“Try me for treason. I betrayed your deranged state”, the Russian anti-war protester Andrei Trofimov told the Second Western District Military Court in May.
In 2023, Trofimov was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, for opposing Russia’s war in Ukraine in social media posts, and trying to join the Free Russia Legion that fights on Ukraine’s side. At that hearing, Trofimov said he hoped for Ukraine’s victory, and called president Putin “a dickhead”.
On the basis of that statement alone, he was further accused of “justifying terrorism” and defaming the Russian army. For those “crimes”, the judge at the hearing in May this year, Vadim Krasnov, added three years to Trofimov’s sentence.
Before sentencing, Trofimov told the court that he had not justified terrorism, but supported the Ukrainian armed forces’ legitimate military actions against aggression, and had not defamed the Russian army whose actions were unconstitutional and illegal. He told the court that he considered himself guilty of a much more serious crime: treason – taking the enemy’s side in war.
And there will be another chance to hear these powerful readings in London – on Thursday 5 February 2026, 6:30 p.m., at Birkbeck College. Here are the details.
You can order copies of Voices Against Putin’s War, or download a free pdf, here.
We published the book against the background of repeated claims that a peace agreement is about to be signed between Russia and Ukraine. These are louder than ever after this week’s talks in Berlin. At the time of writing this, it is not clear to me that the Kremlin is really interested in stopping the war, or what the “security guarantees” being offered to Ukraine actually mean.
I would recommend following the excellent arguments made about the peace process by Oleksandr Kyselov (most recently here, also here and here), Hanna Perekhoda (who writes on Facebook here), and other Ukrainian socialist writers.
If you want to know why the 20% of Donbas that Ukraine still controls matters so much, this comment by the Institute for the Study of War is worth reading. This speech by Valery Zaluzhny helps us understand what the Ukrainian political elite thinks.
Whatever the outcome of the talks now in progress, if any, the defence of victims of Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian territory, and domestic political repression, will remain a central issue for our movement, right across Europe.
On May 16, 2022, the Ukrainian artist Bohdan Ziza poured blue and yellow paint – the colours of his country’s flag – on to a municipal administration building in his home town, Yevpatoria, in Crimea.
Ziza posted a video of the action online, with a call to “adherents of graffiti culture, all the vandals of Crimea, Russia and Belarus” to protest against “the most horrific war” unleashed by “[Vladimir] Putin and the machine of state.” He was soon arrested and charged with “committing a terrorist act” and “incitement to terrorism”.
In June 2023, Ziza used his final statement to the Russian military court that sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment to denounce the war again: “My action was a cry from the heart, from my conscience, to those who were and are afraid — just as I was afraid — but who also did not want this war.”
Ziza is one of ten anti-war protesters whose speeches are published this month, in English translation, in Voices Against Putin’s War: protesters’ defiant speeches in Russian courts. The collection also includes two statements made outside court, related interviews and letters, a summary of seventeen other anti-war speeches in court, and a survey of the anti-war protest movement and the repression against it.
In Russia, dissenters since the Populist rebels of the 1870s have used their final statement in court to urge resistance to power. The tradition flourished in the workers’ movements that preceded the 1917 revolution, was broken by the 1930s Stalinist show trials with their formulaic confessions, and reborn after the 1950s “thaw”, with dissidents such as the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yulii Daniel.
In 2022, Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine was followed by a brutal crackdown on civil society in occupied territory, Crimea included, as well as repression of domestic dissent. Protest was driven off the streets. Individual non-violent direct actions like Ziza’s, or writing or speaking against the war, were punished with long jail sentences, such as those now being served by most of the protagonists in Voices Against Putin’s War.
Ruslan Siddiqi, the Russian-Italian anarchist, went further: he is serving twenty-nine years’ imprisonment for derailing a train that was carrying munitions to Russian army units in Ukraine.
In court, he declared himself a prisoner of war, rather than a political prisoner: “My targets were Russian military equipment and the logistical chains used to transport military hardware and fuel. I wanted to impede military operations against Ukraine.”
Acting according to one’s conscience, in a dystopian world of militarism and big lies, was a central consideration for many of the protagonists.
Alexei Rozhkov, who firebombed a military recruitment centre in Sverdlovsk region, fled to Kyrgyzstan while on bail, before he was kidnapped by Russian special forces and returned to be put on trial.
He told the court that sentenced him to sixteen years: “Although I have never been a politician or a statesman, I could not remain indifferent when the war began. I have a conscience, and I preferred to hold on to it.”
The book’s protagonists oppose the war from a wide range of political viewpoints. On one hand, there are pacifists such as Sasha Skochilenko, the artist jailed for seven years for replacing labels in a supermarket with handwritten anti-war messages (and later freed in a prisoner swap between Russia and Western countries), who told the court: “Wars don’t end thanks to warriors — they end thanks to pacifists.”
