into the fight will prove equally fruitless.

The Ukrainians, by contrast, seem to have an endless supply of new ideas. Every day brings the unveiling of some startling new piece of technology or creative use of an old one. Every day also brings news of another audacious strike deep in the Russian heartland. On April 25, for example, Ukrainian drones hit a Russian airfield in the southern Urals city of Chelyabinsk—a little more than 1,100 miles away from Ukraine.

Kyiv’s forces have devoted considerable resources to eliminating Russian air defenses, which now simply aren’t sufficient to protect every strategic target. At one point a few weeks ago, the threat of Ukrainian attacks closed all four of Moscow’s international airports at the same time. Indeed, the growing range of Ukrainian strikes appears to have influenced the Kremlin’s decision to exclude military equipment from taking part in Victory Day celebrations on May 9. Humiliatingly, Putin even felt compelled to ask U.S. President Donald Trump to dissuade the Ukrainians from attacking during the parade. The Russians are clearly rattled.

Yet Kyiv is not staging such strikes for the sake of psychological impact. The evidence suggests that Ukrainian planners are thinking harder than ever about how to maximize the impact of their attacks. At the end of April, a Ukrainian long-range drone attack on an oil refinery in Perm, more than 900 miles away from the border, targeted distillation columns—the systems that enable the separation of crude oil into gasoline and other petroleum products. Hitting storage tanks provides spectacular footage of fires, but they are relatively easy to repair; core infrastructure like these columns is a different matter altogether. “The Ukrainians have developed a theory of victory which involves the destruction of Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “Without that, it becomes very difficult for Russia to sustain what they’re doing.”

At the end of March, a Reuters analysis concluded that the strike campaign had succeeded in cutting Russia’s oil export capacity by 40 percent. Admittedly, this may not be enough to fully offset the windfall that Moscow has gained from the sharp rise in global oil prices unleashed by the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. Even so, in the first quarter of this year, Russia’s budget deficit already exceeded its full-year target. Financial officials cited a 45 percent drop in oil and gas revenues.

This pattern of smart targeting repeats itself across industries. In their attacks on chemical plantssemiconductor fabrication facilities, and steel factories, the Ukrainians keep hitting core components of the industrial processes that feed Russia’s military machine. Strikingly, the Russians seem incapable of paying back Ukraine in the same coin.

The decentralization of Ukraine’s military production—scattered across myriad small factories in inconspicuous locations—is making it extremely hard for the Russians to find effective targets. So they keep attacking power plants and civilians, cruel tactics that may actually serve to stiffen Ukrainian spines.

That the momentum has shifted in Ukraine’s favor is also demonstrated by Zelensky’s increasingly confident tone toward the United States. “In my view, Russia played the Americans again—played the president of the United States,” he said recently, commenting on Trump’s policy of allowing Russia to skirt sanctions on oil sales. The days of flattery and appeasement are over.

Of course, Ukraine has plenty of problems. Its embrace of drones is driven in part by its persistent manpower personnel shortages; many Ukrainian men are refusing to join the military. And the government continues to contend with corruption scandals.

Even so, Kyiv is enjoying a boost in its international standing even as Moscow faces new headwinds. The war in Iran has given new diplomatic openings to the Ukrainians, who have been leveraging their anti-drone expertise to find new friends among the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Trump seems so sufficiently preoccupied with his own war that he is finding fewer opportunities to pressure Kyiv into unfavorable peace deals.

And the recent electoral defeat of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has robbed Putin of his most trustworthy friend in the European Union. Orban’s exit has finally enabled the EU to break the deadlock over a long-anticipated $106 billion assistance package to Kyiv. That’s enough to keep the Ukrainians in weaponry for a long time to come—entirely apart from the variety of joint ventures for arms production that they have created with partners across the world.

Just to add insult to injury, Moscow is also in the process of losing one of its vaunted new allies in Africa: The Moscow-supported military government in Mali is losing its fight against Islamist rebels.

Losing Mali won’t be enough to cost Putin his throne. But losing the war in Ukraine certainly could—especially when combined with a stagnant economy, restless oligarchs, and a population riled by the Kremlin’s recent crackdown on the internet. Even Russia’s military bloggers, long the most enthusiastic supporters of the war, are starting to lose faith. “Little by little, the advantage is going to our enemies,” one of them recently wrote. “[T]he enemy is counterattacking, and he is succeeding.” Other Russians may well be coming to the same conclusion.

Source: Christian Caryl, “Vladimir Putin Is Much Weaker Than You Think,” Foreign Policy, 6 May 2026. You can thank for me for depaywalling this article by encouraging your friends, relatives, and colleagues to check out this website. ||||| trr


Members of a military band stand next to a screen broadcasting Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s address during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2026. Photo: Igor Ivanko/AFP via Getty Images

Just days after Vladimir Putin secured a ceasefire from U.S. President Donald Trump to hold his Victory Day parade, Russia launched a massive air assault on Ukraine, killing at least 16 people in Kyiv and injuring dozens more.

Hi, my name is Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor at the Kyiv Independent, and this is the latest issue of our newsletter about Russia.

Today, let’s once again talk about why attempting to reach a peace settlement with Putin is a waste of everyone’s time.

Russian President Putin held his parade. Normally, the event is designed as a grand demonstration of military strength and imperial confidence.

This year, it lasted just 45 minutes.

There were no tanks. No heavy equipment. The atmosphere felt restrained, almost uneasy — less a celebration of victory than an attempt to preserve the illusion of power.

After securing Trump’s support for a ceasefire that would effectively ensure Ukraine would not exploit Russia’s weakened air defenses on a day of deep symbolic importance, Putin adopted a different tone regarding the war in Ukraine.

“I think (the war in Ukraine) is coming to an end,” Putin said on May 9. He steered clear of many of the triumphalist themes that have long dominated his public rhetoric. In a somewhat amusing shift, Putin referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as “Mr. Zelensky” for what may have been the first time in years.

Putin had typically resorted to labeling Ukrainian leadership “Nazi sympathizers” or “drug addicts.”

Yet, the three-day-long ceasefire ended, and Russia once again pummeled Ukraine with missiles and drones. The partly collapsed residential building in one of Kyiv’s neighborhoods, with bodies being pulled from under the rubble, became the glaring illustration of Russia’s intent for peace.

What this episode demonstrated, once again, is that Putin treats negotiations not as a path to peace, but as a weapon of war.

Every pause is used to regroup. Every phone call with Western leaders is presented domestically as proof that Russia cannot be isolated. Every public discussion about concessions reinforces the Kremlin’s core belief that time remains on its side.

This is why attempts to “bring Russia to the table” under current conditions do not bring the war closer to an end — rather, they prolong it.

The logic in the White House still seems to be that if Russia is offered enough diplomatic offramps, enough recognition, enough patience, it may eventually choose compromise over continued aggression. But the past four years have shown the opposite. Russia escalates when it senses hesitation. It hardens its demands when it sees fear of escalation on the other side. And it interprets calls for immediate negotiations not as signs of strength or pragmatism, but as exhaustion.

For Putin, the war has never been only about territory. It is about restoring Russian dominance over Ukraine. Russian demands have remained maximalist. Despite mounting military and economic strain, Putin hasn’t moved one inch.

Negotiations, when offered before Russia faces undeniable military, economic, or political pressure, only invite the Russian leader to repeat his maximalist wants.

Ukraine did secure something in return for agreeing to a three-day ceasefire: If everything goes according to plan, a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia will take place on May 15.

That alone justifies allowing Putin to hold his parade. If the price of letting Putin stage a carefully choreographed 45-minute parade was bringing 1,000 Ukrainian prisoners home, that is a trade most Ukrainians would take every time.

But it would be a mistake to confuse this with progress toward peace, or a hint that Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine or the West has changed.

Putin’s comments about the war’s nearing end are domestic messaging to assure the public that everything is going according to plan. It does not, but Putin won’t budge.

At this point, negotiations with the Kremlin often resemble a very specific genre of political theater.

And yet, much of the international discussion continues to revolve around finding the right formula, the right incentive, the right “off-ramp” that will finally persuade Putin to stop the war he chose to start.

There is no indication that the Kremlin is currently prepared to accept a settlement that falls short of its broader wartime objectives. Until Russia faces costs that outweigh those ambitions, negotiations are more likely to drag out the war than bring it to an end.

Source: Oleksiy Sorokin, WTF is wrong with Russia? newsletter (Kyiv Independent), 14 May 2026


Russia launched one of the longest and most massive air attacks since the start of its full-scale invasion just days after the recent ceasefire expired.

Over the course of 30 hours, Russia launched more than 1,500 drones at Ukrainian cities, along with over 50 ballistic and cruise missiles, Zelenskyy said.

An approximate map of the May 13–14 Russian strikes on Ukraine, from the Telegram monitoring channel @StrategicaviationT.

After a drone strike on the capital, part of a high-rise apartment building collapsed in Kyiv, and rescuers recovered the body of a 12-year-old girl from the rubble.

“We live in a building across the road,” said Olesia Holub-Korba, a Kyiv resident who was just meters from the high-rise last night.

Olesia typically does not go to the shelter during air raids because she [has] to keep running up and down from the 20th floor at night with her young son.

“I always go and lie down in bed with my child so that if there are any falling fragments, I can cover them with my body, and if it’s a missile, then either we survive together, or we…[die],” she told The Counteroffensive.

Olesia and her family had just gone to bed, not yet asleep, when a very loud explosion sounded. Lying on the floor, she literally felt the building shaking.

“Fuck,” she said to her husband, “it’s a direct hit on us.” Olesia’s husband reassured her that it nothing had hit their building, at least not yet.

Fortunately, her family is safe.

However, twenty people from the damaged residential building are still considered missing from the building, which has a completely destroyed entrance, which prevents survivors inside from escaping. Emergency services continue search operations under the debris, which will apparently last into the night.

On the first day of last week’s ceasefire, Putin told reporters that he thinks the war is “coming to an end.”

Zelenskyy responded: “These are certainly not the actions of those who believe the war is coming to an end.”

Government-funded Ukrainian news organization United24 reported that this was the longest and largest aerial attack since the start of the full-scale invasion, though that superlative could not be independently verified by The Counteroffensive. The assault ended on the morning of May 14.

97 percent of the drones launched toward Ukraine were neutralized, according to a report from the Ukrainian Air Force, as were 73 percent of missiles.

Although the vast majority of air targets were successfully downed, Russia damaged around 180 buildings, including 50 residential buildings across Ukraine. In Kyiv, at least five people were killed and dozens more injured. Over 100 people have been injured across the country.

Russia has changed its tactics and is now deliberately trying to stretch out attacks in order to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses. During the day, Russia sent hundreds of attack drones mainly to the west of Ukraine to exhaust the air defense. In the late evening, there was a second wave of strikes, followed by missiles, targeting the capital.

Russia’s Defense Ministry described the strike as a “massive retaliatory attack” for recent Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia.

Zelenskyy stated that there will be a “fair” response to that.

The massive attacks come just days after a decree from Zelenskyy effectively ‘allowed’ Putin to host his WWII Victory Day Parade in Moscow’s Red Square, though the celebration was scaled down, likely due to fear of Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Putin’s anxiety over the annual event signaled a shift in Moscow’s projection of power.

On May 8, Trump announced the 3-day ceasefire, and both Putin and Zelenskyy agreed to its terms, which included a 1,000 for 1,000 prisoner swap.

That ceasefire, though fragile as ever on the front lines with both sides alleging a breach, technically expired on Tuesday, May 12, marked by a mutual exchange of fire.

Over the course of the past week, Putin and Trump — the latter of whom campaigned on a promise to end this war in 24 hours — both said they think the war will end soon during the days leading up to last night’s attacks.

Also, for the first time ever, Putin said he is prepared to meet with Zelenskyy in a third country, outside of Moscow, but only in pursuit of a final agreement that ends the war.

Source: Mariana Lastovyria and Jacqueline Cole, “NEWSFLASH: Putin launches massive attacks after signaling war’s end,” The Counteroffensive, 14 May 2026. You can thank for me for depaywalling this article by encouraging your friends, relatives, and colleagues to check out this website. ||||| trr

Give Them Want They Want

Putin: “Give me what I want!” Trump: “Hang on!”

Trump: “There’s a better way!” Trump: “Give him what he wants!”

Source: Moscow Times Russian Service weekly newsletter, 30 November 2025. Original by Michael de Adder. Translated by the Russian Reader


Following the shooting that claimed the life of a National Guard member last Wednesday in Washington, the Trump administration has announced it will be halting all asylum decisions and paused issuing visas for people travelling on Afghan passports. The suspect in Wednesday’s shooting that killed Specialist Sarah Beckstrom, 20, and critically wounded Staff Sgt. Andrew Wolfe, 24, is Rahmanullah Lakanwal, a 29-year-old Afghan national who worked with the CIA during the Afghanistan War and had been living in the U.S. since 2021. He applied for asylum during the Biden administration under a program that resettled Afghans after the U.S. withdrawal from the country, and was granted it this year under President Trump.

As seen in our infographic, based on data released by the U.S. Department of Justice, Afghanistan was not one of the 10 most common countries of origin for people who received asylum in the U.S. in the fiscal year 2024. Only 508 Afghans were granted asylum in the country that year, while 61 were refused. By comparison, the U.S. granted asylum to 3,605 Russian nationals, making Russia the most common nationality to get asylum in the country during that time period. This was followed by China, with 2,998 Chinese nationals receiving asylum, and Venezuela, with 2,656 successful asylum applications.

Source: Valentine Fourreau, “Who Is Granted Asylum in the United States?” Statista, 1 December 2025

Toxicity

School of Rock performs System of a Down’s “Toxicity” (2022)

Actors Martin and Janet Sheen, John Cusack and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek have signed an open letter urging Russian prison officials to end the solitary confinement of jailed activist Mikhail Kriger, who has been on a dry hunger strike for more than a week.

They join Garbage frontwoman Shirley Manson, who earlier this week called on the local prison chief to end Kriger’s isolation.

Kriger, 65, first launched a hunger strike in late September. He started a dry hunger strike — meaning abstention from both food and water — last Friday after a planned visit with his daughter was canceled.

Kriger has accused prison authorities of deliberately trying to isolate him to prevent contact with other inmates. 

The latest signatories of the letter to the head of Correctional Colony No. 5 in Russia’s Oryol region claimed Kriger’s condition “has now become critical,” according to the letter published by the exiled news website Mediazona.

“[Kriger’s] speech has slowed, his gaze is unfocused and he is extremely weak. Dry hunger strikes cause organ failure and quickly lead to shock and death,” the Sheens, Cusack and Žižek wrote.

Kriger was in 2023 sentenced to seven years in prison for “justifying terrorism” and “inciting hatred” over anti-Kremlin social media posts. The activist said during trial that he was being persecuted for his anti-war views and open pro-Ukrainian position.

The Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights group Memorial designated Kriger a political prisoner.

The anti-Kremlin activist group Pussy Riot raised alarm over Kriger’s hunger strike earlier this week, calling on followers to write letters to him and the prison administration. 

It was not immediately clear whether authorities in the Oryol region prison colony intended to respond to the international appeals.

It was also not clear when Kriger was expected to be moved out of solitary confinement and whether his medical condition was being properly monitored.

Kriger’s support group said the activist was taken to a regional hospital on Wednesday for tests, the results of which have not been shared.

Kriger’s lawyer said he was “cheerful, wrote poems and even offered to hop on one leg to show his strength,” the support group said in an update Thursday.

“Forced feeding will only begin if he loses consciousness or doctors deem his condition critical,” Kriger’s support group wrote on Telegram.

Source: “Hollywood Stars Back Jailed Russian Activist on Hunger Strike,” Moscow Times, 17 October 2025


Yegor Shramko holding a placard that reads “No to the war with Ukraine” in Petersburg’s Palace Square

Our correspondent reports that activist Yegor Shramko did an anti-war picket in Palace Square and was detained.

The Petersburg man held a blue-and-yellow placard bearing the slogan “No to the war in Ukraine” and stood this way for around an hour. Shramko told our correspondent that although passersby supported him, the police were summoned by animateurs dressed as Russian emperors and empresses who offer to take photos with them for money on the square.

“I cannot keep silent. A life in which you have to fear everything, keep quiet, and be afraid of every little noise has no value for me,” Shramko explained to Bumaga.

He told RusNews that he had been wanting to stage the protest for four months but only worked up the nerve today.

This past summer, Shramko was jailed for twenty-four hours on charges of “displaying extremist symbols.” The “extremist symbol” in this case was the portrait of Alexei Navalny which Shramko brought to the Solovetsky Stone on the murdered politician’s birthday. At the time, Shramko told Bumaga that Navalny’s own words—”I’m not afraid, and you shouldn’t be afraid either”—had encouraged him to take the plunge and risk arrest by carrying out the proteest.

Source: Bumaga (Facebook), 17 October 2025. Thanks to Hanna Perekhoda for the heads-up.


The activist held a solo picket for about an hour. St. Petersburg residents approached him—some offered words of support, while others began arguing with him. More than 50 minutes after the picket began, security forces in full uniform arrived and detained Yegor.

Source: “Security forces detained activist Yegor Shramko, who was holding a pacifist picket | St. Petersburg,” RusNews (YouTube), 18 October 2025


As you have probably heard, recently, on a Swiss train, a Russian man (with Latvian citizenship) attacked a family. The family was speaking Ukrainian among themselves. He started threatening to kill them and their baby.

It’s easy to dismiss this as just another “fait divers” (which, in a sense, it is), but I think it says something larger. To understand his actions, you have to understand where it comes from.

For centuries, the inhabitants of the Russian state lived in a situation where order depended on fear and extreme forms of violence. This was true in much of the world, but while many countries began to change over the last century (let’s put aside the reasons behind the change), in the Russian/Soviet empire the situation actually became worse. Much worse.

The rules were never something people agreed to follow together (after all, you need to feel a part of a society and thus to share common imaginary to do it, and it is impossible to do it if you live in the empire, however much some contemporary researchers might wish it). It is something they were imposed from above, by the state, or by whoever had power over you at the moment. People learned that laws only mattered when someone strong was watching. So when a person raised in that kind of world finds themselves in a place like Switzerland, where rules work because the majority respects them voluntarily, they see the absence of fear and coercion as a sign that anything goes.

The man in that train was in a setting where no one was looking as capable to physically stop him and he took that as permission to dominate others, those people that he hates for the mere fact of their existence.

This same pattern plays out on a global scale. The Russian state elites see Europe much like that man saw the train: as a place without explicit “real” (military) force. It looks fake, easy to break, like a house of cards, because it relies on trust, and thus, in their view, on NOTHING.

People and societies shaped by fear and domination can’t imagine relationships built on any agreements (that require trust). They assume that if no one is dominating explicitly, it’s an invitation to act.

The man on the train and Putin’s crew are two versions of the same story. Both come from a social setting that sees respect as submission, peace as weakness, agreements as empty shells and absence of explicit force as an invitation to unlimited violence.

Source: Hanna Perekhoda (Facebook), 18 October 2025


Donald Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday to make a deal with Russia, pouring cold water on Kyiv’s push for Tomahawk missiles as the U.S. leader pursues a diplomatic solution to the war.

Trump said as recently as last month that he believed Ukraine could take back all its territory — but a day after agreeing to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin for a new summit the American had changed his tune.

After meeting with Zelensky at the White House, Trump said on social media that their talks were “very interesting, and cordial, but I told him, as I likewise strongly suggested to President Putin, that it is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL!”

Trump also appeared to suggest both sides should accept their current front lines. “They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” he said.

Zelensky said after the meeting that Russia was “afraid” of the U.S.-made long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, but that he was “realistic” about receiving the weapons from Washington.

He told reporters that while he and Trump talked about long-range weapons they “decided that we don’t speak about it because… the United States doesn’t want escalation.”

‘Get the war over’

Zelensky came to Washington after weeks of calls for Tomahawks, hoping to capitalize on Trump’s growing frustration with Putin after a summit in Alaska failed to produce a breakthrough.

But the Ukrainian left empty-handed as Trump eyes a fresh diplomatic breakthrough on the back of last week’s Gaza peace deal.

Trump has appeared far more upbeat about the prospects of a deal since his two-and-a-half hour call with Putin on Thursday, in which they agreed to meet in Budapest.

“Hopefully we’ll be able to get the war over with without thinking about Tomahawks,” Trump told journalists including an AFP reporter as he hosted Zelensky at the White House.

Trump added that he believed Putin “wants to end the war.”

Zelensky, who came to the White House to push for the long-range U.S.-made weapons, said however that he would be ready to swap “thousands” of Ukrainian drones in exchange for Tomahawks.

Zelensky congratulated Trump on his recent Middle East peace deal in Gaza and said he hoped he would do the same for Ukraine. “I hope that President Trump can manage it,” he said.

‘Many questions’

Diplomatic talks on ending Russia’s invasion have stalled since the Alaska summit.

The Kremlin said Friday that “many questions” needed resolving before Putin and Trump could meet, including who would be on each negotiating team.

But it brushed off suggestions Putin would have difficulty flying over European airspace.

Hungary said it would ensure Putin could enter and “hold successful talks” with the United States despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant against him for alleged war crimes.

Since the start of his second term, Trump’s position on the Ukraine war has shifted dramatically back and forth.

Initially Trump and Putin reached out to each other as the U.S. leader derided Zelensky as a “dictator without elections.”

Tensions came to a head in February, when Trump accused his Ukrainian counterpart of “not having the cards” in a rancorous televised meeting at the Oval Office.

Relations between the two have since warmed as Trump has expressed growing frustration with Putin.

But Trump has kept a channel of dialogue open with Putin, saying that they “get along.”

The U.S. leader has repeatedly changed his position on sanctions and other steps against Moscow following calls with the Russian president.

Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, describing it as a “special military operation” to demilitarize the country and prevent the expansion of NATO.

Russia now occupies around a fifth of Ukrainian territory — much of it ravaged by fighting.

On Friday the Russian Defense Ministry announced it had captured three villages in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions.

Source: Danny Kemp (AFP), “Trump Tells Zelensky to ‘Make a Deal’ as Tomahawk Plea Misfires,” Moscow Times, 18 October 2025


All last week, Republican leaders tried to portray the No Kings protests scheduled for Saturday, October 18, as “Hate America” rallies. G. Elliott Morris of Strength in Numbers partnered with Atlanta-based science newsroom The Xylom to estimate that as many as 8.2 million people turned out yesterday to oppose the Trump administration. The mood at the protests was joyful and peaceful, with protesters holding signs that championed American principles of democracy, free speech, equality, and the rule of law. As the Grand Junction, Colorado, Daily Sentinel put it in a front-page headline: “‘This is America’ ‘No Kings’ protests against Trump bring a street party vibe to cities nationwide.”

Then last night, after the protests, the president’s social media account posted an AI-generated video showing Trump in a fighter jet with “KING TRUMP” painted on the side. The president sits in the airplane in front of something round that could be seen as a halo. He is wearing a gold crown; weirdly, the oxygen mask is over his mouth and chin, rather than mouth and nose.

Once in the air, the plane drops excrement on American cities, including what seems to be New York City. The excrement drenches protesters, one of whom is 23-year-old liberal political commentator and influencer Harry Sisson. Journalist Aaron Rupar of Public Notice, who shares media clips that reflect politics, commented: “Trump posts AI video showing him literally dumping sh*t on America.” Historian Larry Glickman noted that media outlets make much of alleged Democratic disdain for ordinary Americans, but have had little to say about the disdain for Americans embodied by Trump’s video.

Several administration videos and images have responded to Americans saying “No Kings” by taking the position “Yes, We Want Kings,” an open embrace of the end of democracy. But they are more than simple trolling. Led by Trump, MAGA Republicans have abandoned the idea of politics, which is the process of engaging in debate and negotiation to attract support and win power. What is left when a system loses the give and take of politics is force.

The idea that leaders must attract voters with reasoned arguments to win power and must concede power when their opponents win has been the central premise of American government since 1800. In that year, after a charged election in which each side accused the other of trying to destroy the country, Federalist John Adams turned the reins of government over to the leader of the opposition, Thomas Jefferson. That peaceful transfer of power not only protected the people, it protected leaders who had lost the support of voters, giving them a way to leave office safely and either retire or regroup to make another run at power.

The peaceful transfer of power symbolized the nation’s political system and became the hallmark of the United States of America. It lasted until January 6, 2021, when sitting president Trump refused to accept the voters’ election of Democrat Joe Biden, the leader of the opposition.

Now back in power, Trump and his loyalists are continuing to undermine the idea of politics, policies, and debate, trying instead to delegitimize the Democratic opposition altogether. Yesterday, during the protests, President Donald Trump, Vice President J.D Vance, and the official White House social media account posted a video of Trump placing a royal crown on his head, draping a royal robe around his shoulders, and unsheathing and brandishing a sword (an image that raises questions about why Trump wanted one of General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s swords so badly that he had the museum director who refused to hand it over fired). In the video, Democratic leaders including former House speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and what appears to be Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) first kneel and then bow to Trump.

Administration imagery doesn’t simply insult opposition leaders; it undermines the idea of politics by suggesting that Democrats are un-American. Last night the White House continued its racist crusade against Democratic leaders by posted an AI-generated image of Trump and Vance wearing jewel-encrusted crowns positioned above an image of House minority leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) and Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) wearing Mexican sombreros. The caption reads: “We’re built different.”

The administration’s hostility to loyal opposition is translating into direct assaults on our government. House speaker Mike Johnson is refusing to seat a member of the opposition. Voters chose representative-elect Adelita Grijalva (D-AZ) on September 23 to fill a vacant House seat, but Johnson has come up with one reason after another not to seat her. Until she is sworn in, she has no access to government resources and cannot represent her constituents. She also cannot be the 218th signature on a discharge petition that would force a vote on whether to demand the release of the Epstein files, the final signature needed.

Grijalva recorded a video reinforcing the political system, saying: “We need to get to work, get on the floor, and negotiate so we can reopen the government.”

But Republican congressional leaders are refusing even to talk with Democrats to reopen the government, let alone to negotiate with them. They are trying to force Democrats simply to do as they say, despite the fact that 78% of Americans, including 59% of Republicans, support the Democrats’ demand for an extension of the tax credit that lowers the cost of healthcare premiums on the Affordable Care Act markets. Lindsay Wise, Anna Wilde Mathews, and Katy Stech Ferek of the Wall Street Journal reported today that more than three quarters of those who are insured through the ACA markets live in states that voted for Trump.

A video of Trump in a bomber attacking American cities carries an implied threat that the disdain of throwing excrement doesn’t erase. This morning, Trump reinforced that threat when he reminded Fox News Channel host Maria Bartiromo: “Don’t forget I can use the Insurrection Act. Fifty percent of the presidents almost have used that. And that’s unquestioned power. I choose not to, I’d rather do this, but I’m met constantly by fake politicians, politicians that think that, that you know they it’s not like a part of the radical left movement to have safety. These cities have to be safe.”

That “safety” apparently involves detaining U.S. citizens without due process. On Thursday, Nicole Foy of ProPublica reported that more than 170 U.S. citizens have been detained by immigration agents. She reports they “have been dragged, tackled, beaten, tased and shot by immigration agents. They’ve had their necks kneeled on. They’ve been held outside in the rain while in their underwear. At least three citizens were pregnant when agents detained them. One of those women had already had the door of her home blown off while Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem watched.”

On Friday, the Trump administration pushed its attempt to use the military in Democratic-led cities, asking the Supreme Court to let it deploy troops in Chicago immediately. Chris Geidner of Law Dork notes that four judges, two appointed by Democrats and two appointed by Republicans, have rejected the administration’s arguments for why they must send in troops. Now the Department of Justice has appealed to the Supreme Court, asking for a decision on the so-called shadow docket, which would provide a fast response, but one without any hearings or explanation.

The administration’s appeal to the Supreme Court warned that there was “pressing risk of violence” in Chicago—a premise the judges rejected—and said preventing Trump from going into the city “improperly impinges on the President’s authority.”

How much difference will the No Kings Day protests, even as big as they were, make in the face of the administration’s attempt to get rid of our democratic political system and replace it with authoritarianism? What good is an inflatable frog against federal agents?

Scholar of social movements Lisa Corrigan noted that large, fun marches full of art and music expand connections and make people more willing to take risks against growing state power. They build larger communities by creating new images that bring together recognizable images from the past in new ways, helping more people see themselves in such an opposition. The community and good feelings those gatherings develop help carry opposition through hard moments. Corrigan notes, too, that yesterday “every single rally (including in the small towns) was bigger than the surrounding police force available. That kind of image event is VERY IMPORTANT if you’re…demonstrating social coherence AGAINST a fascist government and its makeshift gestapo.”

Such rallies “bring together multigenerational groups and the playfulness can help create enthusiasm for big tent politics against the monoculture of fascism,” Corrigan writes. “The frogs (and unicorns and dinosaurs) will be defining ideographs of this period of struggle.”

Source: Heather Cox Richardson, Letters from an American, 19 October 2025


System of a Down, “Toxicity” (2001)

Sunday Reader No. 5: American Pie

Jade Bird, “American Pie” (Don McLean cover). Thanks to the amazing Dick Gregory for the heads-up.

Nearly 3 million Americans identify as transgender, including one in 30 of those aged 13 to 17, according to a new report. But data on the country’s trans community may soon be hard to come by, its authors warned, as the Trump Administration and a number of GOP-led states seek to limit the recognition, and rights, of transgender people.

The UCLA Williams Institute has been publishing reports about transgender Americans since 2011, tracking information such as the race, ethnicity, age, regional location, and mental health of transgender individuals. 

Trans adults and youth make up 1% of Americans aged 13 and older and 3.3% of 13-to 17-year-olds, according to the institute’s Wednesday report. Researchers found that younger adults, those aged 18 to 34, were more likely to identify as transgender than their older counterparts, making up more than 50% of the country’s transgender population.