On the other hand, there are political activists who spoke of Ukraine’s right to resist Russia militarily. Aleksandr Skobov, 67, the oldest protagonist, first jailed for activity in the socialist wing of the Soviet dissident movement in 1978, refused to stand when the judge came into court.
Skobov wished death on the “murderer, tyrant and scoundrel Putin.” He said he would never stop calling on honest Russians to join the Ukrainian armed forces, and for air strikes on Russia’s military facilities.
No less adamant in support of Ukraine was the youngest protagonist, Darya Kozyreva, 19, sentenced to two years and eight months’ imprisonment for laying flowers and a poem at the statue of Ukraine’s national poet, Taras Shevchenko, in St Petersburg.
In court, Bohdan Ziza denounced not only the 2022 invasion but also the frenzied assault on Crimean Tatar organisations that preceded it in Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. “Those who so passionately seek ‘Nazis’ in Ukraine have not opened their eyes to the Nazism in Russia, with its ephemeral ‘Russian world’,” with which the armed forces have “tried to extirpate Ukrainian identity”.
(Last month Ziza, on his own demand, had the Russian citizenship that was imposed on him along with all Crimean residents revoked. He is today in Vladimir Central jail, where “politicals” have been incarcerated since the 19th century.)
Voices Against Putin’s War results from the work of a small volunteer group of translators supporting Russian anti-war organisations, of which I was part, and is supported by the European Network for Solidarity With Ukraine. On top of the speeches published, we have summarised seventeen more from the wonderful “Poslednee Slovo” (“last word”) website.
The trials highlighted in the book also provide a snapshot of Russia’s wartime lurch towards a form of fascism. Against those who take non-violent direct action, charges under terrorism laws were standardised in 2022, with jail sentences of between ten and twenty years. Torture of detainees is routine.
Long sentences are designed to terrorise people into silence: Andrei Trofimov got ten years for social media posts justifying Ukrainian military actions against Russia.
For his two-minute speech in the military court, which ended “Glory to Ukraine! Putin is a dickhead” he was charged with “condoning terrorism” and “defaming the army”: a further three years were added to his sentence.
The monstrosity of Russia’s domestic repression may properly be understood in the context of the bloodbath it has visited on Ukraine, and especially on the occupied territories.
Hundreds of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and wounded in action, and millions of Ukrainian civilians have been uprooted from their homes by bombing. Added to that, people in the occupied areas have faced enforced imposition of Russian citizenship, mass deportations including of children (the basis of a case against Putin in the International Criminal Court), legal nihilism, and an economic slump.
The primary instrument of social discipline in the occupied areas is enforced disappearances, including imprisonment. In September 2024, Ukraine’s register of persons “missing under special circumstances” counted some 48,324 names, of which 4,700 were confirmed by the Ukrainian government to be in captivity, although the true number may be far higher.
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe estimated that 16,000 people on the register were adult civilians. The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group identified 5,000 victims of enforced disappearances while preparing material for the International Criminal Court, and the Ukrainian ombudsman is working on 1,700 such cases. (All these numbers relate to civilians detained or missing, as distinct from Ukrainian prisoners of war, of which there are some 8,000–10,000.)
In short, Russia has taken many thousands of civilian prisoners in the occupied territories, whose fates often remain unknown. Many are political prisoners: 585 journalists, community leaders and activists from newly-occupied territories identified by human-rights organizations, 265 counted by the Crimean Human Rights Group, and others.
Furthermore, there are the thousands of civilian prisoners jailed by the so-called “People’s Republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk between 2014 and 2022, including for political offences, who have been transferred to prisons in Russia.
Alongside this orgy of violence, Russia’s machine of domestic repression has gone into overdrive.
A swathe of new censorious laws, for instance penalizing “disseminating knowingly false information about the Russian military” (which includes calling the war a war) have been added to the pre-existing laws on “foreign agents”, “undesirable organizations” and “extremism” from the last decade. Deranged police sweeps of people whose critical comments are harvested from social media have intensified.
The leading human-rights organisation Memorial: Political Prisoners Support, now based abroad, lists over 3,000 political detainees today, compared to just 50 in 2015 and 420 in 2021. After the post-Stalin “thaw”, historians reckon the number of political detainees in the Soviet Union fell to 5,000-10,000 in the 1970s (in the fifteen-republic union, with a population nearly twice that of Russia alone).
The trend reflected in these numbers justifies the term we have used in Voices Against Putin’s War: a “21st-century gulag.”