For its initial 2011 report, the institute relied on just two state-level population surveys. Researchers noted that they have since been able to access broader and higher-quality data through the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): To generate the most recent findings, they used data from the CDC 2021-2023 Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance System and 2021 and 2023 Youth Risk Behavior Survey. The report authors noted that the Youth Risk Behavior Survey in particular “currently provides the best available data for our estimates of the size and characteristics of youth who identify as transgender in the U.S.”

But the agency will no longer collect information on transgender people in compliance with President Donald Trump’s Executive Order calling for federal recognition of only two biological sexes. 

Since Trump returned to office in January, information regarding trans people and health resources for LGBTQ+ people has been quietly removed or modified on federal websites. And the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has stepped away from its previous practice of supporting gender-affirming-care, in spite of numerous statements from all major medical associations in the U.S., including the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics, declaring the care as best practice. In May, HHS called for “exploratory therapy” or psychotherapy to treat individuals with gender dysphoria instead of the medically recommended care.

Multiple states have also sought to restrict access to gender-affirming care, particularly for minors, amid broader global efforts to target such care for trans youth. A June Supreme Court decision upholding a Tennessee state-level ban on gender-affirming-care for youth delivered a heavy blow to the U.S. LGBTQ+ community, permitting similar bans that have been enacted across the country and presenting a significant obstacle to future efforts to challenge restrictions in the courts.

Amid the current political climate, the authors of Wednesday’s Williams Institute report say they are unsure whether survey respondents will accurately respond to questions regarding their gender identity moving forward. In addition to the uncertain future of data on the U.S. transgender population, they wrote, “It is also unclear whether individuals’ willingness to disclose on surveys that they identify as transgender will remain unchanged in the years to come.”  

Despite those looming challenges in gathering information, however, the authors noted it is already clear that younger people are more likely to identify as transgender and they anticipate that to continue being true.

“This has implications for institutions in our society, including educational institutions, the U.S. Armed Forces, civilian workplaces, health care settings, and other areas, regarding how to meet the needs of and provide opportunities for current youth and future generations,” they said.

Source: Solcyré Burga, “1 in 30 U.S. Teens Identifies as Transgender—But That Data May Soon Disappear,” Time, 20 August 2025


Jade Bird, “I’ve Been Everywhere” (Johnny Cash cover)

In the Central Coast, where my father farmed strawberries, the land is mostly flat for miles in every direction so it was easy to spot the green vans and trucks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service heading our way in the distance, kicking up a cloud of dust in their wake. It was the late ‘70s and raids were an occasional part of working in the ag industry.

When the trucks were spotted — most often by a worker — a loud call would go out: “La Migra, la migra.” That’s when immigrant workers without legal status would drop what they were doing and sprint away, either for a nearby riverbed or over a set of raised railroad tracks adjacent to the fields. The immigration raids on my father’s strawberry fields fascinated me when I was a boy. It wasn’t until I was older that I understood the impact on the workers who were rounded up and deported, as well as the effects on the families left behind. I now recall them in a more somber light.

My father worked as a sharecropper in the Central Coast. He oversaw several acres of strawberries and managed up to a dozen workers for Driscoll Inc., the berry company headquartered in my hometown of Watsonville.

From the time I was about 6 or 7 years old until I was 16, I spent my summers and most weekends in the fall in my dad’s strawberry fields. It was backbreaking work. I have the chiropractor invoices to prove it.

Immigration raid methods have changed. The toll they take has not

The ICE raids of the past few months across Southern California reignited my boyhood memories of the strawberry field raids.

What has not changed is the impact on the immigrant families, especially the children. Children of immigrants sustain deep emotional scars from immigration raids.

A study published last month on Psychiatry News said immigrant children or children of mixed-status parents endure serious trauma when their parents are deported.

“Forced family separations, particularly those resulting from immigration enforcement (e.g., detention, deportation), introduce acute psychological risks,” according to the study, which list the results as an “elevated risk of suicidal ideation, externalizing behavior and alcohol use.”

Even living under the threat of having a parent deported is traumatizing to children.

“These fears have been shown to lead to school absenteeism, academic disengagement, and heightened emotional distress,” the study says.

Even as a boy, the fear and desperation were palpable

When I worked in the fields, the raids came about once or twice a summer. I didn’t witness this myself, but the family lore includes the story of a worker who was so desperate to escape the INS that he jumped into a nearby port-a-potty — hiding among the feces and urine in the holding tanks — until the INS agents departed.

Each summer, two or three of my father’s workers would be deported, only to return the following season. That was more common back in the ‘70s than it is today. My dad tried to help his workers without green cards by connecting them with legal aid groups or lawyers so they could straighten out their legal status. Not all of them did and some who had green cards ran at the sight of INS trucks anyway.

In a recent conversation with my younger brother, Peter, he recalled panicking during the first raids he witnessed. He said he asked my older siblings if he should run from the agents, too.

“No, you’re an American. Just shut up,” they told him.

“How do they know that?” my brother asked.

Source: Hugo Martín, “Essential California” newsletter (Los Angeles Times), 22 August 2025


Jade Bird, “Grinnin’ in Your Face” (Son House cover)

[…]

A lost white race of Bible giants—literally bigger, stronger, and whiter than everyone else—fashioned as a symbol of everything conservatives wanted to remake America into, is an all-too-convenient bit of lore for the conspiracy-besotted right. (Never mind that the Nephilim were technically the villains in Genesis!) And the Smithsonian was, if anything, a useful foil for a fringe movement looking for an enemy to accuse of suppressing the truth.

Soon enough, claims that the Smithsonian intentionally hid the bones of Bible giants went mainstream, presaging the country’s own rightward shift. By the 2010s, the Smithsonian’s secret giants appeared in popular paranormal books, on late-night radio shows, in multiple cable TV documentaries (including at least two separate History Channel shows), and across a network of evangelical and far-right media outlets.

Among the most popular of these were the Christian DVDs and later podcasts produced by Steve Quayle and his Nephilim-hunting partner, Timothy Alberino. Quayle, an archconservative, blamed Bible giants for “teaching” men to be gay. He and Alberino were regulars on the right-wing podcast circuit in the 2010s, often appearing with figures like Alex Jones and Jim Bakker so Quayle could hawk their merch, attack Democratic politicians as demonic, and advocate for a targeted genocide of Nephilim-controlled liberals.

Burlinson told Blaze TV that he had been radicalized against the Smithsonian through Alberino’s podcasts and videos. In his podcasts, Alberino has described Bible giants as a “superior race society.”

In recent years, Alberino has made moves to go more mainstream. He has appeared on Ancient Aliens, the History Channel show advocating historical conspiracies, where David Childress is a featured star. That same show also hosted Tucker Carlson, Tennessee Republican Representative Tim Burchett, and others to peddle conspiracies about government cover-ups of space aliens, interdimensional beings, demons, and more.

For the far right, the E.T.s of Ancient Aliens—the same ones Congress is currently hunting in various UFO hearings—are actually angels and demons, and those demons are the souls of the giants who died in the Flood, according to a nonbiblical text Alberino endorses. Burlinson said in 2023 that he thinks UFOs could be angels, and more recently he promised that a congressional UFO hearing to be held on September 9 would feature witnesses who “handled the bodies” of these beings.

Conspiracies about Bible giants are basically the Christian version of UFOs and aliens, and it’s no wonder there is significant cross-pollination between believers in the two camps, even in Congress, where several representatives like Burlinson and Burchett have publicly discussed their belief in both. In fact, both conspiracies give pride of place to the Nephilim narrative from Genesis 6:4 as proof of either fallen angels or alien intervention.

It would be laughable if the Smithsonian conspiracy theory and tales of Bible giants now being spread on Blaze TV, on Joe Rogan’s podcast, and across right-wing media, were not a kind of Trojan horse to soften up the public to accept political propaganda in place of history and complete the assault on America’s museums that failed in the 1990s. But the conspiracists continue to spread their lore, and mainstream conservative politicians continue to escalate their attacks on the Smithsonian—a far-right pincer movement directed at an institution that is both the nation’s premier repository of historical fact and a potent bolsterer of America’s civic fabric. And that is no laughing matter.

Source: Jason Colavito, “The Super-Weird Origins of the Right’s Hatred of the Smithsonian,” New Republic, 21 August 2025


Jade Bird, “Love Has All Been Done Before”

THE BIZARRE TWISTS AND TURNS of Donald Trump’s Ukraine peacemaking project continue: Just three days after the president announced in a triumphant Truth Social post that Vladimir Putin was willing to meet with Volodymyr Zelensky—either one on one or in a trilateral summit with Trump—and to accept an arrangement in which NATO countries would provide postwar security guarantees for Ukraine, the Putin regime has unequivocally shot down both proposals. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (last seen sporting a “USSR” sweatshirt on his trip to Alaska) has made it clear that there won’t be a meeting with Zelensky until “all the issues” have been resolved—including the question of Zelensky’s legitimacy as president, given that Ukrainian elections have been put on hold on account of the war—and that Russia will not accept the presence of foreign troops, presumably other than its own, on Ukrainian soil.

Trump’s stormy bromance with Putin seems to be off again, too: in social media posts on Thursday, he criticized “crooked and grossly incompetent” Joe Biden for not allowing Ukraine to strike back at Russia and (speciously) compared his chummy-seeming interaction with Putin in Alaska with Richard Nixon’s confrontation with Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow in 1959.

It’s impossible to tell whether Trump’s social-media posturing will translate into action. There is still no word, for instance, on whether the administration is greenlighting Ukraine’s proposal, unveiled after the Monday White House meeting, for $100 billion in U.S. arms shipments to Ukraine (with the Europeans footing the bill) and an additional $50 billion project for joint U.S.-Ukrainian drone production. Nor is there any word on whether or when new sanctions will kick in.

WHILE THE CIRCUS PLAYS ON in Washington and Moscow, the war on the ground—and in the air—continues in Ukraine, and sometimes in Russia. Ukraine is in an undeniably tough position, though nowhere near the desperate predicament imagined both by haters and by worriers who keep predicting an imminent “collapse” of its defenses. On August 12, just before the Alaska summit, many thought they saw a sign of such collapse in a Russian “breakthrough” not far from the long-contested city of Pokrovsk (Donetsk region), near the former coal-mining town of Dobropillia, where Russian forces managed to make rapid advances past severely undermanned Ukrainian lines, move about nine miles forward, seize three villages (now mostly deserted, though some residents who have not been able to get out still remain there), and cut off a vital supply route for Ukrainian troops. These gains appeared to augur the fall of Pokrovsk itself, a prospect that has been discussed since late last year.

But a few days later, the supposed catastrophic defeat turned into an impressive Ukrainian victory thanks to the quick deployment of new units from the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard, which retook two of the captured villages as well as four previously occupied settlements and cleared the area of Russian troops, reportedly inflicting significant losses. As for Pokrovsk itself, there have been some clashes inside the city, with incursions by small Russian units; but observers such as expatriate Russian military expert Yuri Fedorov think it’s extremely unlikely that the city will fall before inclement weather forces the Russian offensive to wind down.

It is true that momentum is on Russia’s side, in the sense that only Russia is currently conducting offensive operations. But Russian forces’ progress is snail-paced and intermittent, with the Ukrainians often successful in pushing them back (and using drones to make up for manpower and ammunition shortages). The result, more often than not, is a ghastly tug-of-war over small patches of devastated land—contests in which a “win” may consist of planting a flag in a ghost settlement.

Overall, analysts agree that Russia has no chance of capturing the entirety of the Donetsk region—as it has tried to do since the start of Putin’s covert war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014—anytime in the foreseeable future; doing so would require taking heavily fortified urban areas, and even the most cavalier willingness to sacrifice men may not accomplish that goal without several more years of costly fighting. Hence Russian demands for Ukraine to surrender the remainder of the region without a fight.

Ukraine also continues to score successes in its aerial war on strategic Russian targets such as oil refineries, arms and ammunition depots and factories, and trains carrying weapons and fuel to the frontlines. (Russian troops aren’t the only ones feeling the effects: there are reported miles-long lineups for gasoline in parts of Russia.) And, Western arms deliveries aside, Ukraine is making strides in developing its own weaponry, like the new Flamingo long-range cruise missile capable of hitting targets more than 1,800 miles away; Zelensky has said that it could be mass-produced by February.

In other words: Ukraine is still not losing. But there is no question that it is exhausted—and that the enemy’s continuing terrorism against its civilian population is taking its toll. On Wednesday night, Russia launched one of its heaviest assault waves yet: 574 drones and 40 missiles, with targets located as far away from the frontlines as Lviv and Transcarpathia. Most were intercepted by Ukrainian defenses, but one person was killed and over a dozen wounded.

Was this a deliberate middle finger to Trump over his supposed peace effort? It sure looks like it, especially considering the bombing of an American factory in the Transcarpathian city of Mukachevo—the premises of Flex Ltd., a manufacturer of civilian electronic goods. At the very least, it shows that Russia is not de-escalating. Likewise, it’s unclear whether the incursion of a Russian drone that crashed and burned in a rural area in eastern Poland during the overnight attack on Ukraine was a deliberate provocation, as the Polish government charged. But it certainly doesn’t tell us that Putin wants peace.

He can still be forced into it, however. A scenario in which Ukraine drives Russian troops and occupation forces out of its territory is as impossible as one in which Russia makes major territorial gains in Ukraine; but there may come a point, perhaps soon, when the war’s economic and political burdens for the Putin regime become too heavy. Even with rigged elections and a thoroughly owned population, Putin still cannot afford too much discontent among the Russian middle class—or among the elites. There is a reason he has not undertaken another round of mobilization since 2022. But right now, recruitment is dropping, soldiers recovering from wounds or suffering from serious physical and mental health problems are being forced into combat, and mobilization may be the only way to keep the war going. The war will end when Putin starts to see its costs as too high and the chances of achieving his aims, stated and unstated, as too low.

U.S. policy could be instrumental in making that happen. But for that, the Trump administration would have to commit to a firm and consistent pro-Ukraine policy. For starters, the president’s promises of “very severe consequences” if Putin stands in the way of peace should mean something more than memes and empty talk. (And the vice president shouldn’t keep fawning about the “soft-spoken” Kremlin dictator who “looks out for the interests, as he sees it, of Russia.” Sorry, JD, but you sound like a jackass.)

Yet here we are, with Putin doing everything to sabotage any meaningful peace talks but put up an “I ♥ WAR” neon sign on the Kremlin walls—and what is Trump’s response? Another deadline: this time, he says, we’ll know whether a deal can be made “within two weeks”—famously, Trump’s “placeholder” unit of time. No doubt they’re quaking in their boots in the Kremlin.

Source: Cathy Young, “Putin Tanks Trump’s Supposed Peace Effort,” The Bulwark, 22 August 2025

Photo by the Russian Reader

The Trump administration has quietly rescinded long-standing guidance that directed schools to accommodate students who are learning English, alarming advocates who fear that schools will stop offering assistance if the federal government quits enforcing the laws that require it.