Amidst an international tide of rising right-wing authoritarianism and militarism, culminating in the genocide in Gaza, the speeches in the book are significant far beyond Russia. In his foreword, John McDonnell, a left-wing Labour MP in the UK, calls them “an inspiration to all those across the globe who see an injustice, and who refuse to passively comply”, from Israeli draft refuseniks and Palestine Action supporters in Britain to women demonstrating for life and liberty in Iran. That is where hope lies in our dark times.
□ Thursday 20 November, 7:00 p.m. TRY ME FOR TREASON. Readings from anti-war protesters’ speeches in Russian courts, and book launch for Voices Against Putin’s War. Pelican House, 144 Cambridge Heath Road, Bethnal Green London E1 5QJ. Register free on Eventbrite here.
Andrei Trofimov, condenado activista pacifista ruso. Foto: Página Vkontakte de Andréi Trofimov, vía Mediazona.
El 2023, el activista pacifista Andrei Trofimov, de Tver, fue condenado por diversos cargos (entre ellos, difundir noticias falsas sobre el ejército ruso, incitar al extremismo e intentar unirse a la legión Libertad de Rusia) a diez años de cárcel en una prisión de máxima seguridad. En su declaración final del juicio, llamó a Vladimir Putin “estúpido” (khuilo) y apoyó vehementemente los ataques ucranianos al Puente de Crimea y al Kremlin. Esta declaración se usó como fundamento para una segunda causa penal contra él, esta vez con cargos de “apología al terrorismo” y “difamación del ejército”.
Hoy (6 de mayo del 2025), el juez Vadim Krasnov del Segundo Tribunal Militar del Distrito Occidental extendió la condena de Trofimov a trece años. El fiscal Andrei Lopata había solicitado al juez una pena mayor a quince años.
Antes de la lectura del veredicto de su primer juicio, Trofimov había solicitado al tribunal la imposición de la pena máxima. Ahora, también ha pedido que se le acuse por alta traición, un delito más grave, alegando su participación del lado ucraniano en la guerra informativa.
A continuación, la publicación de Mediazona, un tanto abreviada, de la declaración de Trofimov durante los argumentos orales del [segundo] juicio.
* * * * *
Su Señoría, las circunstancias objetivas de mis acciones, que la investigación ha calificado como delitos, están correctamente expuestas en la acusación y han sido investigadas a fondo durante la audiencia judicial.
En mi declaración, quisiera profundizar en las razones de estas acciones, en mis objetivos, y analizando en detalle las imputaciones una a una, brindar mi respuesta a las acusaciones; es decir, explicar mis motivos para no declararme culpable. Y, en conclusión, quisiera solicitar al tribunal lo que debe hacerse conmigo a continuación.
Yo vivía tranquilamente en mi casa de campo, con mis gatos, sin molestar a nadie. Mi vida cambió drásticamente el 24 de febrero del 2022. El motivo, tanto del primer proceso penal como del actual [en mi contra], ha sido la invasión a Ucrania por parte de Rusia. Explicaré luego y con más detalle por qué considero así ese evento.
De hecho, estoy en prisión por lo que he dicho. No hice nada ni en el primer caso ni en el segundo. Pero esta ha sido mi forma de involucrarme en tales eventos, porque me era físicamente imposible salir del país y no tenía ningún deseo de permanecer en silencio en ese trance. Porque, claro, es mi vida.
¿Por qué he hecho esto? Debo responder a sus comentarios de ayer en el sentido de que mis declaraciones, incluso en el tribunal, podrían perjudicar mis propios intereses. Su Señoría, no me interesa una sentencia más corta. Yo ya estoy en prisión.
¿Cuál es el propósito de lo que hago? En general, es una cuestión de supervivencia. Simplemente entiendo el instinto de supervivencia no como la preservación del cuerpo en sí, de su salud física, porque no soy solo mi cuerpo. Quiero preservar mi conciencia en esta difícil situación, mi capacidad para distinguir entre blanco y negro, entre la falsedad y la verdad, y, aún más importante, mi capacidad para decir en voz alta lo que creo que es cierto.
Esta cuestión mía no comenzó el 2022. Siempre he intentado vivir así. Es solo que mi deseo de mantener esta capacidad en tales momentos —es decir, la capacidad de decir la verdad, de mantener mi conciencia— es lo que me lleva a actuar así.
¿Qué hechos hemos observado? Hemos presenciado pruebas concretas de delitos de los que no se me acusa, evidencias de la violación del artículo 278 del Código Penal Federal Ruso, es decir, la toma o retención forzosa del poder. Me refiero a Vladímir Putin, quien ha ocupado el cargo oficial más alto de la Federación Rusa durante exactamente un cuarto de siglo. En todo este tiempo, la Constitución de la Federación Rusa ha mantenido el principio de sucesión de poderes, establecido en la forma del gobierno de dos mandatos [para la presidencia rusa]. Hemos presenciado una violación directa de esta norma, es decir, la retención forzosa del poder.
En cuanto a lo ocurrido desde el 24 de febrero, vemos pruebas concretas de la violación del artículo 353 del Código Penal, es decir, la planificación, preparación, desencadenamiento y ejecución de una guerra ofensiva.
¿Qué he hecho al respecto? Públicamente, en un piquete solitario [aunque prolongado], he demostrado la insanía del Estado ruso. Vea, la fiscalía pide quince años en total: una pena por asesinato, pero incluso por asesinatos, las sentencias suelen ser más cortas. Y, sin embargo, mis actos no perjudicaron a nadie ni causaron daño alguno.
No me refiero sólo al período cubierto por estos casos penales. Nunca he tocado a nadie ni robado un céntimo en mi vida. Sin embargo, [el fiscal quiere condenarme a] quince años. Creo que esto demuestra la demencia del Estado. El Estado exhibe con gusto esta cualidad al ponerme como ejemplo.
¿Cómo respondo? Demostrando fortaleza. Esto es vital, porque espero que los ucranianos vean lo que he estado haciendo. Miren: lo arrestaron. Lo condenaron y le dieron doce años de pena máxima. Juzguen el efecto en relación con el segundo caso. ¿Hicieron un buen trabajo convenciéndome [de mi error]? Es decir, ¿he dejado de hacer lo que hacía? ¿Se ha apagado mi voz? No, no se ha apagado.
Hemos presenciado lo mismo en el frente militar. Por cuatro años seguidos el estado ruso ha ensangrentado a un país vecino. Ucrania no se ha rendido ni se rendirá.
Entre las cosas de las que no se me ha acusado exactamente, pero que se han repetido en los autos de acusación y entre las pruebas presentadas en el juicio, está mi insulto a Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin con la palabra grosera «estúpido». ¿Qué he hecho? A esto le llaman desacralización.
Porque la sacralidad del poder supremo es uno de los fundamentos de la forma de gobernar de la Horda de Oro. Cuando pública, repetida y diariamente; en el primer juicio, en el segundo, o en el medio de la detención preventiva, he hecho este truco, he desacralizado a Vladimir Putin. Esto es importante porque este régimen terminará de todas formas y deseo con todas mis fuerzas apurar tal fin. Odio a ese hombre. Y lo que dice la fiscalía sobre el “motivo del odio político” es la pura verdad. Puedo confirmarlo.
El público al que me dirijo con estas acciones no vive en Rusia, porque la sociedad rusa está muerta y es inútil intentar hablar con ella. Mi público es Ucrania.
En cuanto a los cargos contra mí, no me declaro culpable de ninguno de los cargos de violación del artículo 205.2 del Código Penal. El caso es el el texto mismo, simplemente publicado en internet y leído en voz alta en el centro de prisión preventiva, porque no considero que los incidentes que he decidido incluir en mi alegato final del juicio sean “actos terroristas”. Los he elegido a propósito.
Lo que está en juego son los dos ataques al Puente de Crimea. Este puente es una arteria de transporte vital que abastece a las fuerzas armadas federales rusas en Crimea. Un ataque a una instalación militar constituye un caso de violencia armada. El ataque fue llevado a cabo por las fuerzas armadas de Ucrania.
¿Por qué se catalogó como “ataque terrorista”? Sé perfectamente por qué. Esto se hizo, primero, para poder usarlo en la propaganda rusa y así deshumanizar al enemigo. En otras palabras, la Federación Rusa no está en guerra con las fuerzas armadas de Ucrania, que están estipuladas por la ley ucraniana y cumplen con su deber constitucional, sino con bandas terroristas de “banderistas” y “ukronazis“. Para apoyar esta agenda es que se toman decisiones y se inician procesos penales por cargos de “terrorismo” en casos de conflicto armado.
En cuanto al segundo incidente que he mencionado, el ataque al Kremlin el 3 del mayo del 2023, ¿qué sabemos? El comunicado del Comité de Investigación, citado ayer por la fiscalía afirma categóricamente que el ataque se llevó a cabo contra la residencia del presidente de la Federación Rusa, comandante en jefe de las fuerzas armadas federales rusas. Además, los ucranianos también atacaron el edificio del Senado, ubicado en una zona del Kremlin cerrada al turismo y donde se encuentra una de las oficinas de Putin. Disculpenme, pero esto no fue un ataque terrorista. Fue una operación de combate ucraniana, además fallida.
Debo decir, fuerte y claro, que no apruebo ni apoyo el terrorismo, que nunca lo he aprobado ni tengo intención de hacerlo. Mantengo una actitud categóricamente negativa hacia la ideología y la práctica del terrorismo.