The rescission, confirmed by the Education Department on Tuesday, is one of several moves by the administration to scale back support for approximately 5 million schoolchildren not fluent in English, many of them born in the United States. It is also among the first steps in a broader push by the Trump administration to remove multilingual services from federal agencies across the board, an effort the Justice Department has ramped up in recent weeks.

The moves are an acceleration of President Donald Trump’s March 1 order declaring English the country’s “official language,” and they come as the administration is broadly targeting immigrants through its deportation campaign and other policy changes. The Justice Department sent a memorandum to all federal agencies last month directing them to follow Trump’s executive order, including by rescinding guidance related to rules about English-language learners.

Since March, the Education Department has also laid off nearly all workers in its Office of English Language Acquisition and has asked Congress to terminate funding for the federal program that helps pay for educating English-language learners. Last week, education advocates noticed that the guidance document related to English learning had a new label indicating it was rescinded and remains online “for historical purposes only.”

On Tuesday, Education Department spokeswoman Madi Biedermann said that the guidance for teaching English learners, which was originally set forth in 2015, was rescinded because it “is not in line with Administration policy.” A Justice Department spokesman responded to questions by sending a link to the July memorandum and said he had no comment when asked whether the guidance would be replaced.

For decades, the federal government has held that failing to provide resources for people not proficient in English constitutes discrimination based on national original under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.

In rescinding the guidance, the Trump administration is signaling that it may stop enforcing the law under that long-standing interpretation. The Education and Justice departments have been responsible for enforcing the law.

In the July memorandum, Attorney General Pam Bondi cited case law that says treating people, including students, who aren’t proficient in English differently does not on its face amount to discrimination based on national origin.

Other guidance related to language access for people using services across the federal government is also being suspended, according to the memo, and the Justice Department will create new guidance by mid-January to “help agencies prioritize English while explaining precisely when and how multilingual assistance remains necessary.” The aim of the effort, Bondi said in a statement published alongside the memo, is to “promote assimilation over division.”

The consequences for school districts were not immediately clear, but advocates worry that rescinding the 2015 guidance could open the door for weaker instruction for English learners and upend decades of direction from the federal government to provide English-language services to students who need them.

“The Department of Education and the Department of Justice are walking away from 55 years of legal understanding and enforcement. I don’t think we can understate how important that is,” said Michael Pillera, an attorney who worked at the Office for Civil Rights for 10 years and now directs the Educational Opportunities Project at the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights.

Without pressure from the federal government to comply with the law, it is possible that some school districts will drop services, Pillera said, particularly as many districts struggle with financial pressures.

“It’s going to ripple quickly,” he predicted. “Schools were doing this because the Office for Civil Rights told them they had to.”

Many districts will probably not change their services, but rescinding the guidance opens the door, said Leslie Villegas, an education policy analyst at New America, a think tank. Advocates may watch for changes in districts that previously had compliance problems or those that had open cases with the Office for Civil Rights related to English-language instruction, she noted.

“The rescission of this guidance may create the mentality that no one’s watching,” Villegas said.

In recent months, the Justice Department notified at least three school districts — in Boston; Newark; and Worcester, Massachusetts — that the government was releasing them from government monitoring that had been in place to ensure they offered services to English-language learners.

Officials in Worcester said they expected the action even before Trump took office. But in Boston, some parent advocates questioned why the monitoring had ended, the Boston Globe reported.

Supporters of immigration restrictions argued that relieving pressure on schools to provide these services might be helpful, especially given the costs to districts.

“If you devote all these resources to these kids coming in [to school] completely unprepared, inevitably it will diminish the quality of education others are getting,” said Ira Mehlman, spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform.

Todd DuBois, communications director for U.S. English, a group that advocates for English as the official and common language, said some education is needed to help “bridge the gap” for students who do not speak English, but the group is concerned that multilingualism “gets in the way of teaching English literacy earlier in life.”

The requirement to serve English-language learners in school is based on two federal statutes. The first is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which bars discrimination based on national origin, among other traits. Alandmark 1974 Supreme Court case, Lau v. Nichols, interpreted this law to include a mandate for English-language services in schools.

The second federal law at issue is the 1974 Equal Educational Opportunities Act, which requires public schools to provide for students who do not speak English. A 1981 case decided in federal appeals court, Castañeda v. Pickard, laid out a test to determine whether schools were properly providing services to English learners in school.

In 2015, the Justice and Education departments published their 40-page guidance document, explaining how schools can properly comply with these laws and avoid potential federal investigations and penalties.

“For a teacher, it was kind of like the Bible,” said Montserrat Garibay, who headed the Office of English Language Acquisition under the Biden administration. “If, in fact, we want our students to learn English, this needs to be in place.”

In her memorandum, Bondi said that in addition to cutting back on multilingual services the administration deems “nonessential,” federal agencies would be tasked with boosting English education and assimilation.

“Instead of providing this office with more capacity and more resources to do exactly what the executive order says — to make sure that everybody speaks English — they are doing the total opposite,” Garibay said.

Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, which supports immigration enforcement measures, suggested the federal government should not direct how school districts offer services. But he also said that teaching children English is consistent with efforts to make sure people living in the United States speak English.

“I’m all for English-language education. We probably need to do even more of that,” he said. “If you’re going to let people in who don’t speak English, then you want them to be acquiring English as soon as possible.”

Source: Laura Meckler and Justine McDaniel, “Education Department quietly removes rules for teaching English learners,” Washington Post, 20 August 2025

El lector ruso: La muerte como ideal nacional ruso

Vladimir Putin habla con un grupo de viudas rusas de la invasión a Ucrania. Subtitulado en inglés por Julia Khazagaeva.

La muerte como ideal nacional. Observen los rostros de estas mujeres que perdieron a sus hombres en la guerra contra Ucrania. Resplandecen con un nuevo significado. “Soy madre de cuatro hijos y, recientemente, enviudé… Gracias, Vladimir Vladimirovich”, “Perdí a mi hermano en la SVO [operación militar especial], pero mis tres hijos están creciendo para ser futuros defensores. Gracias”, le dicen a quien asesinó a sus familiares. El vacío existencial ruso finalmente se ha llenado. La vida tiene un propósito que redime la falta de sentido de la existencia. Perder la vida en la guerra significa valor y honor. Nada en la vida anterior, en tiempos de paz, garantizaba esto. Un contrato [para servir en el ejército] convierte a un hombre en un héroe. Ya no es un bastardo a los ojos de las mujeres que le estiman.

Así que el millón de vidas que se ha cobrado la guerra no inquieta particularmente a nadie [en Rusia]. Todos los sacrificios y las víctimas valen la pena si se convierten en motivo de orgullo nacional ruso. No escatimarán en personas, tres millones o más si llega el caso. Y no importará a quién asesinen: ucranianos, estonios o polacos. La guerra es una droga. Mientras la guerra siga en curso, la dura humillación se pospone. Estas son malas noticias para el mundo, especialmente para quienes imaginan que mientras Putin libra la guerra, los rusos desean la paz.

P.D.: Subtitulé el video en inglés. Puedes descargarlo de mi canal de Telegram. Compártelo con quienes quieran entender el misterio de “El alma rusa”.

Fuente: Julia Khazagaeva (Facebook), 2 de mayo del 2025. Traducido al inglés por the Russian Reader, y al español por Hugo Palomino.


Fuente: Nexta TV (X), 29 de abril del 2025 (captura de pantalla)


“Tatiana Sokolova no volverá a oír a su hijo llamarla ‘mamá’ nunca más. Él murió heroicamente en la zona de operaciones militares especiales”, decía el titular de un noticiero de la región de Cheliábinsk durante las celebraciones del Día Internacional de la Mujer, en honor a las madres de los soldados rusos.

Ese evento, en el que se entregaron flores a las madres de los soldados, fue organizado por el Movimiento de Mujeres Rusia Unida, grupo afiliado al partido de gobierno.

Esta fue sólo una de las muchas celebraciones de este año, previas al Día Internacional de la Mujer, alrededor de las figuras de madres y esposas de los soldados que toman parte en la invasión a Ucrania, así como de viudas y familias de los caídos.

El Día Internacional de la Mujer, una de las festividades más importantes en Rusia, celebra la contribución de las mujeres en la sociedad, la ciencia y el mundo laboral. Tiene profundas raíces en la historia soviética, cuando se promovió como símbolo de la igualdad de género.

Pero desde la invasión a gran escala a Ucrania, los funcionarios rusos y los medios estatales han defendido un ideal diferente: ser la esposa o la madre de un soldado.

“Con la militarización de la sociedad, el sistema educativo y la economía, y con el ‘ciudadano ideal’ —el soldado varón— al centro de esta, las autoridades están promoviendo activamente la imagen de la esposa del soldado como su complemento”, dice la investigadora de género Sasha Talaver al Moscow Times.

“La representación de las mujeres en tiempos de guerra y de crisis estatal emerge siempre como cuestión fundamental para la imaginación política”, afirma Talaver.

En este Día de la Mujer, miembros del partido Rusia Unida y activistas pro-Kremlin han entregado flores, organizado eventos literarios y visitado a las familias de la  milicia con regalos y comida.

“Estamos orgullosos de las mujeres que criaron a los héroes de la operación especial y a los jóvenes que se han alistado como soldados contratados”, dijo esta semana la senadora Daria Lantratova, copresidenta del Movimiento de Mujeres Rusia Unida.

El movimiento lanzó esta semana la campaña “Flores para las Madres de los Héroes” que se ha extendido a 40 regiones para repartir regalos y flores a los familiares de los soldados.

Una residente de la región de Múrmansk, que perdió a su hijo en la guerra, recibió del partido Rusia Unida una picadora de carne el 8 de marzo. Foto: redes sociales.

En lo que quizás sea el evento más desconcertante de este Día de la Mujer, las madres de los soldados caídos recibieron picadoras de carne como obsequio de funcionarios locales de Rusia Unida en la región de Murmansk.

La noticia provocó una ola de críticas y el electrodoméstico de cocina se ha convertido en un símbolo sombrío del gran número de bajas en los ataques del ejército ruso en Ucrania.

Después de que la historia se hiciese viral en medios rusos y ucranianos, la madre de un soldado fallecido grabó en video una declaración en la que decía que estaba planeando comprarse una picadora de carne, pero Rusia Unida “se la había regalado justo a tiempo”.

“Era justo lo que te pedía”, dijo la anciana.

En Cheboksary, una ciudad de la República de Chuvashia, los funcionarios organizaron un evento exclusivo para viudas y madres de los soldados caídos.

“¡Que el dolor se convierta pronto en orgullo!”, declaró el diputado local Yevgeny Kadyshev. Las mujeres recibieron ramos y bolsas de regalo etiquetados con el mensaje “Felicidad y Alegría”.

Las autoridades rusas, el partido Rusia Unida incluso, promueven la imagen de una esposa o madre militar como el ideal de feminidad, dice la investigadora de estudios de género Ella Rossman al Moscow Times.

El Movimiento de Mujeres Rusia Unida se fundó en los meses posteriores a la invasión de Ucrania en 2022 “como una clara respuesta al activismo feminista contra la guerra”, dijo Rossman, refiriéndose a grupos como la Resistencia Feminista Antibélica y los movimientos de esposas y madres de soldados movilizados.

“Actualmente, el arquetipo femenino más visible en la esfera pública es el de la mujer que espera a que su soldado regrese del frente”, dijo Rossman. “Pero esta no es la única imagen. Hay narrativas completamente opuestas, como la de las mujeres militares propiamente”.

Rossman señaló un artículo de un tabloide pro-Kremlin sobre una mujer de Rostov que firmó un contrato militar y fue a la guerra.

“Es una madre que dejó luchar a su hija,  perdió una pierna en combate y le dice a los periodistas que tan pronto como se recupere, volverá al campo de batalla”, dijo Rossman.

Las estaciones de televisión locales han estado cubriendo los eventos del Día de la Mujer para las madres y esposas de los soldados, mientras que también resaltan a las mujeres que ayudan o luchan en el frente.

Tras estas celebraciones oficiales, los políticos, a veces, invitan a estas mujeres a tomar el té. En Stavropol, se preparó una mesa para las madres y esposas de los soldados tras un concierto en un hospital de veteranos.

“Algunos esperan el regreso de sus hijos. Otros, lamentablemente, han perdido a sus defensores, quienes dieron la vida por la Patria”, escribió en redes sociales la senadora Daria Lantratova, representante de Luhansk ocupado.

Los activistas de Rusia Unida también entregaron flores a las madres de los soldados en el Donetsk ocupado.

“Su hijo es un héroe. La felicitamos por estas fiestas y le deseamos lo mejor. Esperamos que esta guerra termine y que llegue la paz”, le dijo una activista del Movimiento de Mujeres Rusia Unida a una anciana. Al escuchar la palabra “héroe”, la mujer rompió en llanto.

“No llores”, le dijo la activista de Rusia Unida a la anciana al despedirse.

Los soldados rusos que combaten en Ucrania también enviaron mensajes en vídeo a las madres y viudas de la milicia antes de la festividad.

“Los héroes nacen en familia. Las mujeres nos dan a luz. Las mujeres nos crían en jardines de infancia y escuelas. La formación de un héroe se debe a las grandes mujeres de su vida”, declaró Leonid Lapin, soldado que luchó como comandante de pelotón de francotiradores en Ucrania, en un mensaje de video.

Putin recibe a Olga Chebyova, viuda de Sergei Chebnyov, “héroe de Rusia”. Foto: kremlin.ru 

Rusia Unida incluso ha involucrado a niños con discapacidad en las celebraciones. En el distrito autónomo de Yamalo-Nenets, madres e hijos de un centro para progenitores de niños con discapacidad mental y física, elaboraron tarjetas de felicitación para familiares de soldados.

“Esta no es solo una buena iniciativa. Al ver cómo se involucran los niños con necesidades especiales, cómo les brillan  los ojos, uno se da cuenta de que vamos por buen camino”, dijo Alexei Komarevtsev, miembro de Rusia Unida.

En una entrevista en un canal de noticias local, describió el proyecto de manualidades como una forma de socialización para niños con discapacidad. Algunas de las tarjetas, añadió, se enviarán al frente de batalla, “porque también hay niñas sirviendo allí”.

En algunas regiones, como Tula, las esposas y madres de los soldados recibieron un pago único de 10.000 rublos (unos 100 dólares) por el Día de la Mujer. En otros lugares, los regalos incluyeron sets de maquillaje o entradas para la filarmónica.

En la región de Moscú, Rusia Unida organizó un seminario de maquillaje para esposas de soldados, afirmando que este tipo de iniciativas “ayudan a fortalecer los valores familiares y a mejorar la calidad de vida en la sociedad”.

“La guerra altera las normas sociales y el estilo de vida”, dijo Rossman. “Pero también impone restricciones a la posibilidad misma de una dicotomía rígida entre los roles masculinos y femeninos, aunque la guerra parezca encajar perfectamente en esa dicotomía”.

Es probable que esa sea la razón por la que las autoridades han estado trabajando horas extra para reforzar el ideal de valores “tradicionales”del Kremlin desde el inicio de la guerra, dijo.