Pasemos al [los cargos del] artículo 280.3 del Código Penal. Este artículo es completamente nuevo: se adoptó tras el inicio de lo que llamamos la «operación especial».
Esto es un claro ejemplo de persecución por decir la verdad. Porque ha ocurrido algo que ha hecho necesario silenciar a los opositores a la guerra. Pero es imposible acusarlos de violar, por ejemplo, mi querido artículo 207.3 del Código Penal. ¿Cómo se puede acusar a alguien de “difundir noticias falsas” si simplemente expresa su opinión sobre la actualidad? Así surgió el artículo 280.3 y el concepto de “difamación”, que, legalmente, ha sido muy mal concebido.
Me han dicho que mi frase «Ucrania es víctima de una agresión por parte de Rusia» difama a las fuerzas armadas federales rusas. Pero ¿qué hay? Tenemos la resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU de 2014 que dice que Rusia se «anexionó» Ucrania. Esas no son mis palabras. Esta es una resolución de la Asamblea General: no tiene poder de veto [como sí lo tiene el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU], por lo que fue aprobada por una mayoría considerable [de Estados miembros]. Esta es la posición del derecho internacional.
De igual manera, contamos con una resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU de marzo del 2022 que califica los sucesos del 24 de febrero como «agresión». Y tenemos una resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU sobre la incorporación, por parte de Rusia, de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia y Jersón, que califica estas acciones de «anexión».
Debo señalar que las declaraciones de, por ejemplo, la portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Masha Zakharova, no constituyen una fuente de derecho internacional. Las declaraciones del ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso, Lavrov, tampoco lo son. En cambio las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de la ONU sí lo son, y por lo tanto, mis apreciaciones se basan en documentos jurídicos internacionales.
Pero, claro, mi frase sobre los “escorias de Putin” también forma parte de la acusación de “difamación” en mi contra. En primer lugar, desde su punto de vista, “Putin” no puede ser difamatorio, porque, según usted, Putin es bueno. En cuanto a la segunda palabra [de la frase], sí, es mi opinión personal, y no se aplica sólo a militares rusos que siguen órdenes ilegales. Sí, hay también gente en las fuerzas armadas rusas que incumplen órdenes ilegales, pero no son los únicos que luchan allí.
Disculpeme por describir así a quienes asesinan a soldados de un país vecino por dinero. Es mi opinión personal, basada en [sus] acciones.
Resumiré esta parte de mi declaración. La Constitución Federal Rusa contiene el Artículo 29, [que garantiza] el derecho a la libertad de expresión, incluyendo el derecho a recopilar y difundir información. Esto es lo que he estado haciendo. Es decir, no he salido ni un milímetro del Artículo 29 de la Constitución. Sin embargo y al mismo tiempo, ciertamente he violado estos dos artículos vigentes del Código Penal.
¿Cómo es esto posible? Puede que sea porque los artículos por los que se me acusa son inconstitucionales. Si Rusia tuviera un Tribunal Constitucional real, estos artículos habrían dejado de existir hace mucho tiempo.
No puedo dejar de mencionar mi informe al fiscal Zhuk, que no formaba parte de los cargos en mi contra, pero aún así escuchamos a testigos que lo mencionaron ayer . No contiene el texto de [mi] declaración final [del primer juicio]. No hay mención de terrorismo ni ningún acto violento. Tampoco mencioné a las fuerzas armadas.
El caso es que este segundo proceso es el resultado de mi declaración ante la comisión del fiscal. Porque el expediente contiene dos resoluciones del investigador del FSB, el teniente coronel Serguéi Vyacheslavovich Yerofeev, para desestimar el caso; es decir, del investigador de mi [primer] caso, con quien tengo una excelente relación y que comprende perfectamente lo que he estado haciendo y lo que he intentado lograr. Él intentó desestimar este caso dos veces.
En la parte final de mi declaración, me referiré a la adecuada descripción de mis acciones. Estoy involucrado del lado ucraniano en la guerra. Simplemente que esta participación se lleva a cabo sin armas, porque una guerra es un evento extraordinariamente multidimensional. Además de los combates en las estepas del Donbás, en el Mar Negro y en los cielos de Ucrania, se libran ferozmente en el espacio informativo por entidades estatales y organismos rusos. Del lado ucraniano, por ejemplo, también participan entidades interesantes.
Soy un guerrero de la información. ¿En qué sentido? El 9 de octubre del 2022, escribí y envié un correo electrónico al presidente ucraniano, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky, pidiéndole que me concediera la ciudadanía ucraniana. Tengo derecho a ella por mi ascendencia. Todos mis abuelos eran ucranianos. La ley ucraniana dice que tengo derecho a la ciudadanía [ucraniana].