“Las autoridades rusas se ven obligadas a declarar y reforzar los valores tradicionales [porque] muchas familias que antes de la guerra estaban intactas ahora han perdido a sus padres”, dijo Rossman. “También hay mujeres militares —médicas, por ejemplo— y mujeres que han ido voluntariamente a la guerra. Ignorar a estas mujeres es imposible. Ellas también son un objetivo desde el punto de vista de la propaganda”.

A medida que la guerra se alarga y las pérdidas rusas aumentan en el campo de batalla, las autoridades se ven obligadas a equilibrar diferentes ideales de feminidad en sus mensajes de propaganda, dice Rossman.

“Tienen que crear constantemente diferentes arquetipos femeninos para diferentes públicos”, dijo.

Fuente: Angelina Trefilova, “Autoridades rusas glorifican a las esposas y madres  de la milicia por el día de la mujer”. Moscow Times, 7 de marzo del 2025. Traducido al español por Hugo Palomino.

El lector ruso: “Que me juzguen por traición” (Andrei Trofimov)

Andrei Trofimov, condenado activista pacifista ruso. Foto: Página Vkontakte de Andréi Trofimov, vía Mediazona.

El 2023, el activista pacifista Andrei Trofimov, de Tver, fue condenado por diversos cargos (entre ellos, difundir noticias falsas sobre el ejército ruso, incitar al extremismo e intentar unirse a la legión Libertad de Rusia) a diez años de cárcel en una prisión de máxima seguridad. En su declaración final del juicio, llamó a Vladimir Putin “estúpido” (khuilo) y apoyó vehementemente los ataques ucranianos al Puente de Crimea y al Kremlin. Esta declaración se usó como fundamento para una segunda causa penal contra él, esta vez con cargos de “apología al terrorismo” y “difamación del ejército”.

Hoy (6 de mayo del 2025), el juez Vadim Krasnov del Segundo Tribunal Militar del Distrito Occidental extendió la condena de Trofimov a trece años. El fiscal Andrei Lopata había solicitado al juez una pena mayor a quince años.

Antes de la lectura del veredicto de su primer juicio, Trofimov había solicitado al tribunal la imposición de la pena máxima. Ahora, también ha pedido que se le acuse por alta traición, un delito más grave, alegando su participación del lado ucraniano en la guerra informativa.

A continuación, la publicación de Mediazona, un tanto abreviada, de la declaración de Trofimov durante los argumentos orales del [segundo] juicio.

* * * * *

Su Señoría, las circunstancias objetivas de mis acciones, que la investigación ha calificado como delitos, están correctamente expuestas en la acusación y han sido investigadas a fondo durante la audiencia judicial.

En mi declaración, quisiera profundizar en las razones de estas acciones, en mis objetivos, y analizando en detalle las imputaciones una a una, brindar mi respuesta a las acusaciones; es decir, explicar mis motivos para no declararme culpable. Y, en conclusión, quisiera solicitar al tribunal lo que debe hacerse conmigo a continuación.

Yo vivía tranquilamente en mi casa de campo, con mis gatos, sin molestar a nadie. Mi vida cambió drásticamente el 24 de febrero del 2022. El motivo, tanto del primer proceso penal como del actual [en mi contra], ha sido la invasión a Ucrania por parte de Rusia. Explicaré luego y con más detalle por qué considero así ese evento.

De hecho, estoy en prisión por lo que he dicho. No hice nada ni en el primer caso ni en el segundo. Pero esta ha sido mi forma de involucrarme en tales eventos, porque me era físicamente imposible salir del país y no tenía ningún deseo de permanecer en silencio en ese trance. Porque, claro, es mi vida.

¿Por qué he hecho esto? Debo responder a sus comentarios de ayer en el sentido de que mis declaraciones, incluso en el tribunal, podrían perjudicar mis propios intereses. Su Señoría, no me interesa una sentencia más corta. Yo ya estoy en prisión.

¿Cuál es el propósito de lo que hago? En general, es una cuestión de supervivencia. Simplemente entiendo el instinto de supervivencia no como la preservación del cuerpo en sí, de su salud física, porque no soy solo mi cuerpo. Quiero preservar mi conciencia en esta difícil situación, mi capacidad para distinguir entre blanco y negro, entre la falsedad y la verdad, y, aún más importante, mi capacidad para decir en voz alta lo que creo que es cierto.

Esta cuestión mía no comenzó el 2022. Siempre he intentado vivir así. Es solo que mi deseo de mantener esta capacidad en tales momentos —es decir, la capacidad de decir la verdad, de mantener mi conciencia— es lo que me lleva a actuar así.

¿Qué hechos hemos observado? Hemos presenciado pruebas concretas de delitos de los que no se me acusa, evidencias de la violación del artículo 278 del Código Penal Federal Ruso, es decir, la toma o retención forzosa del poder. Me refiero a Vladímir Putin, quien ha ocupado el cargo oficial más alto de la Federación Rusa durante exactamente un cuarto de siglo. En todo este tiempo, la Constitución de la Federación Rusa ha mantenido el principio de sucesión de poderes, establecido en la forma del gobierno de dos mandatos [para la presidencia rusa]. Hemos presenciado una violación directa de esta norma, es decir, la retención forzosa del poder.

En cuanto a lo ocurrido desde el 24 de febrero, vemos pruebas concretas de la violación del artículo 353 del Código Penal, es decir, la planificación, preparación, desencadenamiento y ejecución de una guerra ofensiva.

¿Qué he hecho al respecto? Públicamente, en un piquete solitario [aunque prolongado], he demostrado la insanía del Estado ruso. Vea, la fiscalía pide quince años en total: una pena por asesinato, pero incluso por asesinatos, las sentencias suelen ser más cortas. Y, sin embargo, mis actos no perjudicaron a nadie ni causaron daño alguno.

No me refiero sólo al período cubierto por estos casos penales. Nunca he tocado a nadie ni robado un céntimo en mi vida. Sin embargo, [el fiscal quiere condenarme a] quince años. Creo que esto demuestra la demencia del Estado. El Estado exhibe con gusto esta cualidad al ponerme como ejemplo.

¿Cómo respondo? Demostrando fortaleza. Esto es vital, porque espero que los ucranianos vean lo que he estado haciendo. Miren: lo arrestaron. Lo condenaron y le dieron doce años de pena máxima. Juzguen el efecto en relación con el segundo caso. ¿Hicieron un buen trabajo convenciéndome [de mi error]? Es decir, ¿he dejado de hacer lo que hacía? ¿Se ha apagado mi voz? No, no se ha apagado.

Hemos presenciado lo mismo en el frente militar. Por cuatro años seguidos el estado ruso ha ensangrentado a un país vecino. Ucrania no se ha rendido ni se rendirá.

Entre las cosas de las que no se me ha acusado exactamente, pero que se han repetido en los autos de acusación y entre las pruebas presentadas en el juicio, está mi insulto a Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin con la palabra grosera «estúpido». ¿Qué he hecho? A esto le llaman desacralización.

Porque la sacralidad del poder supremo es uno de los fundamentos de la forma de gobernar de la Horda de Oro. Cuando pública, repetida y diariamente; en el primer juicio, en el segundo, o en el medio de la detención preventiva, he hecho este truco, he desacralizado a Vladimir Putin. Esto es importante porque este régimen terminará de todas formas y deseo con todas mis fuerzas apurar tal fin. Odio a ese hombre. Y lo que dice la fiscalía sobre el “motivo del odio político” es la pura verdad. Puedo confirmarlo.

El público al que me dirijo con estas acciones no vive en Rusia, porque la sociedad rusa está muerta y es inútil intentar hablar con ella. Mi público es Ucrania.

En cuanto a los cargos contra mí, no me declaro culpable de ninguno de los cargos de violación del artículo 205.2 del Código Penal. El caso es el  el texto mismo, simplemente publicado en internet y leído en voz alta en el centro de prisión preventiva, porque no considero que los incidentes que he decidido incluir en mi alegato final del juicio sean “actos terroristas”. Los he elegido a propósito.

Lo que está en juego son los dos ataques al Puente de Crimea. Este puente es una arteria de transporte vital que abastece a las fuerzas armadas federales rusas en Crimea. Un ataque a una instalación militar constituye un caso de violencia armada. El ataque fue llevado a cabo por las fuerzas armadas de Ucrania.

¿Por qué se catalogó como “ataque terrorista”? Sé perfectamente por qué. Esto se hizo, primero, para poder usarlo en la propaganda rusa y así deshumanizar al enemigo. En otras palabras, la Federación Rusa no está en guerra con las fuerzas armadas de Ucrania, que están estipuladas por la ley ucraniana y cumplen con su deber constitucional, sino con bandas terroristas de “banderistas” y “ukronazis. Para apoyar esta agenda es que se toman decisiones y se inician procesos penales por cargos de “terrorismo” en casos de conflicto armado.

En cuanto al segundo incidente que he mencionado, el ataque al Kremlin el 3 del mayo del 2023, ¿qué sabemos? El comunicado del Comité de Investigación, citado ayer por la fiscalía afirma categóricamente que el ataque se llevó a cabo contra la residencia del presidente de la Federación Rusa, comandante en jefe de las fuerzas armadas federales rusas. Además, los ucranianos también atacaron el edificio del Senado, ubicado en una zona del Kremlin cerrada al turismo y donde se encuentra una de las oficinas de Putin. Disculpenme, pero esto no fue un ataque terrorista. Fue una operación de combate ucraniana, además fallida.

Debo decir, fuerte y claro, que no apruebo ni apoyo el terrorismo, que nunca lo he aprobado ni tengo intención de hacerlo. Mantengo una actitud categóricamente negativa hacia la ideología y la práctica del terrorismo.

Pasemos al [los cargos del] artículo 280.3 del Código Penal. Este artículo es completamente nuevo: se adoptó tras el inicio de lo que llamamos la «operación especial».

Esto es un claro ejemplo de persecución por decir la verdad. Porque ha ocurrido algo que ha hecho necesario silenciar a los opositores a la guerra. Pero es imposible acusarlos de violar, por ejemplo, mi querido artículo 207.3 del Código Penal. ¿Cómo se puede acusar a alguien de “difundir noticias falsas” si simplemente expresa su opinión sobre la actualidad? Así surgió el artículo 280.3 y el concepto de “difamación”, que, legalmente, ha sido muy mal concebido.

Me han dicho que mi frase «Ucrania es víctima de una agresión por parte de Rusia» difama a las fuerzas armadas federales rusas. Pero ¿qué hay? Tenemos la resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU de 2014 que dice que Rusia se «anexionó» Ucrania. Esas no son mis palabras. Esta es una resolución de la Asamblea General: no tiene poder de veto [como sí lo tiene el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU], por lo que fue aprobada por una mayoría considerable [de Estados miembros]. Esta es la posición del derecho internacional.

De igual manera, contamos con una resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU de marzo del 2022 que califica los sucesos del 24 de febrero como «agresión». Y tenemos una resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU sobre la incorporación, por parte de Rusia, de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia y Jersón, que califica estas acciones de «anexión».

Debo señalar que las declaraciones de, por ejemplo, la portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Masha Zakharova, no constituyen una fuente de derecho internacional. Las declaraciones del ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso, Lavrov, tampoco lo son. En cambio las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de la ONU sí lo son, y por lo tanto, mis apreciaciones se basan en documentos jurídicos internacionales.

Pero, claro, mi frase sobre los “escorias de Putin” también forma parte de la acusación de “difamación” en mi contra. En primer lugar, desde su punto de vista, “Putin” no puede ser difamatorio, porque, según usted, Putin es bueno. En cuanto a la segunda palabra [de la frase], sí, es mi opinión personal, y no se aplica sólo a  militares rusos que siguen órdenes ilegales. Sí, hay también gente en las fuerzas armadas rusas que incumplen órdenes ilegales, pero no son los únicos que luchan allí.

Disculpeme por describir así a quienes asesinan a soldados de un país vecino por dinero. Es mi opinión personal, basada en [sus] acciones.

Resumiré esta parte de mi declaración. La Constitución Federal Rusa contiene el Artículo 29, [que garantiza] el derecho a la libertad de expresión, incluyendo el derecho a recopilar y difundir información. Esto es lo que he estado haciendo. Es decir, no he salido ni un milímetro del Artículo 29 de la Constitución. Sin embargo y al mismo tiempo, ciertamente he violado estos dos artículos vigentes del Código Penal.

¿Cómo es esto posible? Puede que sea porque los artículos por los que se me acusa son inconstitucionales. Si Rusia tuviera un Tribunal Constitucional real, estos artículos habrían dejado de existir hace mucho tiempo.

No puedo dejar de mencionar mi informe al fiscal Zhuk, que no formaba parte de los cargos en mi contra, pero aún así escuchamos a testigos que lo mencionaron ayer . No contiene el texto de [mi] declaración final [del primer juicio]. No hay mención de terrorismo ni ningún acto violento. Tampoco mencioné a las fuerzas armadas.

El caso es que este segundo proceso es el resultado de mi declaración ante la comisión del fiscal. Porque el expediente contiene dos resoluciones del investigador del FSB, el teniente coronel Serguéi Vyacheslavovich Yerofeev, para desestimar el caso; es decir, del investigador de mi [primer] caso, con quien tengo una excelente relación y que comprende perfectamente lo que he estado haciendo y lo que he intentado lograr. Él intentó desestimar este caso dos veces.

En la parte final de mi declaración, me referiré a la adecuada descripción de mis acciones. Estoy involucrado del lado ucraniano en la guerra. Simplemente que esta participación se lleva a cabo sin armas, porque una guerra es un evento extraordinariamente multidimensional. Además de los combates en las estepas del Donbás, en el Mar Negro y en los cielos de Ucrania, se libran ferozmente en el espacio informativo por entidades estatales y organismos rusos. Del lado ucraniano, por ejemplo, también participan entidades interesantes.

Soy un guerrero de la información. ¿En qué sentido? El 9 de octubre del 2022, escribí y envié un correo electrónico al presidente ucraniano, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky, pidiéndole que me concediera la ciudadanía ucraniana. Tengo derecho a ella por mi ascendencia. Todos mis abuelos eran ucranianos. La ley ucraniana dice que tengo derecho a la ciudadanía [ucraniana].

Pude incluir una captura de pantalla de Kasparov.ru en el expediente para hacer que la examinaran en el tribunal. ¿Qué confirma esto? Que, además de publicar mi alegato final en el juicio, Kasparov.ru me ha publicado regularmente. ¿Qué confirma esto? Que lo que se me está juzgando ahora es, de hecho, solo un ejemplo de mi trabajo, que no he cesado.

También debo mencionar, por supuesto, a Novaya Gazeta, cuyo sitio web también publicó mis cartas. Y mi último logro en este sentido es que me han declarado oficialmente preso político, porque es así como me he denominado en el centro de detención preventiva y así firmo mis peticiones ante este honorable tribunal. Pero, por así decirlo, fue una especie de autodenominación.