Pude incluir una captura de pantalla de Kasparov.ru en el expediente para hacer que la examinaran en el tribunal. ¿Qué confirma esto? Que, además de publicar mi alegato final en el juicio, Kasparov.ru me ha publicado regularmente. ¿Qué confirma esto? Que lo que se me está juzgando ahora es, de hecho, solo un ejemplo de mi trabajo, que no he cesado.
También debo mencionar, por supuesto, a Novaya Gazeta, cuyo sitio web también publicó mis cartas. Y mi último logro en este sentido es que me han declarado oficialmente preso político, porque es así como me he denominado en el centro de detención preventiva y así firmo mis peticiones ante este honorable tribunal. Pero, por así decirlo, fue una especie de autodenominación.
El 14 de abril de este año, el Consejo de Presos Políticos del Centro Internacional de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos Memorial publicó una decisión[que me declara como preso político]. Como parte de mi trabajo, he tomado los casos penales [en mi contra], tanto el primero como el segundo, como oportunidades de difusión.
La guerra de la información es real. Estoy involucrado en ella y ahora intento demostrarlo. En el terreno informativo, apoyo a Ucrania y a sus fuerzas armadas. De hecho, me he unido al bando enemigo en un conflicto armado que involucra a la Federación Rusa. Esta es la esencia del delito tipificado en el artículo 275 del Código Penal Federal ruso: alta traición.
Solicito al tribunal que devuelva mi caso penal a la fiscalía, ya que las circunstancias indican que existen motivos para acusarme de un delito más grave. Que me juzguen por traición: he traicionado su demente país.
* * * * *
Dirección para correo postal:
Trofimov Andrei Nikolayevich (nacido en 1966)
141 ul. Bagzhanova, FKU SIZO-1 UFSIN po Tverskoi oblasti
Tver, Tver Oblast 127081 Federación Rusa
Puede enviar cartas al sr. Trofimov y a otros prisioneros políticos rusos via ZT, F-Pismo, y PrisonMail.online. (Este último acepta pagos con tarjetas de bancos fuera de Rusia.)
Convicted Russian anti-war activist Andrei Trofimov. Photo: Mr. Trofimov’s Vkontakte page, via Mediazona
In 2023, Andrey Trofimov, an anti-war activist from Tver, was sentenced to ten years in a maximum security penal colony on several charges [to wit, disseminating “fake news” about the Russian army, calling for “extremism,” and attempting to join the Free Russia Legion]. In his closing statement at trial, he called Vladimir Putin a “dickhead” [khuilo] and “heartily endorsed” Ukraine’s attacks on the Crimean Bridge and the Kremlin. This statement was the grounds for the second criminal case against Trofimov, this time on charges of “condoning terrorism” and “defaming the army.”
Today [6 May 2025], Judge Vadim Krasnov of the Second Western District Military Court lengthened Trofimov’s sentence to thirteen years. Prosecutor Andrei Lopata had petitioned the judge to impose a longer sentence of fifteen years.
Before the verdict in his first trial was read out, Trofimov had petitioned the court to impose the maximum penalty. Now he has suggested that he be charged with the more serious offense of high treason, claiming that he has been involved in the information war on the Ukrainian side.
Below, Mediazona has published a slightly abridged version of Trofimov’s statement during oral arguments at the [second] trial.
* * * * *
Your honor, the factual circumstances of my actions, which the investigation has categorized as crimes, are correctly stated in the indictment and have been fully investigated during the court hearing.
In my statement I would like to dwell on the reasons for these actions, on my goals, to review in detail, charge by charge, my response to the allegations—that is, to explain my motives for not pleading guilty. And, in my conclusion, I would like to petition the court as to what to do with me next.
I was living quietly at the dacha with my cats and was a bother to no one. My life changed drastically on 24 February 2022. The reason for both the first criminal case and the current criminal case [against me] was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I will further explain why I regarded this event in this way.
I am in prison for what I have said, after all. I took no action in either the first case or the second. But this has been my way of being involved in the events, because it was physically impossible for me to leave the country, and I had no desire to stay silent in this situation. I mean, it is my life.
Why have I done this? I must respond to your remarks yesterday to the effect that my statements, including in court, could harm my own interests. Your honor, I have no interest in a shorter sentence. I am already imprisoned.
What is the purpose of what I am doing? Writ large, it is a matter of self-preservation. It is just that I understand the instinct of self-preservation not as the preservation of the body per se, of its physical health, because I am not my body alone. I want to preserve my conscience in this difficult situation, my ability to tell black from white, and lies from truth, and, quite importantly, my ability to say out loud what I believe to be true.
This thing of mine did not start in 2022. I have always tried to live this way. It is just that my desire to preserve this ability in such situations—meaning, the ability to tell the truth, to maintain my conscience— is what causes such actions.