El 14 de abril de este año, el Consejo de Presos Políticos del Centro Internacional de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos Memorial publicó una decisión [que me declara como preso político]. Como parte de mi trabajo, he tomado los casos penales [en mi contra], tanto el primero como el segundo, como oportunidades de difusión.

La guerra de la información es real. Estoy involucrado en ella y ahora intento demostrarlo. En el terreno informativo, apoyo a Ucrania y a sus fuerzas armadas. De hecho, me he unido al bando enemigo en un conflicto armado que involucra a la Federación Rusa. Esta es la esencia del delito tipificado en el artículo 275 del Código Penal Federal ruso: alta traición.

Solicito al tribunal que devuelva mi caso penal a la fiscalía, ya que las circunstancias indican que existen motivos para acusarme de un delito más grave. Que me juzguen por traición: he traicionado su demente país.

* * * * *

Dirección para correo postal:

Trofimov Andrei Nikolayevich (nacido en 1966)

141 ul. Bagzhanova, FKU SIZO-1 UFSIN po Tverskoi oblasti

Tver,  Tver Oblast 127081 Federación Rusa

Puede enviar cartas al sr. Trofimov y a  otros  prisioneros políticos rusos via ZT, F-Pismo, y PrisonMail.online. (Este último acepta pagos con tarjetas de bancos fuera de Rusia.)

Fuente: “‘Try me for treason: I betrayed your deranged state’: a statement by 58-year-old Andrei Trofimov in a military court,” Mediazona, 6 May 2025. Traducido al inglés por the Russian Reader y al español por Hugo Palomino

El lector ruso: Toda Ucrania le pertenece a Ucrania

Prescott Avenue, Monterey, California, 23 de junio del 2025. Foto de The Russian Reader

En el boletín de esta semana: Riesgos en la ley de ciudadanía ucraniana / Toma de la sede del sindicato de trabajadores / Vida bajo la ocupación / Campaña alto Seapeak / La guerra y la formación de un estado dependiente en Ucrania / Más evidencia del adoctrinamiento ruso de infantes / Aumento masivo de los ataques rusos a civiles

Noticias de los territorios ocupados por Rusia:

Rustam Sheikhaliev, preso político, cumple 46 en su sexto cumpleaños tras las rejas (Crimea Plataform, 22 de junio).

Expulsado de su hogar por 40 años: las deportaciones son la última medida rusa para “limpiar” Ucrania (The Guardian, 21 de junio).

Niños de 7 años son formados para ser parte de la maquinaria bélica rusa en la Ucrania ocupada  (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 20 de junio).

Crimeo condenado a 17 años “por planear la explosión de un helicóptero militar ruso” (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 20 de junio).

Rusia amenaza al cofundador del Grupo de Derechos Humanos de Crimea (Grupo de Derechos Humanos de Crimea, 19 de junio).

Un tribunal ruso ignora secuestro y tortura al incrementar una larga pena contra un ucraniano que intentó rescatar a su madre (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 19 de junio).

Rusia condena a 8 años de prisión a un joven ucraniano de 19 años por “espiar para Ucrania” en su infancia (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 19 de junio).

Una nueva legislación formaliza el brutal aislamiento ruso de los presos políticos tártaros de Crimea y otros ucranianos (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 17 de junio)

Cómo gobierna Putin en la Ucrania ocupada (Workers Liberty, 16 de junio)

Vida bajo la ocupación (Alter Pravo, mayo de 2025)

Vida bajo la ocupación (Alter Pravo, abril de 2025)

Noticias del frente:

Las defensas Sumy se estabilizan: reporte semanal de la guerra (The Insider, 21 de junio)

Noticias de Ucrania:

Discursos en la Rada Suprema: Expropiación de sede sindical (Red Europea de Solidaridad con Ucrania, 20 de junio)

Vitali Klitschko, alcalde de Kiev: rival del presidente (Meduza, 17 de junio)

Observadores de la ONU informan del aumento masivo de ataques rusos contra civiles en toda Ucrania (Grupo de Protección de los Derechos Humanos de Járkov, 16 de junio)

Más de 1900 toneladas de sustancias nocivas emitidas en el aire de la ciudad y la provincia de Kiev en dos días de ataques rusos (Ukrainska Pravda, 16 de junio)

Ucrania se prepara para una “dolorosa” reducción de la ayuda militar estadounidense tras el anuncio de recortes de Hegseth (Kyiv Independent, 11 de junio)

Noticias rusas relacionadas con la guerra:

Foro Económico de San Petersburgo: una verificación de la realidad económica (Meduza, 20 de junio)

Voluntario pacifista ruso condenado a 22 años de prisión (Novaya Gazeta Europe, 20 de junio)

Cómo se construyó una red para vender sexo con adolescentes a ricos y poderosos en Rusia (iStories, 19 de junio)

Denuncias judiciales muestran las bajas rusas: La oleada de desaparecidos (Mediazona, 5 de junio)

Análisis y comentario:

Política migratoria de Ucrania: Regulación legal e integración europea (Opora, 20 de junio)

Riesgos en el proyecto de ley ucraniano de ciudadanía múltiple (Grupo de Derechos Humanos de Crimea, 17 de junio)

La postura de los defensores de los derechos humanos: el proyecto de ley de ciudadanía múltiple crea amenazas para los residentes de los territorios ocupados (Zmina, 17 de junio)

Volodymyr Artiukh y Taras Fedirko: Guerra y formación de un estado dependiente en Ucrania (Berghahn Journals, 2025)

Necesidades y perspectivas de vivienda social en Kalush Hromada (Cedos, 19 de junio)

Investigación en abusos de derechos humanos:

ZMINA destaca la necesidad de responsabilidad en el Foro de Seguridad de Europa Central y Oriental en Varsovia (Zmina, 17 de junio).

ZMINA participó en el desarrollo de la Hoja de Ruta para la investigación de crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos por las fuerzas rusas en Ucrania (Zmina, 16 de junio).

Solidaridad internacional:

Australia sanciona a la “flota fantasma” rusa (Crimea Platform, 17 de junio)

Exportaciones rusas de combustibles fósiles: alto a la campaña Seapeak  (Campaña de Solidaridad con Ucrania en Escocia, 16 de junio)

Próximo evento: 

Jueves 26 de junio, de 19:30 a 21:00 GMT, en línea. Informe de las visitas de solidaridad a Ucrania. Ponentes: Mike Kearney (NEU Ukraine Solidarity Network); Rui Palma (Ukraine Solidarity Campaign Steering Committee). Regístro con enlace Zoom.

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Este boletín es elaborado por activistas del movimiento obrero en solidaridad con la resistencia ucraniana. Para recibirlo por correo electrónico cada lunes escriba a 2022ukrainesolidarity@gmail.com. Para dejar de recibirlo responda con la palabra “STOP” en el asunto. Más información en https://ukraine-solidarity.org/. También en Twitter, Bluesky, Facebook y Substack. El boletín se archiva en línea aquí.

Fuente: Boletín 151 de noticias de Ucrania (23 de junio del 2025). Traducido al inglés por the Russian Reader y al español por Hugo Palomino


Si es usted uno de los pocos que aún creen que el dictador ruso Vladimir Putin está interesado en la paz, observe por favor  algunos de los videos de su actuación en el Foro Económico Internacional de San Petersburgo la semana pasada.

Vladimir Putin en el Foro Económico Internacional de San Petersburgo 2025. Con subtítulos en inglés. Fuente: Michael Rossi

Así sabrá la verdad.

Aquí está la esencia de Vladimir Putin en seis mentiras, todas lanzadas en 48 horas la semana pasada.

MENTIRA 1: “Toda Ucrania le pertenece a Rusia”.

REALIDAD: Basta el derecho internacional. Es realmente así de simple. O pregunte a los ucranianos. Fin de la discusión.

Las palabras de Putin, las risas y los aplausos del público, la admiración en la sonrisa del “entrevistador” —tres años y medio después de la invasión—, todo grita “¡alerta roja, dictador al ataque!”. Sobre todo porque las palabras de Putin esta semana no son más que una continuación de su “tesis histórica”, ​​publicada en el verano de 2021, seis meses antes de invadir Ucrania, en la que afirma que rusos y ucranianos son un solo pueblo y que deberían vivir juntos como un solo Estado: Rusia.

Como ahora sabemos, en febrero del 2022, Putin demostró su “amor” hacia los ucranianos de una manera más bien abusiva: “estén de acuerdo conmigo, mis queridos hermanos y hermanas, de que somos uno, o los invadiré, los asesinaré, los torturaré, los violaré y los mataré, y entonces entederán que somos uno”.

Esto es, como se dice en Rusia, alguien que va ‘va-bank’ –a toda máquina (‘ва-банк’).

MENTIRA 2: Putin dice que desea terminar la guerra lo antes posible.

“Créanme, nosotros también queremos terminar la guerra, y cuanto antes. Y si pacíficamente mejor, si podemos llegar a un acuerdo”, declaró Putin en San Petersburgo.

REALIDAD: Esta es simple. El dictador ruso ha roto nada menos que 26 altos al fuego desde que invadió Ucrania por primera vez en 2014. Esto es cada uno de  los que se acordaron en 11 años.

En San Petersburgo, se le preguntó directamente a Putin sobre la ofensiva rusa a gran escala en la ciudad de Sumy, al noreste de Ucrania. Ucrania afirma que Rusia ha concentrado 60.000 soldados a menos de 30 km de la ciudad y que en  mayo y junio, aldea tras aldea al norte de la ciudad han caído bajo el ejército ruso, que se acerca cada vez más a Sumy.

“No es nuestro objetivo tomar Sumy”, respondió Putin, “pero, en principio, no lo descarto…” ¿Parece este un hombre que desea poner fin a la guerra?

La semana pasada se cumplieron 100 días desde que Ucrania aceptó la propuesta de un alto el fuego incondicional de Trump. Putin aún no la ha aceptado. 100 días. En cambio, el dictador ruso ha aprovechado esos 100 días para intensificar los bombardeos sobre zonas residenciales de ciudades ucranianas, enviando a menudo entre 400 y 500 drones cada noche. La mayoría de las veces, esto significa 6 u 8 muertes, pero cada tanto, como el pasado martes en Kiev, el coste humano es aún mayor: un ataque con drones y bombas en la madrugada dejó 30 muertos mientras dormían y 170 heridos.

Eso es todo lo que se necesita saber acerca de si Putin quiere terminar la guerra. O no.

MENTIRA 3: Putin dice que Rusia no bombardea zonas residenciales sino  objetivos del sector defensa.

“Los ataques no fueron contra zonas residenciales, sino contra instalaciones militares e industriales”, explicó Putin esta semana sobre el bombardeo de Kiev que mató a 30 personas e hirió a 170. Ha repetido estas “explicaciones” decenas de veces tras otros atroces atentados terroristas.

REALIDAD: Sólo basta con mirar este vídeo.

No hace falta ser un experto militar para ver que el dron/bomba ruso se dirige directamente a un bloque de pisos residenciales y no a una instalación industrial-militar.

Hay que ser muy tonto para creer que esto no es intencional. De hecho, la única persona a la que he oído explicar este tipo de ataques como no intencionales es, como podrán adivinar, el presidente de los Estados Unidos. El Domingo de Pascua, Rusia bombardeó la plaza del mercado central de la ciudad de Sumy, al noreste de Ucrania, usando munición en racimo y alcanzando a feligreses y personas que se dirigían, con sus familias, a celebrar la Pascua. 31 personas fueron asesinadas. Pero Donald Trump manifestó que se le había informado que Rusia había, simplemente, cometido un “error“.

Todos los expertos independientes coinciden en que, en los últimos meses, Rusia ha atacado cada vez más parques infantiles, mercados, hospitales y barrios residenciales. Basta con ver los vídeos de ucranianos muertos y heridos rescatados de los escombros en pijama y camisón que se publican cada mañana .

En cambio, el propio enviado de Trump a Ucrania, el general retirado Keith Kellogg, tuiteó que no tenía dudas de que este era un ataque deliberado.

MENTIRA 4: Putin dice que está listo para reunirse con Zelenski 

“Estamos listos para reunirnos… Estoy listo para reunirme con todos, incluso con Zelenski”, dijo Putin en San Petersburgo.

REALIDAD: Putin ha evitado reunirse con el presidente ucraniano en repetidas  oportunidades. La más reciente, en Estambul, en mayo, donde Zelenski lo retó a una reunión cara a cara: “No tiene sentido prolongar las matanzas. Y esperaré a Putin en Turquía el jueves. Personalmente”.

Pero Putin decidió no ir a la reunión con su homólogo, quien es mucho más joven, tiene más cabello, no tiene barriga, no usa bótox, es dinámico y cuenta con gran simpatía de la prensa internacional.

MENTIRA 5: Putin cuestiona la legitimidad de Zelenski

“¿Por qué digo esto?”, se preguntaba en voz alta Putin, en San Petersburgo. “No nos interesa quién esté negociando, aún si es el  líder del actual régimen. Estoy dispuesto a reunirme con él, pero sólo en la etapa final. La firma debe provenir de un gobierno legítimo. De lo contrario, el próximo gobierno simplemente tirará el acuerdo a la basura”.

REALIDAD: ¿Por dónde empezar con esto? Un dictador brutal y corrupto que ha estado en el poder en Rusia desde 1999 y que durante ese período ha destruido todo signo de democracia, libertad de expresión y medios de comunicación, ni que decir de  la mayoría de sus oponentes políticos… acusa a un presidente elegido popularmente de ser ilegítimo (Zelenski obtuvo el 73% de los votos en 2019). Si Zelenski pospuso las elecciones que debían celebrarse en 2024 fue porque el mencionado dictador había invadido su país.

En otras palabras: Putin negociará con Zelensky, según afirma, pero se reservará el derecho a negar el acuerdo por considerarlo ilegítimo.

Alternativamente, Putin quiere forzar elecciones en Ucrania, lo que generaría inestabilidad. Claro, precisamente por eso Putin desea elecciones. Los desafíos logísticos y de seguridad serían insuperables: este es un país y un pueblo que se encuentran en medio del período más traumático de su historia, con un tercio de su población (entre 12 y 14 millones de personas) obligada a huir de sus hogares, el 20 % del país ocupado y cientos de miles de personas muertas y heridas. Imagine llevar a cabo una campaña política y elecciones en tales circunstancias, forzados por su vecino invasor, el país que los ucranianos consideraban su principal aliado.

No es sorprendente que un veterano de la KGB como Putin intente esto; no tiene nada que perder. Lo sorprendente es que Trump y varios miembros de su administración coincidan con el dictador ruso en que Zelenski es ilegítimo y que debe convocar elecciones antes de firmar un acuerdo de paz. ¿Por qué, por qué dirías algo así, Donald, si de verdad quieres ver la paz en Ucrania?

MENTIRA 6: Putin califica la revolución ucraniana del 2014 de “golpe de Estado”

REALIDAD: Lo siento, Vova, estuve en la plaza el 2013-14, prácticamente a diario  durante varios meses. No hay forma educada de decirlo: eres un puto mentiroso. ¡Deja de mentir, Vova!