What actions have we observed? We have witnessed concrete evidence of crimes with which I have not been charged, evidence of the violation of Article 278 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code—that is, the forcible seizure or the forcible retention of power. I am referring to Vladimir Putin, who has held the highest official post in the Russian Federation for exactly a quarter of a century. During this entire time, the Constitution of the Russian Federation has contained the principle of succession of power, set out in the guise of the two-term rule [for Russian presidents]. We have witnessed a direct violation of this rule—that is, the forcible retention of power.
In what has occurred since 24 February, we see concrete evidence of a violation of Criminal Code Article 353—that is, the planning, preparation, unleashing, and waging of a war of aggression.
What have I done in this situation? Publicly, in the mode of a solo picket (just a protracteed one), I have demonstrated the Russian state’s insanity. Look, the prosecution is asking for fifteen years in total—the sentence given for murder, but even for murder, sentences are often shorter. And yet my deeds harmed no one nor caused any damage.
I am not just talking about the period covered by these criminal cases. I have never laid a finger on anyone, never stolen a penny, in my entire life. Nevertheless, [the prosecutor wants to send me down for] fifteen years. I believe that this is a demonstration of the state’s insanity. The state happily displays this quality using me as an example.
What have I done in response? I have shown fortitude. This is vital, because I hope that what I have been doing is seen by Ukrainians. Look at this: they arrested him. He was convicted and given a dozen years of maximum security. Judge the effect in terms of the second case. Did you do a good job of convincing me [of the error of my ways]? That is, have I stopped doing what I was doing? Has my voice become less audible? No, it has not.
We have witnessed the same thing on the military front. For four years running, the Russian state has been spilling blood in a neighboring country. Ukraine has not surrendered and will not surrender.
Among the things that I have not exactly been charged with, but which have been repeated in the indictments and in the evidence presented at trial is my insulting Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin by using the foul word “dickhead.” What have I done? It is called desacralization.
Because the sacredness of supreme power is one of the foundations of the Golden Horde method of governance. When I publicly, repeatedly, and daily, at the first trial, at the second trial, in the pretrial detention center, perform this trick, I am desacralizing Vladimir Putin. This is important, because this regime will end all the same, and I very much want to hasten its end. I hate this man. And what the prosecution says about the “motive of political hatred” is the sacred truth. I can confirm that.
The audience I am addressing by these actions is not in Russia, because Russian society is dead and it is useless to try and talk to it. Ukraine is my audience.
As for the charges against me, I do not plead guilty to either count of violating Criminal Code Article 205.2. At issue is one and the same text, simply posted on the internet and spoken aloud in the pretrial detention center. Because I do not consider the incidents which I chose to include in my closing statement at trial to be “terrorist acts.” I chose them on purpose.
What is at issue are the two attacks on the Crimean Bridge. The Crimean Bridge is a vital transport artery which supplies the Russian federal armed forces in Crimea. An attack on a military installation is an instance of armed hostilities. The attack was carried out by the armed forces of Ukraine.
Why was it categorized as a “terrorist attack”? I know perfectly well why. This was done in order, first, to use it in Russian propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. In other words, the Russian Federation is at war not with the armed forces of Ukraine, which are stipulated under Ukrainian law and are doing their constitutional duty, but with terrorist gangs of “Banderites” and “Ukronazis.” To support this agenda, decisions are made to launch criminal proceedings on charges of “terrorism” over instances of armed conflict.
As for the second incident I mentioned, the attack on the Kremlin on 3 May 2023, what do we know? The communique from the Investigative Committee, which the prosecutor quoted yesterday, states outright that the attack was carried out against the residence of the President of the Russian Federation, who is the commander-in-chief of the Russian federal armed forces. Moreover, the Ukrainians also hit the building of the Senate, which is in the section of the Kremlin closed to tourists and where one of Putin’s offices is actually located. Excuse me, but this was not a terrorist attack. It was a Ukrainian combat operation, and a failed one at that.
I must say loudly and out loud that I do not condone or support terrorism, and that I have never condoned terrorism, nor do I intend to condone terrorism. I have a categorically negative attitude to the ideology and practice of terrorism.
Let us move on to [the charges under] Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code. This article is brand-new: it was adopted after the start of what we call the “special operation.”
This is a pure example of persecution for telling the truth. Because a situation has arisen where it has been necessary to shut the mouths of the war’s opponents, but it is impossible to charge them with violating, say, my beloved Criminal Code Article 207.3. How can you charge a person with “disseminating fake news” if they simply voice their attitude to current events? This is how Article 280.3 and the notion of “defamation” emerged, which is quite poorly conceptualized legally.