Aquel fue un verdadero levantamiento popular, que involucró a millones de ucranianos en todo el país. Los hechos lo prueban: 11 años después, es fácil encontrar ucranianos que participaron en el Maidán durante meses y que hoy están decepcionados con el resultado de la revolución. Demasiados de los antiguos peces gordos permanecieron en el poder; la lucha contra la corrupción ha sido demasiado lenta. Pero ninguna de estas personas —millones— que presenciaron lo sucedido, que realmente participaron, lo llama “golpe de Estado”.

Ellos estuvieron allí. Ellos hicieron la revolución. Ellos lo saben.

Lo cierto es que hoy, 11 años después de que Putin invadiera Ucrania por primera vez, y tres años y cuatro meses después de que lo hiciera por segunda vez, es difícil encontrar a alguien que crea en sus mentiras. Salvo que estén pagados por el Kremlin.

Fuente: Michael Andersen, “Sólo un tonto creería que Putin quiere paz”, Dos viejos gruñones sobre Ucrania, 23 de  junio del 2025. Traducido al inglés por the Russian Reader y al español por Hugo Palomino


Funcionarios ucranianos reaccionaron con indignación a los comentarios de Vladimir Putin del viernes, en los que aseguró a los delegados del Foro Económico Internacional de San Petersburgo que “toda Ucrania es nuestra”.

En su discurso, durante el evento anual de desarrollo económico de San Petersburgo, Putin amenazó con una respuesta nuclear si Kiev desplegara una “bomba sucia” (a pesar de admitir que no había pruebas de que Ucrania estuviera considerando hacerlo) y describió la actual invasión de Ucrania como una necesidad defensiva.

Al negar rotundamente la soberanía de Ucrania, Putin repitió la vieja narrativa del Kremlin de que ucranianos y rusos son “un solo pueblo”, una afirmación que ha sido rechazada una y otra vez tanto por Ucrania como por la comunidad internacional.

Putin confirmó que las fuerzas rusas estaban creando una zona de contención  de 10 a 15 kilómetros dentro de la región ucraniana de Sumy, tras una incursión de siete meses por parte del ejército ucraniano en la vecina región rusa de Kursk. Aunque negó que Rusia planeara ocupar la ciudad de Sumy, Putin añadió, categóricamente, que no lo descartaba.

Putin amenazó con una escalada nuclear y   advirtió de una devastadora respuesta rusa si Ucrania despliega una “bomba sucia”, combinación de explosivos convencionales y material radiactivo, a pesar de que no hay noticia de que Ucrania posea tal dispositivo,  hecho que el propio Putin reconoció.

Un ataque así “sería un error colosal por parte de aquellos a quienes llamamos neonazis en la Ucrania actual”, dijo, añadiendo que “podría ser su último error”.

“Nuestra doctrina nuclear establece que siempre respondemos a las amenazas con la misma moneda. Por tanto, nuestra represalia sería extremadamente severa y, muy probablemente, catastrófica tanto para el régimen neonazi como para la propia Ucrania”, continuó Putin.

En respuesta a los comentarios sobre su  nocturno discurso del viernes a la nación, el presidente ucraniano Volodymyr Zelenski dijo que esto demostraba que Putin no tenía intención de negociar un alto el fuego y que “Rusia quiere continuar la guerra”, y agregó que las fuerzas ucranianas estaban repeliendo con éxito los ataques rusos en la región de Sumy.

Otros funcionarios ucranianos también condenaron las declaraciones de Putin. El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Andrii Sybiha, calificó estas declaraciones de “desquiciadas” y afirmó que el líder ruso había mostrado “un total desdén por los esfuerzos de paz estadounidenses”.

“Mientras que los Estados Unidos y el resto del mundo han pedido el fin inmediato de la matanza, el principal criminal de guerra de Rusia habla de planes para apoderarse de más territorio ucraniano y asesinar a más ucranianos”, escribió Sybiha en X.

A pesar del continuo aislamiento internacional de Rusia, Putin afirmó también que la economía del país seguía fuerte y señaló que el PIB había crecido más del 4% anual en los últimos dos años, que la pobreza había caído al 7,2% y que el desempleo había bajado a un mínimo histórico del 2,3%.

Fuente: Emilia Kurilova, “Indignación en Kiev tras el anuncio de Putin en el Foro Económico internacional de San Petersburgo de que ‘toda Ucrania es nuestra’” Novaya Gazeta Europe, 21 de junio del 2025. Traducido al inglés por the Russian Reader y al español por Hugo Palomino

All of Ukraine Belongs to Ukraine

Prescott Avenue, Monterey, California, 23 June 2025. Photo by the Russian Reader

In this week’s bulletin: Risks in Ukraine’s citizenship lawTrade union house grab/ Life under occupationStop Seapeak campaign/ War & dependent state formation in Ukraine/ More evidence of Russia’s indoctrination of small children/ Massive increase in Russian attacks on civilians

News from the territories occupied by Russia:  

Political prisoner Rustam Sheikhaliev turns 46, his sixth birthday behind bars (Crimea Platform, 22 June)

Banned from home for 40 years: deportations are Russia’s latest move to ‘cleanse’ Ukraine (The Guardian, June 21st)

7-year-olds in occupied Ukraine taught how to become part of Russia’s war machine (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 20th)

Crimean sentenced to 17 years ‘for planning to blow up a Russian military helicopter’ (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 20th)

Russian threat to co-founder of Crimea Human Rights Group (Crimea Human Rights Group, 19 June)

Russian court ignores abduction and torture, increasing huge sentence against Ukrainian for trying to rescue his mother (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 19th)

Russia sentences 19-year-old Ukrainian to 8 years for ‘spying for Ukraine’ as a young boy  (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 19th)

New legislation formalizes Russia’s brutal isolation of Crimean Tatar and other Ukrainian political prisoners (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 17th)

How Putin rules in occupied Ukraine (Workers Liberty, June 16th)

Life Under Occupation (Alter Pravo, May 2025)

Life Under Occupation (Alter Pravo, April 2025)

News from the front:

Sumy defences stabilised: weekly war report (The Insider, 21 June)

News from Ukraine:

Speeches in the Verkhovna Rada: Expropriation of the trade union house (European Network for Solidarity with Ukraine, 20 June)

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko: The President’s Rival (Meduza, 17 June)

UN monitors report massive increase in Russian attacks on civilians throughout Ukraine (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, June 16th)

Over 1,900 tonnes of harmful substances released into air over Kyiv and oblast in two days of Russian attacks (Ukrainska Pravda, June 16th)

Ukraine bracing for ‘painful’ reduction in US military aid after Hegseth announces cuts (Kyiv Independent, June 11th)

War-related news from Russia:

St Petersburg Economic Forum: an economic reality check (Meduza, 20 June)

Russian anti-war volunteer sentenced to 22 years (Novaya Gazeta Europe, 20 June)

How a network for selling sex with teenagers to the rich and powerful was built in Russia (iStories, 19 June)

Court claims show Russian casualties: The wave of the missing (Mediazona, 5 June) 

Analysis and comment:

Migration Policy of Ukraine: Legal Regulation and European Integration (Opora, June 20th)

Risks in Ukraine’s draft law on multiple citizenship (Crimea Human Rights Group, 17 June)

Position of human rights defenders: the draft law on multiple citizenship creates threats for residents of the occupied territories (Zmina, June 17th)

Volodymyr Artiukh and Taras Fedirko: War and dependent state formation in Ukraine (Berghahn Journals, 2025)

Housing Needs and Prospects for Social Housing in the Kalush Hromada (Cedos, June 19th)

Research of human rights abuses:

ZMINA highlights the need for accountability at Central and Eastern Europe Security Forum in Warsaw (Zmina, June 17th)

ZMINA joined the development of the Roadmap for the investigation of crimes against humanity committed by Russian forces in Ukraine (Zmina, June 16th)

International solidarity:

Australia sanctions on Russian “shadow fleet” (Crimea Platform, 17 June)

Russian fossil fuel exports: Stop Seapeak campaign (Ukraine Solidarity Campaign Scotland, 16 June)

Upcoming event:

Thursday, June 26th, from 7:30 to 9:00 PM GMT, online. Report back from solidarity visits to Ukraine. Speakers: Mike Kearney (NEU Ukraine Solidarity Network); Rui Palma (Ukraine Solidarity Campaign Steering Committee). Register for Zoom link.

==

This bulletin is put together by labour movement activists in solidarity with Ukrainian resistance. To receive it by email each Monday, email us at 2022ukrainesolidarity@gmail.com. To stop the bulletin, reply with the word “STOP” in the subject field. More information at https://ukraine-solidarity.org/. We are also on TwitterBlueskyFacebook and Substack, and the bulletin is stored online here

Source: News from Ukraine Bulletin 151 (23 June 2025)


If you are one of the few who still believe that the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is interested in peace, please watch a few of the video clips from his performance at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last week.

Vladimir Putin at the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. With English subtitles. Source: Michael Rossi

And then you will know the truth.

Here is Vladimir Putin summed up in 6 lies, all delivered within 48 hours last week.

LIE 1: “All of Ukraine belongs to Russia.”

FACT: Just go read international law, please. It really is that simple. Or ask the Ukrainians. End of discussion.

Putin’s words, the laughing and applause in the audience, the admiring smile of the ‘interviewer’ — three and a half years into the invasion — everything screams ‘red flag, attacking dictator!’ Not least because Putin’s words this week are simply a continuation of his ‘history thesis’ published in the Summer of 2021, six months before he invaded Ukraine; claiming that Russians and Ukrainians are one, and should live together within one state. Russia.

As we now know, in February 2022, Putin went on to show his ‘love’ for Ukrainians in a rather abusive way: something a la ‘you agree with me, my dear brothers and sisters, that we are one – or I will invade, murder, torture, rape and kill you, and then you will realize that we are one.’

This is, as they say in Russian, a man who is going ‘va-bank’ – for broke (‘ва-банк’).

LIE 2: Putin says that he wants to end the war as soon as possible.

“Believe me, we also want to end the war, and as soon as possible. And better – peacefully, if we could agree,” Putin said in St Petersburg.

FACT: This one is simple. The Russian dictator has broken no less than 26 ceasefires since he first invaded Ukraine in 2014. That’s every single one that has ever been agreed in 11 years.

In St. Petersburg, Putin was asked directly about the large-scale Russian offensive towards the city of Sumy in North-Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine says that Russia has amassed 60,000 troops less than 30 km from the city and all through May and June, village after village north of the city has fallen to the Russian army, edging still closer to Sumy itself.

“We have no objective to take Sumy,” Putin answered, “but in principle I do not rule it out…” Does that sound to you like a man who is keen on ending the war?

As it happens, last week marked 100 days since Ukraine accepted Trump’s proposal of an unconditional ceasefire. Putin still has not. 100 days. Instead, the Russian dictator has used those 100 days to increase the bombardment of residential areas in Ukrainian cities, often sending 4-500 drones with bombs per night. Most nights that kills 6 or 8 people, but every so often, like this past Tuesday in Kyiv, the human toll is even bigger: a drone and bomb onslaught in the early hours of Tuesday, 30 people died in their beds and 170 were injured.

That is all you need to know about Putin wanting to end the war. Or not.

LIE 3: Putin says that the Russian strikes are not on residential areas but on defense industry targets.

“The strikes were not on residential areas but precision strikes on military-industrial facilities,” Putin explained this week about the bombing of Kyiv that killed 30 people and injured 170. He has repeated such ‘explanations’ dozens and dozens of times after other horrific terror bombings.

FACT: All you need to do is watch the video.

You do not need to be a military expert to see that the Russian drone/bomb goes straight into a residential block of flats, not a military-industrial facility.

You do need to be an idiot to believe that this is not on purpose. In fact, the only person I have heard explaining such attacks as not being on purpose is — you guessed it — the U.S. President. On Easter Sunday, Russia bombed the central market square in the town of Sumy, in north-eastern Ukraine — using cluster ammunition and hitting church-goers and people on their way to celebrate Easter with their families. As a result, 31 people died. But Donald Trump explained that he had been informed that Russia had simply made a “a mistake”.

All independent experts agree that over the past months, Russia has increasingly targeted playgrounds, market squares, hospitals and residential neighborhoods. Hell, all you need to do is watch the videos being published every single morning of killed and injured Ukrainians being carried out from the rubble in their pajamas and nightgowns.

Trump’s own envoy to Ukraine, retired general Keith Kellogg tweeted is in no doubt.

LIE 4: Putin says that he is ready to meet Zelensky

“We are ready to meet… I am ready to meet with everyone, including Zelensky,” Putin said in St. Petersburg.

FACT: Putin has several times shied away from meeting the Ukrainian President, most recently in Istanbul in May where Zelensky challenged Putin to a face-to-face meeting: “There is no point in prolonging the killings. And I will be waiting for Putin in Türkiye on Thursday. Personally.

But Putin decided not to meet his much younger counterpart — who has lots of hair, no belly, no botox, dynamic, and great international press and sympathy.

LIE 5: Putin questions Zelensky’s legitimacy

“Why am I saying this?” Putin wondered aloud in St. Petersburg. “We don’t care who is negotiating, even if it’s the current head of the regime. I’m ready to meet – but only if it’s the final stage. The signature must come from a legitimate government. Otherwise, the next government will just throw it all in the trash.”

FACT: Where does one start on this one? A brutal, corrupt dictator who has been in power in Russia since 1999, and during that period has killed all signs of democracy, free expression and media, not to say most of his political opponents … accuses a popularly-elected president (Zelensky got 73% of the vote in 2019) of being illegitimate. Because he postponed elections that were supposed to have taken place in 2024, but couldn’t – because said dictator had invaded his country.

In other words, Putin will negotiate with Zelensky, he claims, but then retain the right afterwards to negate the agreement as illegitimate.

Alternatively, Putin wants to force elections in Ukraine — which would lead to instability. Of course. That is exactly why Putin wants elections. The logistics and security challenges would be insurmountable: This is a country and population in the middle of the most traumatic period in its history, with one-third of the population (12–14 million people) having been forced to flee their homes, 20% of their country occupied and hundreds of thousands of people killed and injured. Imagine running a political campaign and elections under such circumstances. Forced upon them by their invading neighbor and the country the Ukrainians thought was their main ally.

There is nothing surprising in an old KGB-hand like Putin trying this one, he has nothing to lose. The surprising thing is that Trump and several members of his administration agree with the Russian dictator that Zelensky is illegitimate and must hold elections before a peace deal can be signed. Why, oh why would you say something like that, Donald, if you really wanted to see peace in Ukraine?

LIE 6: Putin calls the Ukrainian revolution 2014 “a coup”

FACT: Sorry, Vova, I was there on the square in 2013–14, pretty much every single day for several months. There is no polite way of saying this – you are full of shit. Не пизди, Вова!

This was a true, popular uprising, involving millions of Ukrainians all over the country. The proof is in the pudding: 11 years later, it is easy to find Ukrainians who were on the Maidan during those months who today are disappointed with the outcome of the revolution. Too many of the old fat cats stayed in power, the fight against corruption has been too slow. But none of these people – millions – who saw what happened, who actually participated, call it “a coup”.

They were there. They did it. They know.

The fact is that today, 11 years after Putin invaded Ukraine for the first time, and three years and four months after he invaded Ukraine for the second time, it is difficult to find anybody who believes in his lies. Unless they are paid by the Kremlin.

Source: Michael Andersen, “Only a fool would believe that Putin wants peace,” Two Grumpy Old Men on Ukraine, 23 June 2025


Ukrainian officials have reacted with outrage to comments made by Vladimir Putin on Friday in which he told delegates to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum that “all of Ukraine is ours”.

Addressing the annual showcase for Russia’s economic development in St. Petersburg, Putin threatened a Russian nuclear response should Kyiv deploy a so-called “dirty bomb” — despite admitting that there was no evidence it was considering doing so — and portrayed the ongoing invasion of Ukraine as a defensive necessity.

Bluntly denying Ukraine’s sovereignty, Putin repeated the long-standing Kremlin narrative that Ukrainians and Russians were “one people,” a claim that has been repeatedly rejected both by Ukraine and the international community.

Putin went on to confirm that Russian forces were carving out a 10–15 kilometre buffer zone inside Ukraine’s Sumy region, following a seven-month-long incursion into Russia’s neighbouring Kursk region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Though he denied that Russia planned to occupy the city of Sumy itself, Putin added pointedly that he didn’t “rule it out”.

Raising the spectre of nuclear escalation, Putin warned of a devastating Russian response should Ukraine deploy a so-called “dirty bomb”, which combines conventional explosives with radioactive material, despite the fact that Ukraine is not known to possess such a device — a fact Putin himself acknowledged.

Such an attack “would be a colossal mistake on the part of those we call neo-Nazis in today’s Ukraine,” he said, adding that it “might be their last mistake”.

“Our nuclear doctrine states that we always respond to threats in kind. Therefore, our retaliation would be extremely harsh — and most likely catastrophic for both the neo-Nazi regime and Ukraine itself,” Putin continued.

Responding to the comments in his nightly address to the nation on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that they proved Putin had no intention of negotiating a ceasefire and that “Russia wants to continue the war,” adding that Ukrainian forces were successfully repelling Russian attacks in the Sumy region

Other Ukrainian officials also condemned Putin’s remarks, with Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha describing his statement as “deranged” and saying that the Russian leader had shown “complete disdain for US peace efforts.”

“While the United States and the rest of the world have called for an immediate end to the killing, Russia’s top war criminal discusses plans to seize more Ukrainian territory and kill more Ukrainians,” Sybiha wrote on X.

Despite Russia’s continuing international isolation, Putin also claimed that the country’s economy remained strong, noting that GDP had grown by more than 4% annually over the past two years, poverty had dropped to 7.2%, and that unemployment had fallen to a historic low of 2.3%.

Source: Emilia Kurilova, “Outrage in Kyiv as Putin tells St. Petersburg International Economic Forum ‘all of Ukraine is ours,’” Novaya Gazeta Europe, 21 June 2025

Andrei Trofimov: “Try Me for Treason”

Convicted Russian anti-war activist Andrei Trofimov. Photo: Mr. Trofimov’s Vkontakte page, via Mediazona

In 2023, Andrey Trofimov, an anti-war activist from Tver, was sentenced to ten years in a maximum security penal colony on several charges [to wit, disseminating “fake news” about the Russian army, calling for “extremism,” and attempting to join the Free Russia Legion]. In his closing statement at trial, he called Vladimir Putin a “dickhead” [khuilo] and “heartily endorsed” Ukraine’s attacks on the Crimean Bridge and the Kremlin. This statement was the grounds for the second criminal case against Trofimov, this time on charges of “condoning terrorism” and “defaming the army.”

Today [6 May 2025], Judge Vadim Krasnov of the Second Western District Military Court lengthened Trofimov’s sentence to thirteen years. Prosecutor Andrei Lopata had petitioned the judge to impose a longer sentence of fifteen years.

Before the verdict in his first trial was read out, Trofimov had petitioned the court to impose the maximum penalty. Now he has suggested that he be charged with the more serious offense of high treason, claiming that he has been involved in the information war on the Ukrainian side.

Below, Mediazona has published a slightly abridged version of Trofimov’s statement during oral arguments at the [second] trial.

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Your honor, the factual circumstances of my actions, which the investigation has categorized as crimes, are correctly stated in the indictment and have been fully investigated during the court hearing.

In my statement I would like to dwell on the reasons for these actions, on my goals, to review in detail, charge by charge, my response to the allegations—that is, to explain my motives for not pleading guilty. And, in my conclusion, I would like to petition the court as to what to do with me next.

I was living quietly at the dacha with my cats and was a bother to no one. My life changed drastically on 24 February 2022. The reason for both the first criminal case and the current criminal case [against me] was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I will further explain why I regarded this event in this way.

I am in prison for what I have said, after all. I took no action in either the first case or the second. But this has been my way of being involved in the events, because it was physically impossible for me to leave the country, and I had no desire to stay silent in this situation. I mean, it is my life.

Why have I done this? I must respond to your remarks yesterday to the effect that my statements, including in court, could harm my own interests. Your honor, I have no interest in a shorter sentence. I am already imprisoned.

What is the purpose of what I am doing? Writ large, it is a matter of self-preservation. It is just that I understand the instinct of self-preservation not as the preservation of the body per se, of its physical health, because I am not my body alone. I want to preserve my conscience in this difficult situation, my ability to tell black from white, and lies from truth, and, quite importantly, my ability to say out loud what I believe to be true.

This thing of mine did not start in 2022. I have always tried to live this way. It is just that my desire to preserve this ability in such situations—meaning, the ability to tell the truth, to maintain my conscience— is what causes such actions.

What actions have we observed? We have witnessed concrete evidence of crimes with which I have not been charged, evidence of the violation of Article 278 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code—that is, the forcible seizure or the forcible retention of power. I am referring to Vladimir Putin, who has held the highest official post in the Russian Federation for exactly a quarter of a century. During this entire time, the Constitution of the Russian Federation has contained the principle of succession of power, set out in the guise of the two-term rule [for Russian presidents]. We have witnessed a direct violation of this rule—that is, the forcible retention of power.

In what has occurred since 24 February, we see concrete evidence of a violation of Criminal Code Article 353—that is, the planning, preparation, unleashing, and waging of a war of aggression.

What have I done in this situation? Publicly, in the mode of a solo picket (just a protracteed one), I have demonstrated the Russian state’s insanity. Look, the prosecution is asking for fifteen years in total—the sentence given for murder, but even for murder, sentences are often shorter. And yet my deeds harmed no one nor caused any damage.

I am not just talking about the period covered by these criminal cases. I have never laid a finger on anyone, never stolen a penny, in my entire life. Nevertheless, [the prosecutor wants to send me down for] fifteen years. I believe that this is a demonstration of the state’s insanity. The state happily displays this quality using me as an example.

What have I done in response? I have shown fortitude. This is vital, because I hope that what I have been doing is seen by Ukrainians. Look at this: they arrested him. He was convicted and given a dozen years of maximum security. Judge the effect in terms of the second case. Did you do a good job of convincing me [of the error of my ways]? That is, have I stopped doing what I was doing? Has my voice become less audible? No, it has not.

We have witnessed the same thing on the military front. For four years running, the Russian state has been spilling blood in a neighboring country. Ukraine has not surrendered and will not surrender.

Among the things that I have not exactly been charged with, but which have been repeated in the indictments and in the evidence presented at trial is my insulting Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin by using the foul word “dickhead.” What have I done? It is called desacralization.

Because the sacredness of supreme power is one of the foundations of the Golden Horde method of governance. When I publicly, repeatedly, and daily, at the first trial, at the second trial, in the pretrial detention center, perform this trick, I am desacralizing Vladimir Putin. This is important, because this regime will end all the same, and I very much want to hasten its end. I hate this man. And what the prosecution says about the “motive of political hatred” is the sacred truth. I can confirm that.

The audience I am addressing by these actions is not in Russia, because Russian society is dead and it is useless to try and talk to it. Ukraine is my audience.

As for the charges against me, I do not plead guilty to either count of violating Criminal Code Article 205.2. At issue is one and the same text, simply posted on the internet and spoken aloud in the pretrial detention center. Because I do not consider the incidents which I chose to include in my closing statement at trial to be “terrorist acts.” I chose them on purpose.

What is at issue are the two attacks on the Crimean Bridge. The Crimean Bridge is a vital transport artery which supplies the Russian federal armed forces in Crimea. An attack on a military installation is an instance of armed hostilities. The attack was carried out by the armed forces of Ukraine.

Why was it categorized as a “terrorist attack”? I know perfectly well why. This was done in order, first, to use it in Russian propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. In other words, the Russian Federation is at war not with the armed forces of Ukraine, which are stipulated under Ukrainian law and are doing their constitutional duty, but with terrorist gangs of “Banderites” and “Ukronazis.” To support this agenda, decisions are made to launch criminal proceedings on charges of “terrorism” over instances of armed conflict.

As for the second incident I mentioned, the attack on the Kremlin on 3 May 2023, what do we know? The communique from the Investigative Committee, which the prosecutor quoted yesterday, states outright that the attack was carried out against the residence of the President of the Russian Federation, who is the commander-in-chief of the Russian federal armed forces. Moreover, the Ukrainians also hit the building of the Senate, which is in the section of the Kremlin closed to tourists and where one of Putin’s offices is actually located. Excuse me, but this was not a terrorist attack. It was a Ukrainian combat operation, and a failed one at that.

I must say loudly and out loud that I do not condone or support terrorism, and that I have never condoned terrorism, nor do I intend to condone terrorism. I have a categorically negative attitude to the ideology and practice of terrorism.

Let us move on to [the charges under] Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code. This article is brand-new: it was adopted after the start of what we call the “special operation.”

This is a pure example of persecution for telling the truth. Because a situation has arisen where it has been necessary to shut the mouths of the war’s opponents, but it is impossible to charge them with violating, say, my beloved Criminal Code Article 207.3. How can you charge a person with “disseminating fake news” if they simply voice their attitude to current events? This is how Article 280.3 and the notion of “defamation” emerged, which is quite poorly conceptualized legally.

I have been told that my phrase “Ukraine is a victim of aggression on the part of the country of Russia” defames the Russian federal armed forces. What do we have? We have the UN General Assembly’s 2014 resolution saying that Russia “annexed” Ukraine. Those are not my words. This is a General Assembly resolution: there is no veto power there [as there is on the UN Security Council], so it was passed by a decent majority [of member states]. This is the position of international law.

Similarly, we have a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution, in which the events of February 24 are labeled an “aggression.” And we have a UN General Assembly resolution on Russia’s incorporation of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson which labels these actions “annexation.”

I should note that the statements of, say, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Masha Zakharova are not a source of international law. Statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov are not a source of international law. UN General Assembly resolutions are, on the contrary, a source of international law, and so my assessments are based on international legal documents.

But my phrase about “Putin’s scumbags” is also part of the “defamation” charge against me, of course. First, from your viewpoint, “Putin’s” cannot be defamatory, because as you see it, Putin is good. As for the second word [in the phrase], yes, this is my personal opinion, and it does not apply solely to Russian servicemen who carry out unlawful orders. Yes, there are also people in the Russian armed forces who do not carry out unlawful orders, but they are not the only ones fighting there.

Excuse me for characterizing in this way people who murder the soldiers of a neighboring country for money. This is my personal judgment, and it is based on [their] actions.

I will summarize this part of my statement. The Russian federal constitution contains Article 29, [which guarantees] the right to free speech, including the right to gather and disseminate information. This is what I have actually been doing. That is, I have not overstepped Article 29 of the Constitution by a single millimeter. But at the same time I certainly have violated these two current articles of the Criminal Code.

How can this be the case? It can be the cacse because the articles under which I have been charged are unconstitutional. If Russia had a real Constitutional Court, these articles would have ceased to exist long ago.

I cannot fail to mention my report to Prosecutor Zhuk, which was not part of the charges against me, but nevertheless we heard witnesses talk about it yesterday. It does not contain the text of [my] closing statement [at the first trial]. It makes no mention of terrorism or any violent acts at all. I did not say a word about the armed forces either.

The point is that this second case is the result of my statement to the prosecutor’s commission. Because the case file contains two resolutions by FSB investigator Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vyacheslavovich Yerofeev to dismiss the case—that is, by the investigator in my [first] case, with whom I have a very good level of mutual understanding and who understands exactly what I have been doing and what I have been trying to achieve. He tried to dismiss this case twice.

In the final part of my statement, I turn to the correct characterization of my actions. I am involved in the war on the Ukrainian side. It just that this involvement takes place without weapons, because war is such an extraordinarily multidimensional event. Apart from the fighting in the steppes of Donbas, in the Black Sea, and in the skies above Ukraine, it is fiercely fought in the information space by state entities, by Russian bodies. On the Ukrainian side, for example, interesting entities are also involved.

I am an information warrior. In what sense? On 9 October 2022, I wrote and sent an email to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky asking him to grant me Ukrainian citizenship. I am entitled to it because of my ancestry. All my grandparents hailed from Ukraine. Ukrainian law says that I have the right to [Ukrainian] citizenship.

I was able to enter a screenshot from Kasparov.ru into the record and have it examined in court. What does it confirm? The fact that, apart from publishing my closing statement at trial, Kasparov.ru has published me on a regular basis. What does this confirm? That what I am being tried for now was, in fact, just an instance of my work, which I have not ceased.

I will also mention, of course, Novaya Gazeta, whose website also published my letters. And my latest achievement in this wise is that I have been officially designated a political prisoner, because that is what I call myself at the pretrial detention center, and that is how I sign my petitions to this honorable court. But it was still a kind of self-designation as it were.

On 14 April of this year, the Council on Political Prisoners of the Memorial International Human Rights Defense Center published a decision [designating me a political prisoner]. As part of my work, I have used the criminal cases [against me], the first and the second case, as publicity opportunities.

The information war is a real thing. I am involved in it, and I am trying to prove this now. Informationally, I support Ukraine and the armed forces of Ukraine. In fact, I have defected to the enemy side in an armed conflict involving the Russian Federation. This is the essence of the crime defined in Article 275 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code—high treason.

I ask the court to send my criminal case back to the prosecutor, as the factual circumstances indicate that there are grounds for charging me with a more serious crime. Try me for treason: I betrayed your deranged state.

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Address for letters:

Trofimov Andrei Nikolayevich (born 1966)
141 ul. Bagzhanova, FKU SIZO-1 UFSIN po Tverskoi oblasti
Tver, Tver Oblast 127081 Russian Federation

You can send letters to Mr. Trofimov and other Russian political prisoners via ZT, F-Pismo, and PrisonMail.online. (The last of these services accepts payments made with non-Russian bank cards.)

Source: “‘Try me for treason: I betrayed your deranged state’: a statement by 58-year-old Andrei Trofimov in a military court,” Mediazona, 6 May 2025. Translated by the Russian Reader