I have been told that my phrase “Ukraine is a victim of aggression on the part of the country of Russia” defames the Russian federal armed forces. What do we have? We have the UN General Assembly’s 2014 resolution saying that Russia “annexed” Ukraine. Those are not my words. This is a General Assembly resolution: there is no veto power there [as there is on the UN Security Council], so it was passed by a decent majority [of member states]. This is the position of international law.
Similarly, we have a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution, in which the events of February 24 are labeled an “aggression.” And we have a UN General Assembly resolution on Russia’s incorporation of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson which labels these actions “annexation.”
I should note that the statements of, say, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Masha Zakharova are not a source of international law. Statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov are not a source of international law. UN General Assembly resolutions are, on the contrary, a source of international law, and so my assessments are based on international legal documents.
But my phrase about “Putin’s scumbags” is also part of the “defamation” charge against me, of course. First, from your viewpoint, “Putin’s” cannot be defamatory, because as you see it, Putin is good. As for the second word [in the phrase], yes, this is my personal opinion, and it does not apply solely to Russian servicemen who carry out unlawful orders. Yes, there are also people in the Russian armed forces who do not carry out unlawful orders, but they are not the only ones fighting there.
Excuse me for characterizing in this way people who murder the soldiers of a neighboring country for money. This is my personal judgment, and it is based on [their] actions.
I will summarize this part of my statement. The Russian federal constitution contains Article 29, [which guarantees] the right to free speech, including the right to gather and disseminate information. This is what I have actually been doing. That is, I have not overstepped Article 29 of the Constitution by a single millimeter. But at the same time I certainly have violated these two current articles of the Criminal Code.
How can this be the case? It can be the cacse because the articles under which I have been charged are unconstitutional. If Russia had a real Constitutional Court, these articles would have ceased to exist long ago.
I cannot fail to mention my report to Prosecutor Zhuk, which was not part of the charges against me, but nevertheless we heard witnesses talk about it yesterday. It does not contain the text of [my] closing statement [at the first trial]. It makes no mention of terrorism or any violent acts at all. I did not say a word about the armed forces either.
The point is that this second case is the result of my statement to the prosecutor’s commission. Because the case file contains two resolutions by FSB investigator Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vyacheslavovich Yerofeev to dismiss the case—that is, by the investigator in my [first] case, with whom I have a very good level of mutual understanding and who understands exactly what I have been doing and what I have been trying to achieve. He tried to dismiss this case twice.
In the final part of my statement, I turn to the correct characterization of my actions. I am involved in the war on the Ukrainian side. It just that this involvement takes place without weapons, because war is such an extraordinarily multidimensional event. Apart from the fighting in the steppes of Donbas, in the Black Sea, and in the skies above Ukraine, it is fiercely fought in the information space by state entities, by Russian bodies. On the Ukrainian side, for example, interesting entities are also involved.
I am an information warrior. In what sense? On 9 October 2022, I wrote and sent an email to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky asking him to grant me Ukrainian citizenship. I am entitled to it because of my ancestry. All my grandparents hailed from Ukraine. Ukrainian law says that I have the right to [Ukrainian] citizenship.
I was able to enter a screenshot from Kasparov.ru into the record and have it examined in court. What does it confirm? The fact that, apart from publishing my closing statement at trial, Kasparov.ru has published me on a regular basis. What does this confirm? That what I am being tried for now was, in fact, just an instance of my work, which I have not ceased.
I will also mention, of course, Novaya Gazeta, whose website also published my letters. And my latest achievement in this wise is that I have been officially designated a political prisoner, because that is what I call myself at the pretrial detention center, and that is how I sign my petitions to this honorable court. But it was still a kind of self-designation as it were.
On 14 April of this year, the Council on Political Prisoners of the Memorial International Human Rights Defense Center published a decision[designating me a political prisoner]. As part of my work, I have used the criminal cases [against me], the first and the second case, as publicity opportunities.
The information war is a real thing. I am involved in it, and I am trying to prove this now. Informationally, I support Ukraine and the armed forces of Ukraine. In fact, I have defected to the enemy side in an armed conflict involving the Russian Federation. This is the essence of the crime defined in Article 275 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code—high treason.
I ask the court to send my criminal case back to the prosecutor, as the factual circumstances indicate that there are grounds for charging me with a more serious crime. Try me for treason: I betrayed your deranged state.
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Address for letters:
Trofimov Andrei Nikolayevich (born 1966) 141 ul. Bagzhanova, FKU SIZO-1 UFSIN po Tverskoi oblasti Tver, Tver Oblast 127081 Russian Federation
You can send letters to Mr. Trofimov and other Russian political prisoners via ZT, F-Pismo, and PrisonMail.online. (The last of these services accepts payments made with non-Russian bank cards.)
